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Vorwort der Herausgeber 
 
In dieser Publikationsreihe werden Bachelor- und Masterarbeiten von Studierenden des Fach-
bereichs Sozialökonomie der Universität Hamburg veröffentlicht, die als exemplarisch gelten 
können und es deshalb einerseits verdient haben, einer größeren Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt zu 
werden, die andererseits damit aber auch einen Vorbildcharakter erhalten sollen. Die Arbei-
ten, die in unserer Reihe veröffentlicht werden, werden entweder von Mitgliedern des Zen-
trums für Ökonomische und Soziologische Studien (ZÖSS) vorgeschlagen oder das ZÖSS 
wird von anderen Mitgliedern des Lehrkörpers des Fachbereichs Sozialökonomie auf zumeist 
von ihnen betreute Abschlussarbeiten aufmerksam gemacht und eine entsprechende Veröf-
fentlichung angeregt. 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit von Frederik Knirsch wurde dem ZÖSS von dessen Betreuern Prof. 
Miriam Beblo und Prof. Ulrich Fritsche vorgeschlagen. Frederik Knirsch behandelt darin ein 
gleichermaßen relevantes wie anspruchsvolles Thema: Er untersucht die Interaktion von 
Institutionen und exogenen Schocks auf die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit in der Euro-
päischen Union. Begreift man die jüngste, von den US-amerikanischen Immobilienmärkten 
ausgegangene Weltfinanzkrise als einen exogenen Schock für die Volkswirtschaften der 
Europäischen Union und konstatiert, dass die Arbeitsmärkte in der EU sehr unterschiedlich 
darauf reagierte haben und die Entwicklung der Arbeitslosigkeit innerhalb der EU sehr 
unterschiedlich verlief, dann wird die Relevanz des Themas schnell ersichtlich. Anspruchsvoll 
ist das Thema deshalb, weil es eine ganze Reihe von  Arbeiten und Ansätzen gibt, die zur 
Bearbeitung dieser Fragestellung herangezogen und verarbeitet werden müssen. Miriam 
Beblo und Ulrich Fritsche als Gutachter der Abschlussarbeit bescheinigen dem Autor, dies in 
hervorragender Weise getan zu haben. Nach ihrer Einschätzung hat es die Arbeit deshalb 
verdient, einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit vorgestellt zu werden – ich denke, dieses Urteil wer-
den die geneigten Leser vollkommen teilen. Die Arbeit argumentiert sehr sauber, abgewogen 
und ist auch sprachlich ansprechend – insgesamt also eine überdurchschnittliche Arbeit, die 
wir gerne in dieser Hinsicht als ‚exemplarisch‘ vorstellen. 
 
Allerdings hat die Einreichung und folgliche Begutachtung der Arbeit auch aufgezeigt, dass 
wir im ZÖSS bislang keine klare Definition davon hatten, wann eine Masterarbeit als 
‚exemplarisch‘ gelten darf. Wir haben uns nun darauf verständigt, dass aus Sicht des ZÖSS 
neben der grundsätzlichen, überdurchschnittlichen Qualität der Arbeit auch die Kriterien der 
Interdisziplinarität und/oder der pluralen Herangehensweise (also Betrachtung einer Frage-
stellung aus mehreren paradigmatischen Perspektiven) erfüllt sein sollten. Das Qualitätskri-
terium erfüllt die Masterarbeit allemal, aber sie ist weder explizit interdisziplinär angelegt, 
noch wirklich pluralistisch. Es wird vielmehr auf jene Literatur abgestellt, die die traditio-
nellen theoretischen Grundlagen verwendet, alternative postkeynesianische (Marktkonstella-
tions- oder Regimeansatz; vgl. Fritsche et al. 2004; Heine at al. 2006; Heise 2008; Heise 
2011; Herr/Kazandziska 2011) oder regulationstheoretische Ansätze (vgl. z.B. Amable 2003; 
Atzmüller et al. 2013; Deumelandt 2010; Becker 2009) werden hingegen nicht erwähnt. 
Gerade bei der Erklärung der Arbeitslosigkeit erscheint uns dies aber (zumindest für eine 
  
exemplarische Masterarbeit des ZÖSS) sinnvoll – zumal diese Ansätze von Mitgliedern des 
Fachbereichs vertreten werden und selbst einer der Gutachter (Ulrich Fritsche) auf diesem 
Gebiet gearbeitet hat (aber nicht in der Literaturliste erwähnt  wird). Diese Leerstelle kann 
man angesichts der Marginalisierung alternativer Ansätze in der heutigen Wirtschaftswissen-
schaft sicher nicht dem Autoren anlasten, allenfalls hätten die Betreuer entsprechende Litera-
turhinweise geben können – was wir uns sehr wünschen würden, denn das Studium an einem 
sozialökonomischen Fachbereich sollte doch wohl so verstanden werden, dass hier auch 
Ansätze, Theorien und Paradigmen vorgestellt werden, die ansonsten an traditionellen wirt-
schaftswissenschaftlichen oder volkswirtschaftlichen Fachbereichen heute kaum noch zur 
Kenntnis genommen werden.  
 
Aufgrund der Qualität der Arbeit haben wir uns entschlossen, dass sie eine Veröffentlichung 
verdient hat, auch wenn sie im Umgang mit alternativen theoretischen Zugängen und dem 
Anspruch der Pluralität nicht uneingeschränkt als ‚exemplarisch‘ gelten kann. 
 
Arne Heise 
(Co-Direktor des ZÖSS) 
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1 Introduction 
The Financial Crisis 2007 and the following Great Recession of 2008/2009 still challenge 
the dominating economic theories and political recommendations. Even if the financial 
markets have been identified as the root of the crisis, the labour markets - particular within 
the member states of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) - have been hit by the global recession to a large extend. With regard to the recent 
developments of labour markets, the consequences of the crisis were obvious. Since 2007, 
the average unemployment rate in the OECD rose from around 5% up to around 8% in 
2013.1 Consequently, the Great Recession of 2008/2009 and the ongoing crisis affected not 
only the financial markets but particularly the labour markets and challenged the existing 
political recommendations and economic policies. In that context, a central issue is 
whether the increase of unemployment is cyclical or structural. In order to answer this 
question and to apply the “right” design or institutional framework on OECD labour 
markets, the economic research is characterized by permanent and mutual interactions 
between theoretical arguments and models, empirical developments and findings as well as 
political recommendations and interventions. Thereby, the economic research has always 
been influenced by a comparison between the developments in the United States and the 
Anglo-Saxon liberal labour markets on the one hand and the European countries on the 
other hand. But even in that comparison, the argumentation and preferences for the right 
way have changed with in the historical developments (cp. Blanchard 2006; Boeri & Van 
Ours 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, there has been a broad consensus about the political recommendations 
concerning the design of labour market policies postulated by influential researchers 
around the OECD, the European Commission (EC) or the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). This consensus consists of a couple of theoretical assumptions about the effects and 
interactions of labour market institutions which are based on the empirical findings of the 
1970s and 1980s. The results were a couple of policy reports such as the wide-spread 
OECD Jobs Study from 1994 (cp. OECD 1994a. OECD 1994b). The dominant 
argumentation within the OECD report followed the postulation that OECD unemployment 
has been “natural” or stemmed from structural inefficiencies. Consequently, OECD labour 
markets have to be enhanced by liberal employment- and market-friendly institutions and 
structural reforms (cp. OECD 1994a: chap. 3). Despite the economic research of the last 
decades these political strategies and recommendations are still wide spread. But in the 
light of recent economic research on OECD labour markets, the argumentation is not that 
simple. In order to explain the evolution of unemployment in the OECD, economic 
research has run into theoretical and empirical problems (cp. Blanchard & Wolfers 2000: 
p. 2).  
                                                 
1
 Please note that all numbers, graphs and tables in the following text refer to a sample of 20 OECD member 
states, namely Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the 
United States. For a detailed description cp. Annex I. 
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“Explanations (of high unemployment) based solely on institutions also run however 
into a major empirical problem: many of these institutions were already present when 
unemployment was low […]. Thus, while labour market institutions can potentially 
explain cross country differences today, they do not appear able to explain the general 
evolution of unemployment over time.”(Blanchard & Wolfers 2000: p. 2) 
The question behind that theoretical and empirical problem is related to the old debate 
about cyclical and structural unemployment supplemented by a huge increase of new 
theoretical achievements, empirical data and methodological approaches. In order to 
analyse the different factors which determine (equilibrium) unemployment, extensive 
research focused on the effects and the interactions of institutions and macroeconomic 
shocks (cp. inter alia Scarpetta 1996; Nickell 1997; Blanchard & Wolfers 2000; Belot & 
Van Ours 2001; Nickell et al. 2005; Bassanini & Duval 2006). On the one hand, such 
studies focused on the macroeconomic effects on unemployment explaining unemploy-
ment over time and on the other hand, aimed on the effects of labour market institutions 
explaining the differences of unemployment over the countries. The result of these studies 
has been a sophisticated understanding of institutional interactions which seems to allow 
for broad political recommendations. With regard to those empirical findings, economic 
devices have focused more and more on comprehensive policies and institutional com-
plementarities which challenge the former simple demand of liberal and flexible structural 
reforms (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 40f; Glyn et al. 2006; Baccaro & Rei 2007; 
Howell et al. 2007).  
 
The present work reassesses the existing theoretic explanations of unemployment as well 
as the latest empirical studies. Therefore, the research design follows the methodological 
approach of existing studies which apply the econometric methods of a comparative panel 
data analysis of institutions and institutional interactions namely the works of Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000), Nickel et al. (2005) and Bassanini and Duval (2006, 2009). The 
present work contributing to the existing literature on several grounds, by i) the use of up-
to-date data, which capture developments from 1970 to 20122 ii) by checking the robust-
ness of existing empirical findings with the current data and iii) by switching the focus of 
analysis to the interaction of coordination or corporatism and increasing global com-
petition. The research question can be summarized as follows: To which extend can OECD 
unemployment be explained by institutions, institutional interactions and interactions 
between institutions and macroeconomic shocks?  
 
Therefore, the empirical analysis is divided into three parts in order to answer the research 
question and to test the following working hypotheses. In the first part, actual 
unemployment is explained by labour market institutions and institutional change. 
                                                 
2
 For a comparison of the data with the data used by Nickel and Nunziata (2001) and Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) see as well Chapter 4.2 and Annex III. 
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Therefore, the first working hypothesis H1 states that labour market institutions3 have 
significant direct effects on actual unemployment. In the second part, the differences and 
developments of actual unemployment are explained by labour market institutions and 
institutional interactions. Therefore, the second working hypothesis H2 states that labour 
market institutions have significant interaction effects on actual unemployment. In a final 
third part, the differences and developments of actual unemployment are explained by 
labour market institutions which interact with macroeconomic shocks. Thus, the third 
hypothesis H3 is that labour market institutions have significant effects on actual 
unemployment if they interact with macroeconomic shocks. 
 
Consequently, the present work is structured as follows. The historical developments and 
the evolution of unemployment in the OECD are presented in Chapter 2. Starting with a 
particular focus on the interaction between theoretical achievements, empirical findings 
and political developments of the last decades (Chapter 2.1), followed by a discussion of 
other relevant characteristics such as unemployment duration or specific groups of the 
labour force in more detail (Chapter 2.2) and concluding with the impact of the recent 
Financial Crisis 2007 and the ongoing Great Recession of 2008/2009 (Chapter 2.3). 
 
The theoretical background is presented in Chapter 3 which can be described as a loose 
analytic framework that reflects the explanations of the last decades. In the beginning of 
the 1970s, labour market research focused on the relation between inflation and 
employment and the concept of the so-called natural rate of unemployment (Chapter 03.1). 
Thus, explanations of unemployment were influenced by adverse macroeconomic shocks 
which interact with rigid wage-setting systems (Chapter 3.2) and, since unemployment 
remains high in the 1980s, the focus shifts to mechanisms of persistence (Chapter 3.3). 
Later in the 1990s, labour market theories were dominated by explanations focusing on 
labour market institutions and the search and matching process of job (re-)allocation 
(Chapter 3.4). The pre-crisis theories combine the entire experience from over 30 years of 
research into a loose but straightforward framework including interactions between 
institutions and adverse shocks into the explanation of unemployment (Chapter 3.5). In the 
end, the Financial Crisis 2007 revealed the limits of the existing framework and left behind 
open questions for labour market theories (Chapter 3.6). 
 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 starts with a description of the methodology and the 
research design and an explanation of the working hypotheses that are tested (Chapter 4.1). 
Then, the used data is analysed and discussed (Chapter 4.2). Due to the claim to use new 
data, the discussion of the data focuses on changes and time trends of relevant indicators, 
similarities and differences related to the data of former empirical studies and general 
problems concerning panel data on labour market institutions. Then, the three explanation 
                                                 
3
 In the following work, labour market institutions are primarily referred to the following common set of 
institutions: the union density rate, the coverage of collective agreements, the coordination and the level of 
collective bargaining, government interventions, the degree of corporatism, unemployment benefits, 
employment protection legislation, product market regulation, labour taxes, active labour market policies and 
the degree of globalization (unless otherwise stated). For a detailed description of the single indicators cp. 
Annex I. 
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approaches follow each including a description of the model specification and the main 
results of estimation (Chapter 4.3; Chapter 4.4; Chapter 4.5). Finally, the central empirical 
findings will be discussed in the light of former empirical studies and existing assumptions 
about the effects of institutions and interactions (Chapter 4.6). 
 
Finally, Chapter 5 provides a resume of the work including the main implications for the 
theoretical framework as well as for the empirical analysis of OECD labour markets. 
Therefore, the particular relevance and challenges in the context of the Financial Crisis 
2007 and the following crisis of the Eurozone (European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)) are in the focus of the discussion. 
 
2 Unemployment in the OECD 
“[L]abour market rigidities cannot explain why European unemployment is so 
much higher than US unemployment because the institutions generating these 
rigidities were much the same in the 1960s as they are today and in the 1960s, 
unemployment was much higher in the US than in Europe.”(Nickell et al. 
2005: p. 1) 
2.1 A short history of unemployment 
In the early 1960s, the global economy has recovered from World War II. The so-called 
Golden Age of capitalism was accompanied by high and steady growth rates and most 
OECD countries achieved a broad growth of employment, productivity and wages. The 
explanations for the steady and sustain growth rates ranged from high productivity growth 
rates, fiscal stimulus of the Keynesian economic policies and government spending or have 
been seen as the result of the deregulation and liberalization of the global trade system in 
the course of the implementation of the Bretton Wood system (cp. Skidelsky 2010: chap. 
5). Particular the Continental European countries such as France, Germany, the BeNeLux-
states, Italy and Spain have been characterized by high growth rates combined with 
unemployment rates around 2 %. In the same time, the Anglo-Saxon and liberal market 
economies such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, suffered 
from higher unemployment rates around 5 %. Figure 1 shows the developments of unem-
ployment in the OECD from 1960 to 2012: 
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Figure 1: Regional comparison of unemployment in the OECD, 1960-2012 
Source: OECD Statistical Database  
 
Thus, in the 1960s, researchers and politicians from the United States have focused on the 
characteristics of European labour markets due to the stable unemployment rates much 
lower than in the United States. European labour markets have been seen as a kind of 
reference which should be achieved by political reforms (cp. Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 
1ff). This view has changed in the course of the history of OECD unemployment. 
 
Since the Oil Crisis 1973 (first vertical reference line), unemployment has risen in the most 
countries of the OECD. The extensive increase of the oil prices in the course of the oil 
embargo proclaimed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
can be seen as the initial impulse of the rising unemployment. The rise of stagflation4 in 
some OECD economies such as the United Kingdom and the United States challenged the 
dominated post-war Keynesian macroeconomic explanations and led to a change in 
economic thinking as well as political decisions. The assumptions originated from John M. 
Keynes General Theory, about a stable and negative relationship between inflation and 
unemployment, the so-called Phillips curve, has been challenged by those developments. 
Thus, the shifts of the Phillips curve changed economic thinking towards a Monetarist 
view where rational expectations determine the relation between unemployment and 
inflation in the long-run. In the late-1970s, the labour market in the United States 
recovered in the from around 8% to 5 % whereas the European labour markets suffered 
from a steady growth of unemployment from around 2 % in 1970 to 6 % in 1979. The 
developments repeated as oil prices exploded again in the course of the second Oil Crisis 
                                                 
4
 Stagflation describes the presence of stagnation and inflation at the same time, which means, that economic 
growth slows down while the inflation rate is high and the unemployment rate remains steady at a high level. 
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in 1979 (second vertical reference line). And again, some countries were hit by the initial 
shock more than other countries. The effect of the second oil price shock lasted much 
longer in the European labour markets where unemployment rose up to 10 % in 1985. In 
the United States the initial claim of unemployment up to 10 % recovered and fell down to 
around 5 % in the late-1980s. Thus, European unemployment rose above the level of the 
United States. After a short period of decline, unemployment rose again in the beginning of 
the 1990s – the interest rate hike (third vertical reference line) – and the gap between the 
United States and Europe increased. 
 
The so-called Great Moderation from 1985 to 2007 describes the stable pre-crisis econo-
mic growth without strong turbulences which led to the belief in the right assessment of 
economic policies. Since that time, there has been a great consensus about the effects and 
the functions of the economic policies in particular about the role of monetary policies. 
Figure 2: shows the macroeconomic developments in the OECD from 1960 to 2012: 
 
 
Figure 2: Macroeconomic developments in the OECD, 1960-2012 
Source: OECD Statistical Database 
 
Thereby, the macroeconomic models have seen monetary policy as the best (and unique) 
instrument for the long-run stabilization of the economic developments (cp. inter alia 
Clarida et al. 1998: p. 1048ff; Abel & Bernanke 2001: p. 544ff; Carlin & Soskice 2010: pp. 
13–35). According to the empirical findings of Taylor (1993) or Woodford (2001), econo-
mic (or monetary) policies have to be orientated by inflation targeting (cp. Taylor 1993: p. 
195ff; Woodford 2001: p. 232). Therefore, the control of the short-term interest rates 
should ensure stable prices by focusing on economic trend-indicators such as the potential 
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output and the output gap, the potential employment and the NAIRU and the inflation gap. 
The central conclusions were i) the focus on inflation targeting and price stability ii) the 
short-term interest rates as the prime instrument iii) the limitations of fiscal policies and iv) 
the strict separation of monetary policy and the regulation of the financial markets (cp. 
Blanchard et al. 2010: p. 3ff).  
 
In the 1990s, the unemployment rates remained high in most of Continental European 
countries such as France, Spain, Italy and Germany.5 Other countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands showed a decrease of unemploy-
ment. In countries such as Austria, Norway or Portugal, the unemployment rate was still 
relative low. Those developments described a steady and, to some extent, an increasing 
dispersion of unemployment in the OECD. At the same time, the developments of unem-
ployment in the last decades, that declined from around 9 % in the early 1990s to 5 % in 
2005, are often believed to reflect structural unemployment because of the low and stable 
wage and price inflation (cp. inter alia Arpaia & Mourre 2005: p. 4; with reference to 
Garibaldi & Mauro 2002; Blanchard 2006: p. 9). Accordingly, the focus of economic 
research on labour markets and unemployment shifted towards labour market institutions 
as an useful explanation of cross-country differences (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 25). Domi-
nant economic researchers demanded for political reforms under the credo of flexibility 
and decentralization which resulted in a couple of reports such as the influential OECD 
Jobs Study 1994. 
 
Consequently, the Monetary Revolution was accompanied by a liberal course and the so-
called third way has been spread over many OECD member states. According to Giddens 
(1998), this transition has been characterized by specific simultaneous developments. This 
includes, inter alia, an autonomous and responsible civil society, market fundamentalism 
(especially with regard to the labour market), growing social and economic inequalities (in 
combination with an increasing concentration of property and assets), the contrast between 
increasing demands for economic liberties and (authoritarian) security policies, the percep-
tion of a linear development through liberalization and free markets (modernization 
theory), the privatization of public goods and the unlimited belief in economic growth (cp. 
Giddens 1998: p. 18f). Since the 1990s, in regard of the so-called globalization, this trans-
formation has become a self-enhancing dynamic process which has been declared to be 
unavoidable. Therefore, the decline of the unions (cp. Chapter 4.2) has to be considered 
primarily as the result of conscious political decisions based on the dominating economic 
paradigm (cp. the argumentation of Polanyi 2001: p. 41ff). The necessary adjustments to 
extern conditions such as the increasing global product market competitions have sup-
ported the acceptance of the third way and served as an explanation of the current situation 
(cp. Driffill 2006: p. 12). But this consensus of economic thinking has failed to prevent the 
global economy to fall in a great recession again in 2008. 
 
                                                 
5
 Whereas the unemployment rate in Germany depended to a large extend on the high rates in Eastern 
Germany after the reunification in 1990. 
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But nevertheless, in the beginning of the 21th century, the OECD economies were hit again 
by the so-called dot-com crisis in 2001 (fourth vertical reference line). And again, unem-
ployment rose at both sides of the Atlantic, whereas the United States were hit stronger 
than the European economies and the divergence slightly decreased. 
 
The Financial Crisis 2007 (fifth vertical reference line) and the following Great Recession 
2008/2009 affected OECD labour markets to a large extend. Almost all countries were hit 
by the collapse of the financial sector and the decline of real GDP growth. The average of 
real GDP growth suddenly fell from around 4 % in 2007 down to a recession of around 4% 
in 2009. The result was a reduction of aggregated consumption in most countries and a 
decreasing global aggregated demand. The consequences for the growth-driven OECD 
economies were heavy regardless of whether the economy was sustained on a credit-based 
consumption growth model such as the liberal economies (e.g. the United States or the 
United Kingdom) or an export-orientated growth model such as more coordinated eco-
nomies (e.g. Germany or Japan) (cp. inter alia Krueger & Perri 2006: p. 187; Horn et al. 
2009: p. 1). With regard to the comparison of Europe and the United States, the Financial 
Crisis 2007 brought the economic thinking back to the ideas of 1960s. Just like US-
American researchers and politicians in the 1960s, European labour market institutions are 
considered as the job miracle which prevents the economy to suffer from adverse shocks 
and high unemployment growth rates. Thus, Paul Krugman emphasizes, like his colleagues 
50 years ago, the specific combination of rigid labour market institutions such as strict em-
ployment protection with flexible instruments such as the “short-time work scheme” which 
allowed “Germany got through the recession with remarkably few job losses.” (Krugman 
2009)6 
 
2.2 Characteristics of unemployment 
In order to get a better understanding of the unemployment patterns in the OECD, it seems 
necessary to take a closer look to the characteristics of unemployment and labour market 
performance. The general unemployment rate is solely one indicator beside a couple of 
additional indicators which describe labour market performance. Thus, different measure-
ments indicate different aspects of labour market performance including efficiency aspects 
(e.g. labour productivity or unit labour costs), justice and distributional aspects (e.g. the so-
called GINI-coefficient) or extended concepts of labour market well-being (cp. Layard 
2009: p. 145ff). Even if alternative measurements and concepts such as the employment 
rate or the participation rate provide useful additional information, the following analysis 
focused on the actual unemployment rate in order to understand and explain the unem-
ployment developments in the OECD (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 13). Nevertheless, it has to 
be mentioned here that particular alternative indicators such as the participation rate or the 
GINI-coefficient are affected by the Financial Crisis 2007 and the following Great 
Recession of 2008/2009. 
                                                 
6
 Surely, he has in mind the worse situation of the United States where the economy suffered from a long 
trend of decreasing productivity in manufacturing, industrial decline and rising long-term unemployment. 
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The initial rise of unemployment in the early 1970s was accompanied by an increasing 
dispersion across the industrialized market economies. As Blanchard (2006) pointed out 
“[w]hile this heterogeneity has always been present, it is more marked today, to the point 
where talking about ‘European unemployment’ is indeed misleading.” (Blanchard 2006: p. 
10) This heterogeneity seems to have originated in different responses to macroeconomic 
conditions and adverse shocks. Even if these differences are visible and measurable to 
some extend only a few aspects of the heterogeneity can be captured by the existing 
empirical indicators (cp. Blanchard & Wolfers 2000: p. 25; Blanchard 2006: pp. 9–11). In 
order to understand the heterogeneity, the hidden characteristics beside the overall unem-
ployment rate play a major role. Thus, the particular differences can be expressed by the 
differences referring to the distribution of unemployment among different groups of wor-
kers or the duration of unemployment. In order to illustrate such differences, Figure 3 
shows the unemployment rate including the 25 and 75 percentile (reflecting the inter-
quartile range) (left scale) and the variance7 (right scale) from 1960 to 2012: 
 
 
Figure 3: Dispersion of unemployment in the OECD, 1960-2012 
Source: OECD Statistical Database and own calculations 
 
These measurements can give a first but straightforward picture of unemployment 
dispersion in the OECD since 1960. The increase in dispersion in the 1980s as well as in 
the 1990s and 2007 is based to a large extend on the high fluctuations of unemployment in 
the so-called “PIIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and particular Spain). Thus, the 
increase of dispersion (in terms of the variance) is much lower without the five countries. 
                                                 
7
 The variance measures the deviation of the single values from the mean and therefore indicates the 
distribution of unemployment rates over the time. 
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But, as mentioned before, this picture cannot capture further aspects of labour market 
performance such as the duration of unemployment or the distribution of unemployment 
over specific groups of the labour force. 
 
The relevance of the duration of unemployment on the theoretical explanations is high. 
Thus, long-term unemployment (which is defined as an unemployment duration longer 
than one year) seems to reflect the dynamics of the labour market and the efficiency of the 
search and matching process (referring to the works of Diamond 1982; Pissarides 1985; 
Mortensen & Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000). This aspect indicates, whether the origin 
of high unemployment has come from high flows in and out of unemployment or from 
long durations of unemployment. Figure 4 shows a regional comparison of the develop-
ments of the long-term unemployment rate from 1980 to 2012: 
 
 
Figure 4: Regional comparison of long-term unemployment in the OECD, 1980-2012 
Source: OECD Statistical Database, description see Annex I. 
When comparing long-term unemployment across the OECD, great differences emerge 
between the liberal and flexible Anglo-Saxon labour markets (e.g. Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand or the United States) where the average long-term unemployment rate is under 
10% and the European labour markets (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain or 
Portugal) where the average long-term unemployment rate is above 20% with peaks above 
60% (cp. Table 9). Obviously, the regional differences are significant but the differences 
seem to converge slightly in the last decades (for a detailed comparison please sees as well 
Table 9). Blanchard and Portugal (2001) has given a fruitful analysis of such hidden 
characteristics with regard to the duration of unemployment in the United States and 
Portugal. Accordingly, even if the general unemployment rate has been very similar, the 
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underlying structure (in terms of unemployment duration) differs due to different 
institutional conditions (cp. Blanchard & Portugal 2001: p. 187). Furthermore, long-term 
unemployment seems to affect labour market performances itself through several 
mechanisms such as the negative effects on human capital. Following the argumentation of 
Phelps (1972), Nickell and Layard (1987) postulated a negative effect of long-term 
unemployment on human capital and the skill levels of workers. A separation of the labour 
market into skilled short-term unemployed workers on the one hand and unskilled long-
term unemployed on the other hand has been the consequence (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 24 
referring to; Layard & Nickell 1987). This aspect is directly related to the distribution of 
unemployment among groups of unemployed persons. Thus, there are great differences 
between men and women, young and old-age persons and skilled or unskilled workers. 
Especially the differences between skilled and unskilled unemployment as well as between 
youth and old-age unemployment are interesting. Such dispersions can be explained, inter 
alia, by different reactions on adverse shocks due to labour market institutions and 
conditions (cp. for deeper analysis Bertola et al. 2007). A regional comparison of youth 
unemployment in the OECD shows that relative high levels were found in the European 
labour markets compared to other non-European countries such as the United States or 
Canada (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 12). But the relevant aspect here is the comparison 
between youth, old-age unemployment and average unemployment (cp. Figure 5). 
Blanchflower and Freemann (2000) pointed out that unemployment becomes more and 
more a problem of the youth which can be seen in the high correlation between youth 
unemployment and overall unemployment (cp. Blanchflower & Freeman 2000: p. 19f). 
According to the argumentation of Bertola et al. (2007), cross-country differences in youth 
or old-age unemployment originate in the different labour market institutions which affect 
the elasticity of specific groups of the labour supply (cp. Bertola et al. 2007: p. 835f).  
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Figure 5 illustrates the significant difference between youth, old-age and average 
unemployment rates: 
 
Figure 5: Youth and old-age unemployment, 1960-2012 
Source: OECD Statistical Database 
Different levels of skilled and unskilled unemployment can be explained by a similar 
argumentation targeting on the demand and supply of skilled and unskilled workers which 
differ in various aspects. One aspect is the different elasticity of labour demand referring to 
structural changes. Hence technology progress influences particular groups of the labour 
market, the labour demand of unskilled workers can decline in the same time when the 
labour demand for skilled workers increases (cp. Blanchard & Katz 1997: p. 58). This 
aspect supports the formation of a dual labour market where young and old-age unskilled 
workers tend to become unemployed and persist in that status for a long time. The 
structural reforms of the 1990s intensify this process due to an unbalanced flexibility of the 
labour market. These reforms are widely discussed under the postulation of a so-called 
honeymoon-effect of two-tier labour market reforms (cp. inter alia Boeri & Garibaldi 2007; 
Ochel 2008). In short, the debate follows the argumentation that the two-tier flexibility of 
the OECD labour markets (e.g. in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands or Sweden) which targets mainly on the reduction of employment protection 
of temporary contracts, has led to a transitional job creating effect. But such two-tier 
employment protection reforms have no long-run effects on labour demand and therefore, 
the positive employment effect seems to reflect only a short honeymoon. Finally, the two-
tier flexibility ends up in higher volatility in the course of cyclical developments and a fall 
of average productivity can be predicted (cp. Boeri & Garibaldi 2007: p. 1f). Thus, 
especially unskilled and young employees were affected by the deregulation whereas 
regularly employed skilled workers were often still protected against wage pressure and 
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dismissals. Nevertheless, a recent comprehensive study on the employment situation of 
young and old-age workers suggested that i) both groups are not in a competition, ii) 
labour market institutions can play a crucial role in enhancing the situation for such groups 
(particular vocational training schemes and active labour market policies are named) and 
iii) political reforms have to be implemented at the national level (instead of the EU level) 
(cp. Eichhorst et al. 2013: p. 91f). 
 
2.3 Recent developments  
In the run up to the Financial Crisis 2007, most OECD countries recorded low but stable 
GDP growth between 1% and 4% (around 5% in Ireland) and a steady decline of 
unemployment down to an average around 5,3% in 2007 (cp. Table 7 and Table 12). 
Figure 6 shows the change of the unemployment rate and the real GDP growth rate from 
2007 to 2009: 
 
 
Figure 6: Average change of unemployment and GDP growth in the OECD, 2007-2009 
Source: OECD Statistical Database and own calculations 
 
The Financial Crisis 2007 hit the OECD economies immediately by a continuous decline 
of real growth rates. Thus, OECD fell into a Great Recession in 2008/2009 but the 
developments of unemployment were very heterogonous. The effects on unemployment 
were particular strong in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, the United States, Ireland and 
Spain. The consequence was that the social costs increased due to the combination of high 
rates of long-term unemployment and the absence of adequate unemployment benefits and 
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social security systems (e.g. in the United States). On the other hand, the high degree of 
coordination and the presence of social pacts preventing further job losses (e.g. in 
Germany or Austria) (cp. OECD 2013: p. 20). As mentioned above, especially young and 
unskilled workers were hit by the crisis and, at the same time, the risk of youth and old-age 
unemployment and poverty increased due to growing inequality before and after the initial 
recession. Therefore, the crisis intensified the trend of growing inequalities in the OECD 
(cp. inter alia OECD 2008. OECD 2011) particular due to public debt pressure and 
austerity policies which are decreasing political redistribution. Even if the aspect of in-
equality and distribution of income and assets plays an import role in macroeconomic 
thinking and growth theory, this issue is neglected with regard to the focus of the present 
work.8 The central banks reacted with a expansionary monetary policy (which has been 
limited at the zero bond level) and further so-called quantitative easing to prevent of de-
flation (cp. Bernanke 2009). Subsequently, the crisis affected the labour markets in 2008 
and 2009 and unemployment rose in nearly all OECD countries with particular effects on 
different groups of the labour market. The following three aspects seem to be most 
relevant, i) the rise of long-term unemployment in the United States, ii) the particular 
effects on young and unskilled groups and iii) the increasing inequality of wages and 
property and the separation of the labour markets. With regard to the following analysis, 
the question is how such developments can be explained by specific institutional 
arrangements. In the course of the Financial Crisis 2007 and the following Great Recession 
2008/2009, the rise of unemployment (and particular long-term unemployment) challenged 
the existing explanation of unemployment and rose up again the debate about structural 
and cyclical components of unemployment, particular in the United States.  
 
3 Analytic framework 
“Forget the conventional analysis of the labor market in terms of neo-classical 
labor demand and supply: Unemployment does not make sense in that 
framework, and imperfections must be at the centre of any theory of 
unemployment. Think instead in terms of a price-setting and of a wage-setting 
relation.” (Blanchard 2007: p. 411) 
3.1 Wage-setting, price-setting and equilibrium unemployment 
In the 1960s, the economic theory was influenced by the experiences of the last decades, in 
particular the Great Depression in the 1930s. The economic thinking changed dramatically 
and, driven by John M. Keynes General Theory, economists developed a macroeconomic 
framework which took into account the relation between employment, interest rates and 
                                                 
8
 Recent OECD Studies proved the increasing inequality in the OECD (particular in Germany) (OECD 2008. 
OECD 2011). The effects of inequality and distributions on macroeconomic performance have been analyzed 
to a large extend. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical findings suggest that inequality affects growth via 
several mechanisms such as consumption and saving patterns as well as social inclusions, trust and political 
and social stability. At this point, the work of Fukuyama (2011) and Sturn and van Treeck (2010) should be 
taken into account as examples for the effects of inequality on macroeconomic performance and social 
cohesion. 
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money (cp. Skidelsky 2010: chap. 4). In the course of the so-called Keynesian Revolution, 
economics started to explain cyclical fluctuations of the economy focusing on the function 
of the state or fiscal and monetary policies. The most relevant aspect for the present work 
was the development of a macroeconomic framework which explained the interdependence 
between monetary policy, inflation and employment, expressed by the so-called Philips 
curve relation. The Philips curve describes the simple relationship between the rate of (un-) 
employment and inflation whereas a higher inflation is correlated with a lower rate of 
unemployment (cp. Samuelson & Solow 1960: p. 192f). The implication of such a trade-
off between unemployment and inflation implies the possibility to control fluctuations of 
the economy by government policy. Figure 7 shows this relation for the United States from 
1960 to 1969: 
 
 
Figure 7: The Phillips Curve in the United States, 1961-1969 
Source: Hoover (2014) 
 
But the incidence of stagflation in the 1970s led to a contrary understanding of the Philips 
curve relation. This argumentation is mainly influenced by Milton Friedman and Edmund 
Phelps who postulated a so-called natural rate of unemployment (cp. Friedman 1968: p. 
1ff; Phelps 1968: p. 678ff). 
“The “natural rate of unemployment,” […] is the level that would be ground out by 
the Walrasian system of general equilibrium equations, provided there is imbedded in 
them the actual structural characteristics of the labor and commodity markets, 
including market imperfections, stochastic variability in demands and supplies, the 
cost of gathering information about job vacancies and labor availabilities, the costs of 
mobility, and so on.” (Friedman 1968: p. 8) 
Accordingly, the Philips curve relation, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, 
holds as long as the market does not expect future inflation which seems to be true in the 
short-run. Thus the short-run Phillips curve is a sloping curve describing a negative 
relation between inflation and unemployment. Thus, increasing inflation through monetary 
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or fiscal policies leads to lower unemployment along the short-term Phillips curve. But the 
relation between inflation and unemployment changes since individuals generate either 
adaptive or rational expectations about future inflation. Figure 8 shows this so-called 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve: 
 
 
Figure 8: The expectations-augmented Phillips Curve in the United States, 1976-2002 
Source: Hoover (2014) 
 
This seems to be true for the long-run (or medium-run), when wage-setters of nominal 
wages take into account the potential price developments and adopted monetary policies in 
the course of wage bargaining. Thus, expectations determine future price- and wage-setting 
and increasing inflation ends in a so-called wage-price spiral (cp. Layard et al. 2005: pp. 
12–16). The natural rate of unemployment or the so-called non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment (NAIRU) describes a level of unemployment which corresponds with a 
stable and low inflation rate. This long-term Philips curve relation derived from expecta-
tions about inflations as well as the expected impact of unemployment on prices. Thus, the 
NAIRU can be seen as the natural, structural or equilibrium unemployment which results 
from the bargaining process about nominal wages.9 Since that time there is a broad and 
emotional discussion in economic research whether unemployment originates from fluc-
tuations and cycles of the economy or from structural inefficiency.10 But how is unemploy-
ment related to inflation? A major challenge is the combination between the macroecono-
mic framework (explaining the relation of aggregated indicators of the economy such has 
the Phillips curve) and microeconomic explanations (based on individual choices in an 
institutional framework). Thereby, thinking in terms of neo-classical labour demand and 
                                                 
9
 The concept of the natural rate of unemployment describes a long-run equilibrium level of unemployment 
which is determined by structural policies. The term natural is not convincing since the concept targets on an 
equilibrium or structural rate of unemployment. Hence, a natural unemployment rate suggests a misleading 
idea of an unavoidable unemployment level. In the following, the term equilibrium unemployment or NAIRU 
refers to this concept. 
10
 At this point, Layard et al. (2005) comment that present theory is neither Keynesian nor classical and 
consists of elements from both strands. Labeling with such terms does not help to achieve objectives. 
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supply does not make sense in order to understand this relation or explain unemployment 
(cp. Blanchard 2007: p. 411). 
 
The relation between inflation and unemployment as well as the effects of adverse shocks 
and institutions on unemployment can be described in a simple standard model which 
“combines a model of monopolistic price setting among firms with collective bargaining 
over the nominal wage level” (Nymoen & Sparrman 2013: p. 2). Such a simple wage-
setting and price-setting model (WS-PS model) is useful to show macroeconomic effects of 
institutions on unemployment and to understand the underlying microeconomic founda-
tions (cp. inter alia Layard et al. 2005: p. 12ff). In that framework, equilibrium unemploy-
ment and stable inflation depend on the relation of real wages and employment or the 
consistency between wage claims and price setting “[a]nd the variable which brings about 
this consistency is the level of unemployment” (Layard et al. 2005: p. 12f). Thus, price-
setters establish prices in relation to nominal wages which can be seen “as a mark-up on 
expected wages” (Layard et al. 2005: p. 13) represented in the following equation: 
 

 −  =  −      (β1≥0) ( 1 ) 
where p reflects log prices, we log expected wages and u the actual unemployment rate. 
This price-setting relation PS reflects the former aggregated labour demand curve Ld. PS 
depends on the warrant wage which describes the price of the factor labour in relation to 
the price of other factors of production. Thus, the warrant wage depends on the produc-
tivity of the factor labour and decreases when the prices of other factors increase. 
 
On the other hand, wage-setters set wages by bargaining about nominal wages wn in 
relation to a given price level p which can be seen “as a mark-up on expected prices” 
(Layard et al. 2005: p. 13), given in the equation: 
 
 − 
 =  −      (γ1≥0) ( 2 ) 
where wn reflects log nominal wages, pe log expected prices and u the actual 
unemployment rate. This wage-setting relation WS reflects the old labour supply curve Ls. 
WS depends on the bargained wage wb which describes the wage set by the wage-setters in 
the bargaining system and depends inter alia on the preferences of the labour force 
(reservation wages) or the collective bargaining system (e.g. the bargaining power of firms 
and trade unions or the degree of organization) and, to some extent, on the given unem-
ployment level as well. In the context of the simple WS-PS model, equilibrium unemploy-
ment or the NAIRU can be described in a equation where actual prices equals expected 
prices (p=pe) and actual wages equals expected wages (w=we): 
 ∗ =  +  +  ( 3 ) 
where equilibrium unemployment u* is determined by exogenous factors that increases u* 
through rising wage push γ0 or rising price push β0 or reduce u* through rising wage 
flexibility γ1 or rising price flexibility β1 (cp. Layard et al. 2005: p. 14). According to 
Layard et al. (2005), the NAIRU is determined solely by supply factors in the long-run 
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whereas in the short-run unemployment is influenced by aggregated demand and short-run 
aggregated supply. 
 
Figure 9: Unemployment and inflation in a WS-PS model 
Source: Layard et al. (2005): 14 
 
The following formal description can be seen as a simplification in order to explain the 
micro-foundation of the underlying principles (cp. Blanchard 2000: p. 2ff. Blanchard 2006: 
p. 17f). Following Blanchard (2000, 2006), the underlying mechanism is related to the 
relation between wages and employment based on the assumption that “[a]long a balanced 
growth path, the wage consistent with stable employment must grow at the rate of Harrod-
neutral technological progress” (cp. Blanchard & Katz 1997: p. 53ff; Blanchard 2006: p. 
13). Thus, the output of firms with constant returns to labour is a function from employ-
ment and productivity (whereas capital is exclude for simplification and labour produc-
tivity complies total factor productivity in that case and ). Such an economy can be 
described by the production function: 
  =  = ( + ) ( 4 ) 
where log output y depends on log employment L and log productivity a and the output 
elasticity of labour is expressed by .  
 
In a competitive product market, firms pay the warrant wage given by the equation: 
  =  − 
 =  ( 5 ) 
where the warrant wage is expressed by the log real wage wr (log nominal wage wn minus 
the price level p) which equals the technological or productivity level a (either total factor 
productivity or labour productivity). Moreover, a growth at the constant rate of ga. 
The short-run labour demand, assuming that capital is fixed, is given by: 
  =  =   	! "    #(. ) < 0 ( 6 ) 
Knirsch: Institutions, Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD 
 
19 
 
where aggregated short-run labour demand  can be described as the ratio of “labour in 
efficiency units” aL to capital K or as a decreasing function of “wage in efficiency units” 	!  (cp. Blanchard 2000: p. 3). The elasticity of the decreasing labour demand curve 
derived from the substitution between capital and labour and thus, the lower the elasticity 
the steeper the short-run demand curve.  In terms of price-setting PS,  is influenced by 
the adjustments of expected prices to real prices and expected wages to real wages and, in 
the presence of inflation, the relation between both delays determines the distribution 
between labour and capital (cp. Layard et al. 2005: p. 20). 
 
The long-run labour demand, can be described in the following equation: 
  = ' = ( = )  	! " 					)#(. ) < 0 ( 7 ) 
where capital is not fix, the cost of labour c equals the profit rate π and g describes the 
factor price frontier relation derived by the production function. The equation implies a 
horizontal long-term labour demand curve which is determined by the profit rate π. In 
terms of price-setting PS,  can be seen as a case of normal pricing with a constant price 
mark-up which implies that increasing wage claims affected solely unemployment whereas 
real wages stay constant (cp. Layard et al. 2005: p. 19f). 
 
On the other hand, short-run labour supply is described by the equation: 
  = *()    *#(. ) > 0 ( 8 ) 
where the short-run labour supply   is an increasing function G of the real wage wr which 
depends on the aggregated individual reservation wages. Thus, aggregated labour supply 
consists of workers (in working age, willing to work) with a reservation wage equal or 
lower than wr. 
 
The wage-setting WS in a balanced economy (where “wage in efficiency units” and unem-
ployment is constant) can be simplified expressed as (cp. Blanchard 2000: p. 4ff. 
Blanchard 2006: p. 13ff): 
 
, = 	 = -ℎ()    ℎ#(. ) ≤ 0 ( 9 ) 
where the bargained wage wb or “wage in efficiency units” 	  is described by a decreasing 
function of unemployment u. The factor z as well as the form of the function h captures all 
determinants which affect the wage-setting process. These factors include the structure of 
collective wage bargaining, the power of trade unions as well as the unemployment 
benefits, employment protection legislation and additional institutional features which are 
reflected in the following section in more detail. 
 
Two questions arise from the idea of equilibrium unemployment: i) why does actual 
unemployment differ from equilibrium in the short-run and ii) what determines the 
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equilibrium unemployment level in the long-run? The following framework was developed 
to find answers on these questions. 
 
3.2 Adverse shocks and rigidities 
In the 1970s, research was influenced by the rise of unemployment in the course of the oil 
price shocks and the following slowdown of the productivity growth and explanations 
targeting on the role of adverse shocks and collective bargaining. The main argumentation 
was that the bargained wages increase over the warrant wages in the course of unexpected 
macroeconomic shocks (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 14). This understanding based to a large 
extent on the work of Bruno and Sachs (1985), who wrote about the Economics of world-
wide stagflation and formulated a theory of movements of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment (cp. Bruno & Sachs 1985). They explained the rise of unemployment in the 1970s 
with adverse shocks such as the oil price shock in 1973 and 1979 and a significant factor 
productivity slowdown which interacts with real and nominal rigidities. 
 
Therefore, turning back to the relation between wages and productivity where the warrant 
wage wr paid by the firms depends on productivity a, assuming that an unexpected 
decrease of productivity can be captured by a-ae. On the other hand, the bargained wage is 
influenced by the expected productivity and simultaneous negative related to unemploy-
ment expressed in the equation: 
 , =  −  ( 10 ) 
where the bargained wage wb depends on the expected productivity ae and the actual 
unemployment u. The adjustments of expected to actual productivity can be described by: 
  = 0(−1) + (1 − 0) ( 11 ) 
where the speed of adjustment (1-λ) depends on the parameter λ.11 
 
Hence, unemployment as a function of the warranted and the bargained wage can be 
expressed by the following equation: 
  = − 1 ( − ) ( 12 ) 
That implies that an unexpected decline of productivity ( − ) leads to an increase of 
unemployment. Integrating the equation of expected productivity, the result describes the 
assumptions of the equilibrium rate of unemployment: 
  = 0(−1) − 0 2 ( 13 ) 
which implies that a permanent decline of productivity (captured by a negative value of ( − )) increases the equilibrium unemployment over the time depending on the two 
                                                 
11
 This parameter can be formalized in further adoption models, where the agents learn in a Bayesian setting 
(cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 17; referring to Taylor 1980; Calvo 1983)) 
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dimensions of real rigidities λ and β. The higher λ the slower the adjustments of 
expectations after a shock and the longer lasting the (negative) effects of the shock. 
Whereas β influences the strength of the effect, i.e. the lower β the stronger the effect of a 
productivity slowdown on unemployment. On the other hand, nominal rigidities can be 
captured by the equation for the bargained wage: 
 , = 
 +  −  ( 14 ) 
where the bargained wage wb is based on the expected price level pe and the expected 
productivity ae. And again, unemployment, as a function of the warranted and the 
bargained wage, can be expressed by the equation: 
  = − 1 3( − ) + (
 − 
)4 ( 15 ) 
which describes the common Philips curve relation (
 = 
 − ) expanded by the ex-
pected productivity ae. 
 
Consequently, cross-country differences after an initial adverse shock can be explained by 
the differences in real and nominal rigidities. On the one hand, real wage rigidities describe 
the adaptability of the real wage in response to a change in productivity or the warrant 
wage. That means, the slower the adjustments of the bargained real wages, the longer 
lasting the effects of a factor productivity shock. The differences of real rigidities are 
rooted in the collective bargaining systems and refer to centralization and coordination of 
wage bargaining as well as strong unions and high levels of coverage of collective agree-
ments. According to extensive research on the relation between collective bargaining 
systems and macroeconomic performance there is no clear and linear relation expected. 
 
But at this point, the model described before solely reflects real terms “with no nominal 
rigidities, and so no role for monetary policy in affecting real interest rates. […] And if 
monetary policy affects not only actual but also equilibrium unemployment, we may need 
to revisit its role.”(Blanchard 2000: p. 14f) Blanchard’s statement on the role of monetary 
policy implicitly pointed out the demand for further efforts and a deeper understanding of 
unemployment. In order to answer the question how wage-setting was adjusted to changes 
in prices and productivity, a closer look to the inner structure of the bargain process is nec-
essary. Accordingly, nominal wage rigidities describe the adaptability of the nominal 
wages in response to changes in prices. That means, the slower the anticipation of inflation 
the more the real wages decrease. The major implication is that the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in order to reduce actual unemployment depends on the extent of nominal 
wage rigidities. According to the existence of nominal rigidities, monetary policies can 
increase p-pe and hence, reduce the negative effects of an adverse productivity shock (cp. 
Blanchard 2006: p. 15ff; for more details cp. Blanchard & Gali 2005). Nominal rigidities 
are originated in the collective bargaining systems. Institutional features of the collective 
bargaining systems such as the degree of indexation are referred to the possibility and the 
speed of nominal adjustments and therefore, for the effectiveness of monetary instruments.  
Turner et al. (1993) analyzed the role of real and nominal rigidities in a comparison 
between USA, Germany and Japan and studied the different reactions of macroeconomic 
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adjustments. According to their empirical analysis, they found some empirical evidence 
referring to differences in national wage-setting institutions. Accordingly, the United States 
(as well as Germany to a smaller extent) suffer from much more disturbance after demand 
and supply shocks due to higher real and nominal rigidities in wage and price setting 
whereas in Japan, wage-setting is much more sensitive to unemployment (cp. Turner et al. 
1993: p. 113f). 
 
To conclude, two key implications can be drawn from the developed framework, i) 
demand shocks can be seen as a shift of the aggregated labour demand Ld outwards which 
raise inflation as well as employment and ii) supply-shocks can be seen as a rise of equili-
brium unemployment which increases inflation and reduce employment. In the same way, 
it can be distinguished between demand-pull inflation (shift of the aggregated demand 
curve) and cost-push inflation (shift of the aggregated supply curve). Regarding that, a 
supply shock or cost-push inflation e.g. an increase in the oil price could led to stagflation 
(cp. Abel & Bernanke 2001: p. 419f). 
 
3.3 Persistence of unemployment 
Since there has been an economic model which explains the initial rise of unemployment 
across OECD countries, there was no explanation for the persistence of unemployment in 
or the rise of equilibrium unemployment. According to the assumption that wage-setters 
develop expectations about wages and prices (or productivity and inflation), it has to be 
expected that adjustments towards equilibrium unemployment occur over time. The expla-
nation that the loose monetary policies in the 1970s have moved unemployment into the 
1980s did not consist when inflation started to decrease in the mid-1980s in the course of 
tight monetary policies. The shortcomings and limits of the existing model are obvious (cp. 
Blanchard 2000: p. 14. Blanchard 2006: p. 25). The adverse shocks in the 1970s and mone-
tary policy response pushed the average inflation in the OECD from 5% in 1970 up to 12% 
in 1980. Since the 1980s, the economic thinking around Margret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan changed in the mid-1980s and the inflation rate started to decline due to their 
monetary policies targeting on inflation. The consequence was a huge rise of unemploy-
ment which seemed to represent an increase of the actual rate over the equilibrium rate 
where inflation has been stable at a low level (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 19). But even in the 
1980s when the initial adverse shock had been past, actual unemployment remained high 
especially in the Continental European countries (and still increases in some countries such 
as Finland or Norway). Such persistence of unemployment was difficult to explain by the 
framework developed above where oil prices recovered and the productivity slowdown 
should be adjusted by the expectations of the wage setters. There have to be mechanisms of 
persistence which prevent economies from a recovery of adverse shocks. Such factors of 
persistence referring to hysteresis or the possibility that unemployment directly affects 
equilibrium unemployment (cp. Blanchard & Summers 1986: p. 1). Hence, economic re-
search started to focus on capital accumulation and the role of insiders in collective 
bargaining (the description follows Box 2 in Blanchard 2006: p. 19ff).  
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Therefore, considering a Cobb-Douglas production function including labour and capital 
with constant returns to scale (instead of constant return to labour): 
  = 56 = ( + ) + (1 − )5 ( 16 ) 
where log output y is a function of log employment L and log capital K and the Harrod-
neutral technology level a. The warrant real wage is expressed by the equation: 
  = ( − 1)( − 5 + ) +  ( 17 ) 
where the real wage wr decreases at a fixed capital stock K if employment L increase and 
the marginal product of labour decrease. According to a given real wage, the profit rate π 
of the firms can be expressed by the factor price frontier relation: 
 ( = − 1 −  ( − ) ( 18 ) 
where the profit rate π depends on the user cost of labour wr and on the user cost of capital 
r. In the long-run the profit rate π equals the user cost r and therefore determines the 
warrant wage wr: 
  =  + 1 −  7 ( 19 ) 
According to that, the capital stock K grows if π>r and declines if π<r. On the other hand, 
the bargained wage is given by: 
 , =  −  ( 20 ) 
The combination of the short-run warrant wage and the bargained wage: 
 
 + ( − 1)(8 − 5 + ) − ( − 1) = 
 +  −  ( 21 ) 
where N is the aggregated labour force. It follows that: 
  = 	− 11 −  +  3( − ) + (
 − 
) + ( − 1)(8 − 5 + )4 ( 22 ) 
where, in the short-run, the unemployment rate u depends on the difference between actual 
and expected productivity (a-ae), the actual and expected price level (p-pe) and additionally 
on the capital stock K. The implication is that unemployment is negatively related to 
capital, if capital declines, labour demand decreases and unemployment increases. 
 
According to the assumptions above, a long-lasting decrease in productivity leads to higher 
expectations than actual productivity (a<ae) and, ceteris paribus without nominal rigidities, 
to higher unemployment. This negative effect is recovered by the adjustments of ae to a. 
But additionally, capital accumulation is negatively affected by lower employment and 
lower profits which can be seen as one conclusion for the long persistence of unemploy-
ment due to a productivity shock. 
 
The second argumentation, the so-called insider-effect, stems from the assumption that the 
structure of the wage bargaining system is the source for unemployment persistence. 
Remember, firms paid the real wage given by: 
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 = ( − 1)( − 5 + ) +  = ( − 1)( − 5) +  ( 23 ) 
And, focusing on collective bargaining, capital is held constant yet. 
 
Then, assume that a monopoly union sets the nominal wage so that a member is employed 
whereas firms chose employment: 
 ,|	 = : ( 24 ) 
where the membership m influences both, the bargained wage wb and expected 
employment . Thereby, the membership is given by: 
 : = (−1) + ;(8 − (−1)) ( 25 ) 
where the parameter ϴ describes unions care about unemployment. If the employment in 
the last period equals membership (ϴ=0) unions focus only on their employed members. 
But if the union considers unemployment as well, the parameter is higher (1>ϴ>0). 
According to the considerations above, the bargained wage is given by: 
 , = 
 + ( − 1)<(−1) + ;(8 − (−1) − 5)= + 	 ( 26 ) 
Finally, unemployment u is determined by the combination of the equations for the warrant 
and the bargained wage: 
  = (1 − ;)(−1) − 11 −  3(
 − 
) + ( − )4 ( 27 ) 
The unemployment rate which is originated from unexpected price and productivity 
developments will be adjusted over time. But the persistence of unemployment is 
influenced by the wage claims of trade unions or the parameter ϴ. 
 
If trade unions only care about their members, the so-called insiders, the weight of unem-
ployment in the wage bargaining is low (low value of ϴ) and the persistence is high. The 
consequence of such insider-driven wage setting (assume that ϴ=0) is known as hysteresis. 
But the assumption of a perfect insider-driven wage-setting behaviour (ϴ=0), inter alia 
formulated by Blanchard and Summers (1986), does not correspond with theoretical and 
empirical experiences. Though unions always care about the risk for their members to be 
unemployed and thus, it could be assumed that ϴ increases with higher unemployment 
rates. That means, it can be considered that strong trade unions are a source of persistence 
rather than hysteresis (ϴ>0). Even though the argumentation about the insider-effect and 
the assumptions about hysteresis are still controversial within the scientific debate, the 
underlying principles are clear and relevant in order to understand the difference between 
OECD unemployment persistence. To conclude, adverse macroeconomic shocks affected 
deviations of actual unemployment over equilibrium unemployment as well as shifts of 
equilibrium unemployment through hysteresis-effects (cp. Blanchard & Summers 1986: p. 
73; Blanchard & Wolfers 2000: p. 17). But these effects depend on the specific structure of 
the wage-setting regime. 
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Calmfors and Driffill (1988) postulated a so-called hump-shaped relation between unem-
ployment and the degree of coordination in collective bargaining. They have verified this 
postulation theoretically and empirically for the most OECD member states (cp. for a 
revision of the hump-shape thesis Driffill 2006). Calmfors’ and Driffill’s arguments have 
been based on Mancur Olsons (1982) assumptions about the private interests and objec-
tives of organizations (and trade unions) within a market economy. Therefore, organiza-
tions cause lower social costs or produce greater economic benefits if the organization is 
both i) very small and decentralized and therefore not able to enforce particular interests or 
ii) centralized and powerful enough to anticipate the social costs and benefits within the 
private calculations (cp. Calmfors et al. 1988: p. 15f; Driffill 2006: p. 3; referring to Olson 
1982). Calmfors and Driffill have pointed out simple theoretical assumptions and they 
have constructed a straightforward theoretical model consisting of a closed static economy 
where, inter alia, all workers are union members, the capital stock is fixed, goods are pro-
duced for the final use and the structure of collective bargaining appears as an exogenous 
variable. In the simplest monopoly-union model, the outcome or wages are modelled as 
Nash equilibrium among the wage-setting units. Within these restrictions, the relationship 
between centralization and real wages and employment appears as a non-monotonic or 
hump-shaped curve affected by the interaction of rising wages and rising prices (cp. 
Driffill 2006: p. 3ff). 
 
3.4 Search frictions and the matching-process 
In the 1990s, the focus of economic labour market research moved from the mechanism of 
persistence described above to a deeper analysis of labour market institutions and their 
effects on unemployment. In that period, the average unemployment rate of the OECD 
sample was still very high from around 6-9% in the early 1990s and around 5% at the end 
of the century. But this picture hides the real situation, the increasing heterogeneity of 
labour market performance across the OECD member states. 
 
Thus, there was a large group of countries particularly the Continental European econo-
mies such as France, Spain, Italy and Germany, where unemployment remained at a high 
level. Within another couple of countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland or the 
Netherlands, unemployment declined to rates under 5%. Finally, some countries stayed at 
low levels of unemployment such as the United States, Austria, Norway and even Portugal. 
Whereas the temporary increase of unemployment in Sweden, Denmark and Finland could 
be explained by an increase of the actual unemployment over the equilibrium rate due to 
cyclical dynamics of the economy (cp. Chapter 4.2). The existing theories about the effects 
of adverse shocks on unemployment did not explain these developments and economic 
research focused stronger on the dynamics and differences of unemployment durations 
across OECD economies. The matching-theory in labour markets with so-called search 
frictions was originally developed by Peter A. Diamond, Dale T. Mortensen and 
Christopher A. Pissarides (cp. Diamond 1982; Mortensen & Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 
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2000).12 Based on the far-reaching book Equilibrium Unemployment Theory by Pissarides 
2000, the formal description of the flow approach can be briefly described as a complex 
process of job construction and job destruction (for the following description cp. Blanchard 
2006: p. 27ff). The underlying argumentation can be described by a growing market 
economy which is characterized by a permanent allocation of resources. Within such an 
economy, an increase of living standards stems from the growth of productivity which is, 
in turn, connected with a reallocation of productive resources and therefore, with a steady 
and dynamic exchange of jobs. Therefore, job construction x is given by: 
 >	 = 	−;?() 	+ 	-?	 ( 28 ) 
where job construction x decreases with the real wage wr. Whereas job destruction y 
 
	 = 	−;@() 	+ 	-@	 ( 29 ) 
increases with the real wage wr. Given the real wage wr, zx and zy are the factors that 
affected job creation and destruction such as increasing (oil) prices or capital user costs. 
Hence, the matching process is characterized by a permanent exchange between unem-
ployed workers and vacancies and, in a steady state, employment is constant and x equals 
y. The stable level of inflows x and outflows y is determined by the warrant wage: 
 
 = - = 1;? + ;@ (-? + -@)	 ( 30 ) 
According to that, the matching function is given by: 
 ℎ =  + (1 − )A + -B	 ( 31 ) 
describing the rate of successful hires h depending on unemployment u and vacancies v. 
Hence, the higher either unemployment and/or vacancies, the more matches whereas zm 
express the efficiency of the matching process. That means zm is a parameter for institu-
tions and policies which affect the matching process (e.g. training schemes, information 
and incentives for job search or unemployment benefits). 
 
The so-called Beveridge curve or unemployment-vacancies curve (UV) describes the 
relation between unemployment and vacancies for a given level of hires h, which implies, 
that shifts of the curve are solely based on changes in zm: 
 (ℎ − ) = (1 − )(A − )+-B	 ( 32 ) 
where the log of the ratio of hires to unemployment (h-u) describes the log of the 
probability to find a job and in the other direction, suggesting that unemployment duration 
is a decreasing function of the ratio of job vacancies to unemployment (cp. Blanchard 
2006: p. 28). Figure 10 illustrates the underlying principles: 
                                                 
12
 In 2010, they won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences "for their analysis of markets with 
search frictions" (cp. nobelprize.org 2010) 
Knirsch: Institutions, Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD 
 
27 
 
 
Figure 10: The Beveridge Curve relation 
Source: own illustration 
 
The implications of the UV relationship are strongly connected with the discussion about 
whether unemployment stems from structural or cyclical reasons. Accordingly, frictional 
unemployment originates from structural problems due to an inefficient matching process. 
If unemployment equals vacancies (45 degree line v=u), the economy suffers from 
matching inefficiencies which demands for structural reforms shifting the UV curve either 
to the left, a more efficient matching, or to the right, a less efficient matching. On the other 
hand, there is a cyclical component of unemployment, which cannot be explained solely by 
frictional or structural aspects. In the context of the UV curve, cyclical unemployment 
means that unemployment unequal vacancies (either v>u or v<u) and, therefore, cannot be 
addressed by institutional or political reforms targeting on the improvements of the 
matching process. 
 
The second target of the research on labour market institutions was referred again to the 
wage bargaining process. But, in the context of the flow model, researchers considered 
unemployment themselves as a relevant determinant of the bargaining process. In the con-
text of wage bargaining between firms and individual workers, the bargain power of both 
sides depends on the exiting employment situation. Therefore, the bargain power of the 
workers increases with (h-u) and decreases with (h-v) (the other way around for the firms). 
According to this, the wage-setting function can be expanded by: 
  − 
 = 3(ℎ − ) − (ℎ − A)4+-,	 ( 33 ) 
where the bargained wage depends on the expected price level pe and the relation of the 
bargaining power (the difference between the possibility to find a job (h-u) and the 
possibility to find a worker (h-v)). Finally, zb describes all institutional and political factors 
affecting the bargaining process. These factors include the entire social system such as 
unemployment benefits as well as employment protection legislations and firing cost. 
Hence, the bargained wage can be expressed as: 
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 − 
 = ( − A)+-,	 ( 34 ) 
or, according to the relation of the matching function described above, as: 
  − 
 = 1 −  3(ℎ − ) − -B4+-,	 ( 35 ) 
These assumptions implicate, that wage bargaining depends on the ratio between 
unemployment and vacancies or the Beveridge curve and not, as applied in former 
theories, on unemployment alone. At this point, the combination of the bargained wage and 
the warranted wage results in the equation: 
 
 − 
 = −( − A) − -+-,	 ( 36 ) 
which describes a Phillips curve relation where z is a factor at stable employment and zb is 
a proxy for those factors which affect bargaining. 
 
In the context of a long-run equilibrium where expected prices equals actual prices (p=pe) 
and the warrant wage is set by the firms, equilibrium unemployment duration is given by: 
 ℎ −  = 1 3(1 − α)z + βzF − (1 − α)zG4	 ( 37 ) 
where the equilibrium duration of unemployment (remember h-u is the log of duration) 
depends on all factors that shift the warrant wage (z), that shift the matching function (zm) 
and the bargain function (zb). Even if the underlying institutional factors of the different “z-
parameters” can be the same, they influence the outcome in various ways.  
 
The most important consequence which derives from that argumentation is that, in the 
long-run, equilibrium flow h has to be the same as job creation (h=x). Hence, job construc-
tion x depends on the warrant wage wr, the equilibrium rate of unemployment is the 
product of equilibrium unemployment duration and the equilibrium flow h. Finally, it can 
be considered that shifts of the equilibrium rate of unemployment are explained by the 
Beveridge curve or the unemployment-vacancies relation (that means shifts of zm) and by 
the Philips curve (that means shifts of z or zb) (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 29; Layard et al. 
2005: p. 34ff).  
 
The formalized concept of the matching-process was the most important achievement of 
the explanation of equilibrium unemployment in the last decades, particular for a better 
understanding of long-term unemployment in the OECD (cp. Blanchard 2007: p. 6).13 With 
regard to the search and matching theory, a permanent existing level of equilibrium unem-
ployment is intuitively comprehensible. The flow model and the implications for equilibri-
um unemployment resulted in a couple of new insights about the evolution of unemploy-
ment. The analytic framework allowed a systematic analysis of the hidden characteristics 
of unemployment particularly with regard to the underlying effects of institutions on the 
                                                 
13
 Nevertheless, the recent rise of unemployment duration in the United States reveals an unsolved puzzle in 
the searching model. 
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dynamic of the labour market, the unemployment duration or the distribution of employ-
ment among different types of workers or sectors.  
 
The focus on employment protection provides a fruitful example of the application of the 
flow model. The correlation between employment protection and unemployment is 
ambiguous and depends on the broader assumptions on the single impacts of employment 
protection on either labour demand or supply. But even if the underlying mechanisms of 
employment protection are still unclear, there seems to be a good evidence for their impact 
on the unemployment duration. Hence, employment protection produces higher firing costs 
for the firms leading to lower job construction and job destruction and at the same time 
strengthening the bargain position of workers. With regard to the analytic framework of the 
flow model, cross-country differences in the employment protection can explain differ-
ences in unemployment duration to a large extend (cp. Blanchard & Portugal 2001: p. 
187ff). Another dimension of the matching process is the suitable skill level of the unem-
ployed referring to vacancies or, in other words, the coordination of the educational 
system. Particularly according to technological progress or structural change, the adjust-
ments of job allocations can affect the labour demand of particular groups of the labour 
market. Hence, the elasticity of skilled and unskilled workers often differ to a large extend, 
technological progress can increase the demand for skilled workers while the labour de-
mand for unskilled workers declines (cp. Blanchard & Katz 1997: p. 58). The consequence 
was a dramatic shift of the focus of economic research towards labour market institutions 
which resulted in a great consensus about the reasons of unemployment among policy 
makers particularly in the OECD and the IMF (cp. Baccaro & Rei 2007: p. 527f). 
 
3.5 Institutions, institutional complementarities and globalization 
In the 1990s, the impact of institutions was indisputable among economic researchers and 
played a major role within the analysis of the effects of institutions on unemployment and 
other macroeconomic indicators (cp. exemplary North 1990). In that time, the economic 
recommendations demanded for employment-friendly structural labour market reforms 
targeting mainly on more flexibility and decentralization. That means “to reduce “labor 
market rigidities” such as generous unemployment insurance schemes; high employment 
protection, such as high firing costs; high minimum wages; non-competitive wage-setting 
mechanisms; and severe tax distortions.” (International Monetary Fund 2003: p. 129). The 
idea emerge that all industrialized economies follows such a liberal development path and 
a convergence of the markets was postulated (cp. Sachs & Warner 1995: p. 1ff). At the 
same time, leading economic researchers have supported such liberal structural reforms 
(e.g. Elmeskov et al. 1998; Nickell 1997) even if the robustness of their results based on 
their specific variables and approaches their evidence was ambiguous (cp. Baker et al. 
2004: p. 72ff). The argumentation based on the idea of a perfect labour market which can 
be seen as a background reference. Thus, the equilibrium derived from the aggregated 
labour demand Ld and aggregated labour supply Ls (The following description follows 
Boeri & Van Ours 2013: chap. 1; Blanchard 2006 Box 1 to 5; Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 
19f). In that model, the equilibrium consists of the equilibrium wage w* where individual 
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firms and workers are maximizing their surplus and equilibrium employment L* which 
implies that all individuals who are willing to work are employed.14 But as mentioned 
before, the real world is not reflected by such a simple model and the theoretical equilib-
rium does not exist. There are several arguments for a deviation from the perfect labour 
market equilibrium. Such arguments base on considerations about efficiency, equity and 
policy failure and are directly linked to the effects of institutions on performance (cp. Boeri 
& Van Ours 2013: p. 20f). Therefore, labour market institutions produce a wedge between 
the existing outcome of the labour market and the theoretical first-best equilibrium. 
Accordingly, institutions can act on prices such as minimum wages or labour taxes or on 
quantities such as regulations on working hours or retirement plans. Furthermore 
institutions influence the elasticity of the labour demand and supply functions defined as a 
percentage change of labour supply or demand caused by a 1 percentage change of wage. 
 
In the analytic framework of the WS-PS model described above, the effects of labour 
market institutions and the mechanism of institutional interaction and their impact on 
unemployment can be shown. Figure 11 and Figure 12 illustrate that policies and 
institutions can affect the elasticity of the WS and/or the PS curve as well as the level of 
the WS and/or PS curve: 
 
 
Figure 11: Institutional interaction in the WS-PS model 
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006): Box 1, pp. 19-20. 
 
According to Belot and van Ours (2004), two groups of mechanism are relevant: i) the 
effects on the elasticity of the wage-setting curve and ii) the effects on the marginal impact 
on labour demand (depending on the initial level of unemployment) (cp. for the following 
                                                 
14
 According to Boeri and van Ours (2013), in a perfect labour market, all unemployed individuals are either 
indifferent to work (wr=w*), voluntary unemployed (wr>w*) or inactive. 
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description Bassanini & Duval 2006: pp. 19–20 Box 1). Consequently, every structural 
reform or institutional change which affects either the elasticity or the level interacts with 
each other. Thus, the WS-PS model provides a useful framework for a more detailed 
analysis. For example, the effect of a cut of unemployment benefit (which shifts the WS-
curve downwards) is greater if the degree of product market regulation is low (which 
means that the PS-curve is flat) or if the bargain power of trade unions is weak (which 
means that the PS-curve is flat). In both cases, the desired positive effects are reduced 
through the “smaller feedback effects in terms of higher wage claims” (Bassanini & Duval 
2006: p. 19). 
 
 
Figure 12: Initial employment level in the WS-PS model 
Source: Bassanini and Duval (2006): Box 1, pp. 19-20. 
 
A main implication refers to the marginal effect of a change in real wages on labour de-
mand which seems to depend on the initial level of unemployment. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the marginal effect is higher if unemployment is at a low level and vice versa 
which means that e.g. a cut in unemployment benefits has stronger effects on employment 
if the initial institutional setting is already employment-friendly.  
 
Since the 1990s, OECD labour markets are influenced by a strong pressure for liberal 
employment-friendly structural reforms. Based on the scientific and political supported 
credo of competitiveness, the pressure from the global competition has been transferred to 
the national markets in particular with regard to the labour cost. Thus, particularly in the 
context of an increasing product market competition due to liberal and open global mar-
kets, the costs of the so-called wedge (the deviation from the perfect market produced by 
labour market institutions) rise. If the elasticity of the labour demand rises due to an in-
crease in product market competition (represented by a decrease of product market 
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regulation and an increase of trade and open markets), higher bargained wages lead to 
lower labour demand (than in the context of lower competition). But the effects of labour 
market institutions on unemployment seem to depend on the particular interaction between 
the institutions as well as between the institutions and adverse shocks. This perspective has 
become more and more important in the analytic framework (cp. inter alia Scarpetta 1996; 
Nickell 1997; Elmeskov et al. 1998; Blanchard & Wolfers 2000; Nickell et al. 2005; 
Bassanini & Duval 2006). In the course of the debate about institutional interactions the 
former view of structural reforms targeting on the simple reduction of the wedge was 
challenged by contrary empirical evidence (inter alia Baker et al. 2004; Glyn et al. 2006; 
Baccaro & Rei 2007; Howell et al. 2007). An alternative understanding of LMIs was 
enforced. Researchers argued that institutional changes or labour market reforms are more 
effective if they include “comprehensive policy packages” (Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 
17) which take into account the characteristics of national institutional frameworks. Thus, 
the wage-setting process is embedded in the specific national institutional framework 
including the historical and cultural tradition as well as the behaviour of the wage setting 
units (cp. Granovetter 1985: p. 481f; Hall & Soskice 2001: p. 12ff). The consequence of 
the development of such an analytic framework was the possibility to analyze the complex 
interactions between the different labour market institutions allowing for statements about 
the institutional complementarities (cp. Aoki 1994; Coe & Snower 1997; Belot & Van 
Ours 2004; Blanchard 2006: p. 29; Hall & Gingerich 2009). Especially in the context of 
increasing global competition, institutional competitive advantages can be derived from 
that perspective (cp. Hall & Soskice 2001: p. 56f).  
 
A prominent example for such institutional complementarities are the flexicurity reforms 
within some OECD countries, such as Denmark or Austria. In the context of the increasing 
global competition, the idea of flexicurity has been seen as a kind of best practice for the 
trade-off between flexibility and security within globalized labour markets. According to 
the EC, the “idea of flexicurity is based on three points: […] the protection of people, […] 
greater flexibility […] [and] the cohesion of the social system as a whole.” (European 
Commission 2006) Particular Austria and Denmark are seen as good examples for the 
positive impact of the strategy which “protects workers not jobs” (cp. Blanchard et al. 
2013: p. 5). But since today, there has been no theoretical or empirical evidence on the 
“right” or “best” labour market reform program. Even if recent researchers found good 
examples of successful and comprehensive labour market reforms such as in Denmark or 
the Netherland, there is no robust evidence on institutional interaction and institutional 
complementarities (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 17). The Financial Crisis 2007 re-
vealed the short-comings and gaps of the existing framework. Today, the theoretical 
understanding and empirical evidence is still ambiguous and there are still open questions 
and research gaps in economic research. The extensive experience on unemployment has 
to be enhanced by new insights of the impact of financial markets. 
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3.6 Actual questions 
In the run up of the Financial Crisis 2007, the theoretical and empirical efforts on the 
explanation of OECD unemployment have achieved a good matching between macroeco-
nomic models and microeconomic foundations as well as empirical validation of various 
indicators (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 35f). Thereby, a potential direction of further research 
seems to be relevant, the focus on additional shocks, institutions and interactions and par-
ticular on all factors which describe the openness and competitiveness of an economy.15 
The main conclusion is that “higher competition in the goods market, lower trade barriers 
and higher integration of goods markets across countries, higher globalization and 
outsourcing, are all leading to a more turbulent environment, an environment with more 
job destruction and job creation.” (Blanchard 2006: p. 36) And indeed, the considerations 
about economic turbulences which mainly derive from the deregulated financial markets 
seem to be true. Such turbulences affect in turn the effectiveness of existing institutions, 
such as high employment protection (e.g. in Portugal, France or Spain) and increase the 
cost of firms due to unknown dynamics (that means higher rates of job destruction and 
construction) (cp. Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 2). 
 
The question whether post-crisis unemployment has a cyclical or structural nature has been 
discussed in particular in the United States where the debate is still relevant whereas Euro-
pean unemployment is not in the focus of that discussion yet (cp. European Commission 
2013a: p. 62). Thereby, researchers have not been able to give a clear answer where some 
argued for structural reasons (e.g. Katz 2010) and others supported cyclical arguments (e.g. 
Bernanke 2010). According to Katz (2010), the rise of unemployment in the United States 
originated from normal cyclical developments due to job destructions in the course of the 
recession but the persistence of unemployment in terms of long-term unemployment 
cannot be explained by a assumed relation between GDP growth and job construction (or 
destruction) (cp. Katz 2010: p. 4). Consequently, the persistence of unemployment has had 
to stem from a mismatch in the labour market and therefore structural inefficiency. But 
these argumentation is not that easy and Lazear and Splezer (2012) pointed out that the rise 
of long-term unemployment in the United States is rooted in the “depth of the current 
recession” as well as in a trend “which began many decades ago” (Lazear & Spletzer 2012: 
p. 33). Furthermore, there is a trend of a decreasing matching process after the labour de-
mand shocks in 2009 and 2011, whereas an adjustments process through increasing 
vacancies is suggested (cp. European Commission 2013a: p. 1ff). Within the OECD 
Employment Outlook 2013, the effects on such subgroups are analyzed and highlighted. 
Thus, young and unskilled workers are affected much more than older employees who are, 
generally spoken, often more skilled and protected by better working conditions and 
contracts preventing them from short-term job losses (cp. OECD 2013: p. 19ff). Besides 
varying employment protection legislation schemes, another aspect can explain the dif-
ferent effects on skilled and unskilled workers. The argumentation targets on the efficiency 
                                                 
15
 The exploration and the measurement of institutions are discussed in Chapter 4 in more detail and for 
further research on the joint behaviour of unemployment, employment, capital, wages and user cost see inter 
alia Bassanini (2012) who analyzes the effects of institutions on aggregated earnings and employment.  
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of the matching effect of the national labour markets. According to the EC, changes and 
shifts of the Beveridge curve have been the main causes for the post-crisis cross-country 
differences in Europe (cp. European Commission 2013a: p. 64ff). An analysis through the 
lens of the Beveridge curve suggests that the nature of unemployment differs across OECD 
countries. According to Pissarides (2013), some countries suffer from the recession from 
cyclical but not structural problems (e.g. the United Kingdom) whereas other countries 
reveal great structural problems (such as the United States) (cp. Pissarides 2013: p. 1). 
 
It seems to be necessary to take a closer look at the structure of the national economies as 
well as the political response in terms of fiscal efforts and institutional adjustments (cp. 
Eichhorst et al. 2010: p. 1). One aspect is that there is a relation between different spheres 
of the economy especially between industrial relations on labour markets and corporate 
finance (cp. Hall & Gingerich 2009: p. 453ff). The main conclusion which derives from 
recent theoretical and empirical developments is that the existing framework has to be 
expanding in order to capture the new interactions between institutions of the labour and 
financial markets. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
„The view that unemployment is caused by labor market rigidities and should be 
addressed through systematic institutional deregulation has gained broad currency 
and has been embraced by national and international policymaking agencies alike. It 
is unclear, however, whether there really is robust empirical support for such 
conclusions. This article engages in an econometric analysis comparing several 
estimators and specifications. It does not find much robust evidence either of labor 
market institutions’ direct effects on unemployment rate, or of a more indirect impact 
through the magnitude of adverse shocks“ (Baccaro & Rei 2007: p. 527) 
4.1 Methodology and hypotheses 
The empirical analysis focuses on the question to which extend labour market institutions 
and structural changes and policies can explain unemployment in the OECD. In order to 
explain differences across countries and developments over time, the central argumenta-
tion is that labour market institutions have direct effects on unemployment and simul-
taneously interact with other institutions and macroeconomic shocks. The analysis follows 
the methodological approach of recent existing studies which focus on the same question, 
namely the works of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickel et al. (2005) and Bassanini and 
Duval (2006, 2009). Thus, the empirical analysis consists of several panel data estimations 
within a sample of 20 OECD countries over the period from 1980 to 2012.16 
 
The present work is contributing to the existing literature on several grounds, by i) the use 
of up-to-date data, which capture recent developments up to 201217 ii) by checking the 
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 For a detailed description of the sample and the coverage see Annex I. 
17
 For a comparison of the data with the data used by Nickel and Nunziata (2001) and Bassanini and Duval 
(2006) see as well Chapter 4.2 and Annex III. 
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robustness of existing empirical findings with the new data and iii) by switching the focus 
of analysis to the interaction of coordination or corporatism and increasing global competi-
tion. The later can be seen as a link to the argumentation that globalization affects national 
labour markets not only through increasing productivity and growth rates but as well 
through increasing turbulences and risks in the course of the liberalization of global 
financial markets.  
 
Therefore, the empirical analysis is divided into three parts in order to answer the research 
question which has been introduced in the beginning.  
 
In the first part, actual unemployment is explained by labour market institutions and 
institutional change. Therefore, the first hypothesis H1 is that labour market institutions 
(namely the union density rate, the coverage of collective agreements, the coordination and 
the level of collective bargaining, government interventions, the degree of corporatism, 
unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation, product market regulation, 
labour taxes, active labour market policies and the degree of globalization)18 have signifi-
cant direct effects on actual unemployment. Furthermore, this hypothesis can be refined by 
further specifications that the direct effects of labour market institutions are robust to the 
control for i) unobserved and common macroeconomic shocks (in terms of common time-
effects), ii) unobserved country-specific macroeconomic shocks (in terms of the output 
gap) and iii) observed country-specific macroeconomic shocks (in terms of productivity 
shocks, interest rate shocks, terms of trade shocks and labour demand shocks). 
 
In the second part, the differences and developments of actual unemployment are ex-
plained by labour market institutions and institutional interactions (or complementarities). 
Therefore, the second hypothesis H2 is that labour market institutions (which are 
mentioned above) have significant interaction effects on actual unemployment. Such 
interaction effects have to be controlled for the direct effects of the institutions as well as 
for common and country-specific macroeconomic shocks. Obviously, the number of poten-
tial institutions and interaction terms exceed every reasonable estimation equation and 
therefore the empirical analysis has to be limited to particular interaction terms. Thus, the 
second hypothesis has been specified for two argumentation strands which focus on the 
interaction between i) labour market institutions and coordination in wage bargaining and 
ii) labour market institutions and globalization. 
 
In a third and final part, the differences and developments of actual unemployment are 
explained by labour market institutions which interact with macroeconomic shocks. Thus, 
the third hypothesis H3 is that labour market institutions (which are mentioned above) 
have significant effects on actual unemployment if they interact with macroeconomic 
shocks. And again, such interaction effects have to be controlled for the direct effects of 
the institutions as well as for common and country-specific macroeconomic shocks. The 
hypothesis can be tested for the interaction of labour market institution with i) unobserved 
and common macroeconomic shocks (in terms of common time-effects), ii) unobserved 
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 For a detailed description of the single indicators see Annex I. 
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country-specific macroeconomic shocks (in terms of the output gap) and iii) observed 
country-specific macroeconomic shocks (in terms of productivity shocks, interest rate 
shocks, terms of trade shocks and labour demand shocks). 
 
Note that all estimations are based on a static instead of a dynamic model which has been 
used in recent literature as well (e.g. Nickell et al. 2005). Even if dynamic estimation 
equations content some worthwhile advantages, problems can derive from the case where 
the construction of the first difference is based on a variable – here unemployment - which 
is “close to a random walk” (Nymoen & Sparrman 2013: p. 14). Furthermore, Bassanini 
and Duval (2009) stated that the large number of institutional variables and infrequent 
changes, which effects are long-lasting and difficult to verify, do not allow “to specify the 
correct error structure of a model” (Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 41). Moreover, serial 
correlated residuals which will be barely the case are a problem of efficiency rather than 
consistency of the estimations. 
 
4.2 Data analysis 
Within the last decades, the economic literature as well as empirical studies discussed and 
analysed a broad spectrum of empirical indicators and, in the same time, the foundation of 
micro- and macro-data has grown. Thereby, the existing empirical literature refers to a in-
creasing selection of potential variables which have been assumed to determine (equilibri-
um) unemployment. Unfortunately, there is no possibility to capture all relevant variables 
in one model due to the limits of statistical options. Consequently, the choice of indepen-
dent variables has to be an ad-hoc decision based on the large extend of theoretical and 
empirical literature (cp. Blanchard 2006: p. 36; Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 10). In order to 
take into account recent developments, the empirical analysis consists of several model 
specifications which can be seen as a step by step approach to capture different institu-
tional interactions. According to this, the following section gives a short overview about 
the most relevant aspects and problems referring to the used data.19 Thus, the source, the 
sample and some empirical developments are represented and potential problems and their 
consequences are discussed in more detail.  
 
The main source of the used data is the OECD Statistical Database (http://stats.oecd.org/) 
as well as additional sources such as the database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade 
Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS) from the Amsterdam 
Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) (http://www.uva-aias.net/208) and the CEP-
OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004) from the Centre of Economic Performance (CEP) 
in London (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/data0759.zip) which provided indicators 
from previous studies. Particular acknowledgments count for the work from Blanchard and 
Wolfers (2000), Nickell and Nunziata (2001), Nickell et al (2005) and Bassanini and Duval 
(2006, 2009) which serve as reference for the data selection. The data which has been used 
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 Please note that the extent of potential data is not captured by the following section and therefore some 
alternative references are presented as well. 
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in the following analysis correlates with the data from Nickell and Nunziata (2001) 
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/data0502.zip) and Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
(www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/25/37431112.zip) to some extent (cp. Annex IV). Moreover, 
some indicators which are used in the present analysis reflect expansions of these data e.g. 
the employment protection legislation index first used by Lazear (1990) or the product 
market regulation indicator used by Nickell et al. (2001) and Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
(cp. Annex I). The macroeconomic indicators of observed adverse shocks, namely the pro-
ductivity shock, the interest rate shock and the terms of trade shock are following the 
definition of Bassanini and Duval (2006) and have been reconstructed on the basis of the 
data from the OECD Statistics. An exception is the indicator of the labour demand shock 
which is directly taken from the data provided by Bassanini and Duval (2006) due to the 
great deviations from own calculations.20 
 
According to the fRDB-IZA Social Reforms Database from the Institution for the Study of 
Labour (IZA) and the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti institute (fRDB) (cp. Fondazione 
Rodolfo DeBenedetti 2009), the political reforms of the last decades increasingly focused 
on a decrease of the wedge (cp. Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 22ff). Such institutions which 
are associated to produce a wedge have been discussed above (e.g. strong employment pro-
tection, high and generous unemployment benefits or strong trade unions). In order to 
connect the empirical developments to the theoretical framework, the institutional indica-
tors are subsumed under the following dimensions: i) the wage-setting system and 
coordination of bargaining, ii) the social security system, flexibility and regulation of 
labour markets and iii) additional indicators referring to globalization and competitiveness. 
The empirical variables of the wage-setting system consist namely of the union density rate 
and the coverage of collective agreements as indicators for the degree of organization or 
the bargaining power of employers. Furthermore, the wage-setting system includes those 
indicators which are describing the degree of coordination or corporatism – namely the 
degree of coordination, the level of bargaining and the degree of government interventions. 
Additionally, institutional features such as indexation mechanisms and legal extension 
mechanisms are part of the wage-setting system.21 Although the structure of the collective 
wage bargaining systems is very complex, two dimensions can be distinguished, the bar-
gaining power or the degree of organization of the wage-setters – namely the trade unions 
and the employer’s associations – and the structure of the bargaining process (cp. 
Leertouwer & Haan 2002 for a detailed factor analysis of existing corporatism indicators). 
Both dimensions and their different effects on the macroeconomic performance have been 
analysed to a large extend (e.g. Flanagan et al. 1983; Calmfors et al. 1988; Hall & Franzese 
1997; Cukierman & Lippi 1999; Iversen et al. 2000; Driffill 2006). 
                                                 
20
 Note that the indicator of the labour demand shock which is provided by the data from Nickel and 
Nunziata (2001) differs from that provided by Bassanini and Duval (2006) as well with a negative correlation 
coefficient of  -0.0862  (significant at the 10% level). 
21
 One aspect which is particularly relevant in the context of collective wage bargaining is that trade unions 
and social partners often bargain not only about wages but as well about working conditions such as 
employment protection, retirement plans, family allowance, working hours and even unemployment benefits 
(in the case of the Belgium Ghent system (cp. Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 63ff). 
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But how do wage-setting systems in the OECD have changed since 1960? The general 
trend can be described as a decline of unions in the OECD since the 1980s. Particular in 
the United Kingdom as well as later in Germany with the Agenda 2010, labour markets 
changed towards more flexible and decentralized wage-setting structures. Thus, the trend 
describes the decline in union density - from around 49% in 1980 to 31% in 2010 – and a 
decline of bargaining coverage – from 67% in 1960 to 56% in 2010. Even if the decline of 
unions has to be appointed as the general trend, the developments within the national 
wage-setting regimes differ considerably. Usually, the union density rate serves as a 
common empirical indicator reflecting the bargaining power. But a closer look on the 
features of the collective bargaining system shows that the bargaining power depends on 
more than solely the union density rate. Thereby, it can be observed that the employee 
bargaining powers differ between the countries and the coverage of wage bargaining 
becomes more and more significant for bargaining power (instead of the union density). 
The bargaining power increasingly depends on the coverage of wage bargaining and on the 
specific institutional characteristics. One important aspect is the legal extension mecha-
nism which expand the collective agreements over broad parts of the economy (even 
without membership) such as the entire public sector. Thus, some countries have legal 
extensions of collective agreements binding wage-setting to a broader part of the economy 
i) through political decisions such as in Germany, France and the Netherlands, ii) quasi 
automatic such as in Italy, Spain or Finland, or iii) an obligated membership of all workers 
in employers’ associations such as in Austria (cp. inter alia Nickell et al. 2005: p. 6; Driffill 
2006: p. 12; European Commission 2013b: p. 3). This so-called excess coverage has com-
pensated the decline of members in the Continental European economies to some extent or 
on the other hand, has induced this development due to decrease of the incentives for a 
membership. Consequentially, the coverage of the collective agreements reflects the bar-
gaining power of the unions as well and has to be taken into account (cp. inter alia 
Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 35; Nickell et al. 2005: p. 12; Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 
63ff). However, the argumentation of the effects of legal extension mechanisms on labour 
market performance is the same as for collective agreements in general. The extension of 
collective agreements prevent wage adjustments to local productivity levels and moreover, 
reduce “the need to avoid pricing their members out of work” (Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 
72f). The consequence is that legal extension mechanism raises wage claims of unions 
which are likely to be higher than without such mechanism and on the other hand, the 
union density rates are expected to be lower due to the “free-ride” on collective agree-
ments. But it has to be noted here, that the bargaining power of the employees is captured 
by the empirical data only in some extent. In addition to these empirical insights, there are 
further institutional characteristics, which affect the wage-setting such as the presence of 
minimum wages, the duration of collective agreements, the so-called escape clauses, wage 
indexation mechanism, or the (German) co-decision model ("Mitbestimmung") (cp. inter 
alia Driffill 2006: p. 13ff; with regard to Spielmann 2006; European Commission 2013b: 
pp. 1–4). Du Caju et al. (2008) have identified three groups within the OECD member 
states, whose wage-setting regimes can be characterized by five institutional dimensions 
(cp. Du Caju et al. 2008: p. 28ff). The first group is distinguished by strong regulated wage 
setting systems, legal extension procedures and a domination of the sectoral bargaining 
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level.22 The second group is similar to the first one but is complemented by indexation of 
wage setting, inter-sectoral coordination and government interventions.23 Within the third 
group, wage-settings are to a large extent deregulated and decentralized, thus, the union 
density and the bargaining coverage is low and the dominant level of bargaining is, if at all, 
at the firm level. 24 A common approach to test and estimate the effects of the different de-
grees of corporatism is the application of dummy variables capturing the different groups 
such as high, intermediated or low corporatism (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 41; 
Scarpetta 1996; Elmeskov et al. 1998).25 
 
The entire social security system as well as all institutions and political regulations which 
affect the flexibility of labour markets have been seen as relevant factors determining 
actual and particular equilibrium unemployment. In the context of the current analysis the 
unemployment benefits, the employment protection legislation and the regulation of pro-
duct markets are relevant due to the theoretical and empirical findings. 
 
The unemployment benefit systems consist namely of four relevant dimensions which 
seem to influence (equilibrium) unemployment: i) the level of unemployment benefits, ii) 
the duration of unemployment benefits, iii) the coverage of unemployment benefits and the 
strictness and incentives of the benefit system (cp. Layard et al. 2005: p. xxvii). In the 
context of the current work, particular two dimensions are relevant and available in terms 
of cross-country time-series data, the generous replacement rate and the duration of 
unemployment benefits. Thus, the OECD has collected comparable data on benefit levels 
for different family types and unemployment durations. The duration of unemployment 
benefits has been neglected here due to weak data availability and insignificant results. 
Even if the strictness and generosity of unemployment benefits have been captured by 
more empirical aspects than solely the level of benefits, the gross replacement rate is a 
common and useful indicator for the underlying theoretical argumentation particularly in 
regard that the level correlates with other dimensions such as the duration. Therefore, the 
following analysis refers to the unemployment benefit level in terms of the average gross 
replacement rate (cp. Annex I). 26 There is an alternative measure for the replacement rates 
of the OECD for the period from 1971 to 2002 reported by Scruggs (2005). 27 This alterna-
tive measurement is used by Bassanini and Duval (2009) and other researchers due to the 
higher volatility (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 45) but not considered here (in order to 
compare with other studies). With regard to the level of unemployment benefits in the 
OECD countries, there was a general trend towards a more generous system and higher 
levels from an average of 15.5% around 1960 up to 31,3% around 2000. Particular in 
                                                 
22
 Including Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and 
Sweden. 
23
 Including Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain. 
24
 Including Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Japan, Lithuania, Poland, Great Britain and the United 
States. 
25
 Within the current analysis, the approach of dummy variables for high or intermediated corporatism is 
adopted, for a detailed description of the indicators see Annex I. 
26
 Note that a high correlation between the gross replacement rate and net replacement rate can be considered 
(cp. Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 44f; Howell & Rehm 2009). 
27
 The data is available under http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/#links. 
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countries such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, 
Sweden and Switzerland, the unemployment benefit systems have been expanded. Other 
countries such as Germany, New Zealand and the United Kingdom can be characterized by 
a decline of generous unemployment benefits. Whereas the variance between the single 
benefit systems has been relative high until 2000, the national systems have significantly 
adjusted their generous unemployment benefit levels in the last decade. 
 
In the context of increasing global competition another set of institutions becomes more 
and more relevant such as labour taxes as well as employment protection and product 
market regulation or active labour market policies. Thereby, globalization is associated 
with several empirical developments which has been measured usually by empirical indi-
cators such as increasing product market competition due to the reduction of all kind of 
trade barriers, foreign direct investments (FDI), the share of foreign trade flows (import 
and exports) to GDP, indicating the so-called openness, or further aggregated indices such 
as the KOF Index of globalization developed by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute from 
the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zürich) (cp. Dreher 2006; updated 
in Dreher et al. 2008 as well as Annex I). But there is no clear theoretical and empirical 
evidence on an overall effect of globalization on unemployment in the economic literature 
yet (cp. Gozgor 2013: p. 1f). 
 
Thereby, the use of quantitative aggregated data on labour market institutions is quite prob-
lematic and researchers have to be aware of the underlying survey methods and definitions 
which can influence the empirical results in various ways. Several researchers stated the 
weak robustness of panel data analysis due to different problems and shortcomings (e.g. 
inter alia Baker et al. 2004; Baccaro & Rei 2007). In order to face the problems of panel 
data analysis and to ensure the robustness of empirical results, a couple of sensitive checks 
have been developed. At this point, it can be referred to Bassanini and Duval (2006, 2009), 
who provide a comprehensive treatment of the data and panel data analysis in that context 
(cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 15f. Bassanini & Duval 2009: pp. 42–45). The empirical 
studies which have analysed the effects of institutions on aggregated unemployment must 
surely be treated with caution. Freeman (2005) has summed up the weaknesses of the 
debate about the role of institution and structural policies by pointing out three main as-
pects of current research: i) the analysis of existing data does not provide stringent results, 
ii) research is always influenced by their own views and prior assumptions, iii) further 
efforts should focus on better understanding of the microeconomic foundations of the 
institutional setting rather than “by continued regression mongering of weak cross-country 
data.” (Freeman 2005: p. 143) 
 
An extensive comparison of the existing empirical analysis shows a very ambiguous pic-
ture. A deeper assessment of the underlying empirical measurements, assumptions and 
approaches (cp. inter alia Baker et al. 2004: p. 72ff; Bassanini & Duval 2006: pp. 61–69 
Table A1) supports Freeman’s concerns and challenges the robustness of former empirical 
findings. The case of employment protection in Spain reveals such problematic treatment 
of empirical measurements. Therefore, the empirical measurements of the employment 
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protection index has been constructed ex-post in order to capture the political reforms of 
the labour market but, at the same time, the high unemployment rate has been well known. 
Such approaches reveal that researchers often try to trace explanations which often reflect 
“ex-post rationalizations” (Blanchard 2006: p. 44). Therefore, the robustness of empirical 
results concerning employment protection is very fragile and depends on the contribution 
of Spain to a large extend (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 12). 
 
According to Bassanini and Duval (2006), there are special country-specific historical 
factors such as the collapse of the Soviet Union for Finland, the German Reunification and 
the Scandinavian banking and real estate crisis for Sweden which demand for a 
modification of the data for the relevant countries and periods. Therefore, e.g. Bassanini 
and Duval exclude some observations in their analysis which are hard to explain by insti-
tutional change but they have pointed out, that “the main conclusions from the analysis are 
not dependent on whether these observations are excluded or not from the sample” 
(Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 12. Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 42; referring to Biagi & 
Lucifora 2008). 
 
Further problems of the empirical analysis concern potential endogeneity and multi-
collinearity of OECD labour market institutions. Hence, the causalities between unem-
ployment and labour market institutions are not so clear and it can be assumed that e.g. the 
tax wedge or benefit replacement rates are modified due to increasing unemployment (cp. 
Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 45; 54ff). Moreover, the endogeneity of institutional variables 
with regard to unemployment is not uniquely clear and difficult to test. According to 
Bassanini and Duval (2006), who address this issue with the help of instrument variable 
techniques, the results seems to be robust to the assumption of endogenous institutional 
variables (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 17). Whereas Bassanini and Duval (2009) high-
light that, “once methods that correct for potential endogeneity bias are used, virtually 
none of the standard interactions which have been highlighted in the past appear to be 
robust” (Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 41). With regard to the multicollinearity, it can be 
assumed that cross-country correlations of the institutional indicators usually have been 
strong particular if a set of time invariant variables is used such as in Chapter 4.5. In the 
present work, multicollinearity seems to be relevant due to the high cross-country corre-
lation between a couple of institutional variables such as the union density rate and active 
labour market policies, the coverage rate and employment protection, product market 
regulation and the tax wedge or employment protection and high corporatism (cp. Annex 
III). Unfortunately, there is no proper alternative to address those multicollinearity 
problems unless to test a huge number of potential combinations in order to identify the 
most confided set of variables (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 36). The implication for the 
following analysis is that the results have to be handled with care and the multicollinearity 
between the different institutions has to be taken into account. 
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4.3 Simple effects of institutional change and macroeconomic shocks 
The first model specification can be seen as a common reduced baseline model for the 
panel analysis of the direct effects of institutions and adverse macroeconomic shocks on 
actual unemployment. Comparable model specification was used, inter alia, from 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000); Nickell et al. (2005), Bassanini and Duval (2006, 2009). 
The argumentation based on the formal WS-PS model which shows that institutions can 
affect both, the elasticity of wages on employment and labour demand as well as the level 
of wages and labour demand. The interaction between those factors determines the output 
of the market – here in terms of unemployment (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2009: p. 45f).  
 
Within the first step, the analysis focuses on the institutional variables which we assumed 
to determine equilibrium unemployment and explaining cross-country differences in the 
long-run. The initial model can be described in a common standard static and reduced 
unemployment equation: 
 
HI =JKK LHIK + M*HI + H + 0I + 2HI	 ( 38 ) 
where i and t capture the country and time suffices, u is the actual unemployment rate, Xj 
describes the institutional and political explanatory variables, that means the structural 
determinants, G reflects the explanatory control variables of cyclical fluctuations such as 
the output gap or further specific shocks, αi and λt are the country and time effects.  
 
As mentioned before, the set of indicators is based on the theoretical assumptions and 
depends on accessibility of the data. Accordingly, the structural determinants consist of the 
indicators of the collective wage bargaining system, namely the union density rate, the 
coverage of collective agreements, the degree of coordination, the level of bargaining and 
the government interventions as well as dummies for high and intermediated corporatism 
which combines the different dimensions (respectively the coordination, level and 
government intervention).28 With regard to the variables which indicate the structure of the 
bargaining process (particular the degree of corporatism) it becomes a common practice to 
estimate the effects of either high, intermediated or low corporatism on unemployment in 
respect to the underlying assumptions about a hump-shaped relation. The variables of the 
unemployment benefit system consist of the average gross replacement rates which indi-
cate the level of unemployment benefits. The variables of regulation consist of an aggre-
gated indicator of employment protection and product market regulation. The labour taxes 
are captured by the variable of the overall tax wedge. Furthermore, additional variables are 
discussed such as government spending on active labour market policies in relation to the 
unemployment rate and the degree of globalization captured by actual foreign trade flows 
and weak trade barriers and restrictions which are included in the baseline equation. 
 
With regard to the relevance of additional indicators discussed above (such as indexation 
mechanism, minimum wages or house ownership) it has to be noted here, that the used 
                                                 
28
 Please cp. Annex I for a detailed description. 
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collection of institutional variables reflects the most common set which is discussed in 
economic literature. Moreover, it can be assumed that controlling for additional variables 
does not change the main results of the estimation (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 15f). 
 
According to common practice for panel data analysis, time effects are included to control 
for common unobserved shocks and country effects are included in order to control for 
country-specific averages of unobserved institutions and policies. Furthermore, it can be 
assumed that the institutional indicators are correlated across countries rather than within 
countries or over time. In that case, country effects seem to reflect the missing institutional 
characteristics (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 47).  
 
Table 1 shows the results of the baseline model which focuses on the direct effects of 
institutions, institutional changes and macroeconomic shocks including time and country 
fixed effects. In Column 1, all variables of the collective bargaining system have been 
entered apart and in Column 2, the corporatism indicators are combined into two dummy 
variables which reflect either high corporatism or intermediated corporatism. In both cases, 
the results have been comparable. Thus Column 1 and 2 show that most of the explanatory 
variables have significant direct effects on unemployment with exception of the 
employment protection legislation, the level of bargaining in Column 1 and the dummy for 
intermediated corporatism in column 2. These variables seem to have no direct effect on 
unemployment or it can be suggested that potential effects are hidden due to 
multicollinearity (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 36). On the other hand, all relevant and 
significant variables affect unemployment more or less in the expected direction. 
 
Table 1: Unemployment explained by institutions and adverse shocks, 1980-2010 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 = baseline = baseline incl. 
dummies for 
corporatism 
= baseline incl. 
output gap 
= baseline incl. 
observed shocks 
= baseline incl. 
labour demand 
shock 
union density 0.1616*** 0.1303*** 0.0819*** 0.1283*** 0.2230*** 
coverage -0.0477*** -0.0429*** -0.0332*** -0.02 -0.0710*** 
coordination -1.2816*** 
 
-0.8687*** -0.9651*** -0.7260*** 
level 0.237 
 
0.2057 0.2966* -0.0643 
government 0.3416* 
 
0.2846* 0.1214 0.0439 
high corporatism 
 
-1.7035** 
   
intermediate 
corporatism  -0.05    
unemployment 
benefit 0.0660*** 0.0577*** 0.0739*** 0.0706*** 0.0412 
employment 
protection 0.0124 0.1159 -0.3823 0.2302 -0.6938 
product market 
regulation -0.3598* -0.4286** -0.1586 -0.3997* 0.064 
tax wedge 0.0439* 0.0637*** 0.0423** 0.0193 0.0216 
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active labour  
market policies -0.1146*** -0.1160*** -0.0848*** -0.1069*** -0.1002*** 
trade flows 0.0433*** 0.0543*** 0.0349** 0.0297* -0.0072 
trade restrictions 0.0498** 0.0357* 0.0183 0.0680*** 0.1242*** 
output gap 
  
-0.4336*** 
  
productivity shock 
   
7.1424 7.5083 
interest rate shock 
   
0.2777*** 0.1924** 
terms of trade shock 
   
0.0833*** 0.0562 
labour demand shock 
    
16.0974*** 
country effects yes yes yes yes yes 
time effects yes yes yes yes yes 
N 511 511 511 493 333 
r2 0.59 0.57 0.68 0.61 0.68 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Estimation: OLS allowing for heteroscedastic; all estimations including time and country effects which control for 
common unobserved macroeconomic developments as well as unobserved country characteristics (not represented in 
the table).  
Source: Estimations based on data described in Annex I. 
Note: Data for labour demand shock is taken from Bassanini and Duval (2006) and covers the period 1980 to 2003. 
Therefore, estimations in column 5 cover the period 1980 to 2003 as well. 
 
The density rate is positively correlated with unemployment as well as the benefit 
replacement rate, the tax wedge and the globalization indicators (actual foreign trade flows 
and weak trade restrictions). Whereas the coverage of collective agreements as well as 
active labour market policies and product market regulations are significant negatively 
related with unemployment in that specification.  
 
Thus, the union density rate seems to reflect the negative impact of inadequate wage 
claims whereas the coverage rate affects unemployment in the opposite direction reducing 
unemployment (cp. Chapter 4.6). With regard to the corporatism indicators, all variables 
which indicate high coordination have the expected negative effect on unemployment 
whereas the negative effect of intermediated corporatism is not significant in that context. 
These results can be seen as a support of the hump-shape thesis (cp. Chapter 4.6). The 
positive effect of unemployment benefits seems to be in-line with theoretical consider-
ations and to be robust even if controlled for different macroeconomic shocks (Column 3-
5) except of labour demand shocks (Column 5). The results for the direct effects of 
employment protection and product market regulation have to be handled with caution (cp. 
Chapter 4.6). With regard to the globalization indicators, the results seem to be more clear-
ly, foreign trade flows (which reflect the openness of the economy) increase unemploy-
ment as well as weak trade restrictions have a significant positive effect on unemployment. 
These results have been controlled for common unobserved macroeconomic shocks in 
terms of common time effects (Column 1 and 2), country-specific unobserved shocks (in 
terms of the output gap (Column 3)), country-specific observed shocks (without labour 
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demand shocks (Column 4) and including labour demand shocks (Column 6)). The output 
gap as a proxy for unobserved macroeconomic shocks seems to be very suitable to explain 
the development of unemployment over the time. The empirical evidence is given in a 
couple of empirical studies which states highly significant estimation coefficients in vari-
ous specifications (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 14).  Additionally, the use of the output 
gap as a proxy for macroeconomic shocks seems suitable, the replacement of the output 
gap by more specific macroeconomic shocks (such as productivity, interest rate or terms of 
trade shocks) does not affect the reported estimation coefficients (cp. Bassanini & Duval 
2009: p. 43). The control for labour demand shocks seems to be highly significant and 
affects the results more than the other shocks. But, as mentioned before, the interpretation 
and robustness of these results has to be handled with care. 
 
The results reveal that most of the detected significant effects are robust to the control for 
macroeconomic cyclical developments whereas some are not. Thus, the direct effects of 
the different measurements of macroeconomic shocks capture some of the direct effects of 
the institutions such as the effect of product market regulation (cp. Table 1). Thereby, the 
output gap has the expected significant negative effect on unemployment, whereas the 
productivity shock seems to be not significant. The interest rate shock, the terms of trade 
shock and the labour demand shock have significant positive effects on unemployment. 
Even if the estimation coefficient of the output gap is significant, the result has to be 
handle with caution due to potential endogeneity of the variable (cp. Bassanini & Duval 
2006: p. 14).  
 
4.4 Institutional interactions and complementarities 
The second model specification can be seen as an expansion of the baseline model 
explaining unemployment by institutional interactions. This section is directly referred to 
the second set of working hypotheses. As mentioned above, the interaction of institutions 
is to a large extent indisputable and plays a major role within the analysis of the effects of 
institutions on unemployment and other macroeconomic indicators. There is a broad 
spectrum of possible interactions between different institutions and the theoretical and 
empirical correlations are complex and still ambiguous. The simple interaction between 
two institutions Land LN can be expressed by the model modification of the baseline 
model which is described above. Thus, institutional interactions can be modelled as 
multiplicative terms which reflect the product of deviations of the institutions from their 
sample mean (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 18f): 
 
HI =JKK LHIK + N<LHI − LO=<LHIN − LON= + M*HI + H + 0I + 2HI	 ( 39 ) 
where LO and LON capture the cross-country sample means of an institution variable over 
time. Thus, the associated coefficient  indicates the marginal effect of institution L at 
the sample mean LO in the case where all other variables are stable at their sample means. 
In order to illustrate the effects of institutional interactions in the model, a simple 
interaction between two institutions which are expected to increase unemployment (e.g. the 
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tax wedge and unemployment benefits) can be analysed. Thus, a positive interaction 
coefficient N can be interpreted as evidence for institutional or political complemen-
tarities. That means, the marginal effect of institution L (e.g. tax wedge) is larger the 
lower the value of LN (e.g. unemployment benefits). Consequently, a large set of potential 
institutional interactions can be analysed within such framework but the empirical analysis 
runs into statistical and technical problems. An extension of the equation to more inter-
action terms demands for the inclusion of all implicit interactions with reducing the risk of 
coefficient bias. However, theory suggests that all potential interactions are possible but 
the addition of more than two institutions (and all potential combination terms) leads to a 
loss of degrees of freedom (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: pp. 18, 49). A systematic analysis 
of institutional interactions has been described by Bassanini and Duval (2006), who are 
starting with a pair-wise comparison of all potential interaction terms of the variables from 
the baseline model. Despite the statistical and theoretical problems of implicit interactions 
such an analysis of the single interaction effect provides a good overview about all poten-
tial effects and gives first insights. According to the results of various sensitive checks 
reported in Bassanini and Duval (2006) only a few of these interaction effects can be 
expected to be robust, respectively the negative effect of interaction between unemploy-
ment benefit and union density (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 23f). The following 
specifications have been based on theoretical assumptions on the interaction between 
institutions and different bargaining regimes such as high or intermediated corporatism and 
interactions between institutions and globalization.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the second model specifications which focus on the effects of 
institutional interactions. Column 1 shows the effects of the interactions between the 
baseline variables with the dummies for high corporatism and intermediated corporatism as 
well as the interaction with globalization in terms of foreign trade flows. The interaction 
effects have been controlled for the direct effects of the baseline variables as well as for 
common macroeconomic shocks (time effects) and the output gap. The results for the inter-
actions with high and intermediated corporatism show that the marginal effects are nearly 
the same for high or intermediated corporatism. With regard to the interaction effects of 
the institutional variables with foreign trade flows, the coverage rate, product market 
regulation, the tax wedge and weak trade restrictions seem to have significant negative 
interaction effects while the interaction effect of employment protection and foreign trade 
flows is significant and positive. The other interaction effects are not significant in that 
estimation specification.29   
                                                 
29
 The reasons for insignificant (interaction) effects surely should be discussed in more detail, at this point it 
solely can be considered that potential multicollinearity has been taken into account (e.g. between 
employment protection and product market regulation or trade restrictions). 
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Table 2: Unemployment explained by interactions between globalization and bargain 
regimes, 1980-2010 
 
 1 2 3 4 
   interaction incl. corporatism 
dummies and globalization 
within sample of 
high corporatism 
within sample of 
intermediate 
corporatism 
within sample of 
low corporatism 
direct effects 
    
union density 0.080*** 0.001 0.100 0.068 
coverage 0.002 -0.056 0.007 0.071 
high corporatism -5.991*** 
   
intermediate corporatism -5.646*** 
   
gross replacement rate 0.079*** 0.032 -0.124 0.019 
employment protection -3.209*** -2.480* -0.781 -6.843 
product market regulation 0.115 -1.027*** 0.111 0.239 
tax wedge 0.117*** 0.245*** 0.068 0.055 
active labour market policies -0.066*** -0.103*** -0.054*** -0.350*** 
foreign trade flows 0.055*** 0.054* -0.003 0.008 
trade restrictions 0.067*** -0.038 0.063 0.070 
interacting with corporatism high intermediate 
   
union density 0.185 0.189 
   
coverage -0.345*** -0.288*** 
   
unemployment  benefit -0.107 -0.085 
   
employment protection 0.146 0.880 
   
product market regulation 2.369** 2.845*** 
   
tax wedge 0.239** 0.249** 
   
active labour market policies -0.420*** -0.391*** 
   
foreign trade flows 0.251* 0.291** 
   
trade restrictions 0.244* 0.238 
   
interacting with foreign trade flows 
   
union density -0.002 -0.004** 0.000 -0.007 
coverage -0.003** -0.004 -0.002 0.001 
gross replacement rate 0.000 0.004* 0.008 0.003 
employment protection 0.304*** 0.041 0.225*** 0.334 
product market regulation -0.039** -0.03 -0.047 -0.174*** 
tax wedge -0.010*** -0.026*** -0.001 -0.009 
active labour market policies -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.012 
trade restrictions -0.003* 0.008*** -0.006* -0.026*** 
output gap -0.430*** -0.419*** -0.328*** -0.236*** 
country effects yes yes yes yes 
time effects yes yes yes yes 
N 511 255 158 98 
r2 0.77 0.79 0.84 0.97 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Estimation: OLS allowing for heteroscedastic; all estimations including time and country effects which control for common 
unobserved macroeconomic developments as well as unobserved country characteristics (not represented in the table). 
Source: Estimations based on data described in Annex I. 
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Surprisingly, the interaction effects of the baseline variables with either high or interme-
diated corporatism have been nearly the same. One explanation is that this can be the result 
of the particular model specification where the institutions have been modelled as devia-
tions from the sample mean. In order to understand the interaction effects of labour market 
institutions and globalization and to capture the different bargaining regimes, Column 2-4 
represent the interaction model for each of the three bargaining subtypes. Thus, the results 
for the subsample of high corporatism are represented in Column 2, for the subsample of 
intermediated regimes in Column 3 and for the subsample of low corporatism economies 
in Column 4. The main results can be summarized as follows. The direct effects of the 
baseline variables become more or less insignificant in the context of the single sub-
samples except of the active labour market policies which are significant negative related 
with unemployment in all three subsamples with a higher impact in the sample of low cor-
poratism and a lower in the subsample of intermediated bargaining regimes. Only in the 
sample of high corporatism, other direct effects seems to be relevant respectively the 
negative effect of product market regulation on unemployment and the positive effects of 
tax wedge and actual foreign trade flows. With regard to the interaction of the institutions 
with foreign trade flows, there are some remarkable differences across the results of the 
single subsamples. In the sample of high corporatism, the tax wedge as well as union den-
sity has significant negative effects and unemployment benefits and weak trade restrictions 
have significant positive effects while interacting with foreign trade flows. In the sub-
sample of intermediated corporatism, the results change significantly where only the 
interaction of employment protection with foreign trade flows is significant positive related 
with unemployment and the interaction between weak trade restrictions and foreign trade is 
negative related to unemployment. In the subsample of low corporatism, the relations 
change again where the interactions between product market regulation and weak trade 
restrictions with foreign trade flows reduce unemployment significant. 
 
4.5 Interactions between institutions and macroeconomic shocks 
Finally, the baseline model can be expanded in order to capture the interaction between 
institutions and observed or unobserved macroeconomic shocks (cp. Blanchard & Wolfers 
2000: p. 19ff; for the following formal description cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: pp. 35–
40). According to Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) the interaction between time-invariant 
institutions and macroeconomic developments can be expressed in an unemployment 
equation such as: 
 HI =JKK LHIK + 0I P1 +JK<LOHK − LOK=K Q + H + 2HI	 ( 40 ) 
where the direct effects of institutions are capture by the first term ∑ KK LHIK  used in the 
estimations above. Unobserved, that means undefined and common, macroeconomic 
shocks are captured by the time-effects 0I which interact with time-invariant institutions 
described by LOHKthe country average of institution j for country i minus the sample average 
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of institution j. Thus, the time-invariant institution has been multiplied with each coeffi-
cient of the time-dummies for each year. In other words, the common time-effects (the 
average development of unemployment over the time) have been weighted by the country-
specific deviation of the institution from the sample mean.30 
 
Such estimation can be modified for unobserved but country-specific macroeconomic 
shocks such as the output gap or observed macroeconomic shocks such as a productivity 
slowdown or terms of trade shocks expressed in the following equation:  
 HI =JKK LHIK + SJTUHI VP1 +JK<LOHK − LOK=K Q + H + 2HI	 ( 41 ) 
where the common undefined variable of time-effects 0I is substituted by the output gap or 
a set of observed that means country-specific shocks UHI . The assumption behind such 
specification is that macroeconomic shocks either observed or not, affect unemployment 
not directly but indirectly through the country-specific institutional framework.  
 
The results represented in Table 3 show the estimation models which are specified for the 
interaction effects of institution and macroeconomic shocks. Interactions with common 
unobserved shocks (time-effects) are included in Column 1, the interaction with the 
county-specific output gap is included in Column 2 and Column 3 represents the inter-
action effects of the baseline variables with country-specific observed macroeconomic 
shocks. The interaction effects are controlled for the direct effects of the institutions as 
well as country and time effects. 
  
                                                 
30
 Note that this approach follows directly Bassanini and Duval (2006) whereas their description is not that 
clear at this point. 
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Table 3: Unemployment explained by interactions between institutions and macroeconomic 
shocks, 1980-2010 
 1 2 3 
 common 
unobserved 
shocks 
specific 
unobserved 
shocks 
specific observed shocks 
(1980-2003) 
direct effects 
   
union density 0.122*** 0.085*** 0.260*** 
coverage -0.041*** -0.052*** -0.059*** 
high corporatism -1.635** -0.611 -3.288*** 
intermediate corporatism -0.264 0.918 -2.297** 
gross replacement rate 0.043** 0.058*** 0.013 
employment protection 0.978* 0.215 0.363 
product market regulation -0.634*** -0.234 0.035 
tax wedge 0.124*** 0.054** 0.063* 
active labour market policies -0.113*** -0.107*** -0.070*** 
foreign trade flows 0.062*** 0.062*** -0.049** 
trade restrictions 0.031 0.034* 0.080** 
interacting with 
macroeconomic shocks 
time effects output gap productivity 
shock 
interest rate 
shock 
terms of 
trade shock 
labour 
demand 
union density 0.006 0.001 -1.666*** -0.007 0.002 0.434 
coverage 0.011 -0.018*** 1.582*** 0.025*** -0.001 1.383*** 
high corporatism 0.569 -0.204 -45.075 -0.589 0.324 -68.758** 
intermediate corporatism 1.577** 0.263 -63.754 -1.171** -0.262 -102.001*** 
gross replacement rate 0.038*** -0.012*** -0.703 0.020** -0.008 -1.103 
employment protection 0.530* 0.231** -8.094 0.043 -0.145 10.316 
product market regulation -0.523*** 0.022 -9.95 0.058 -0.045 -12.117*** 
tax wedge -0.058*** 0.061*** -0.632 -0.062*** 0.000 0.714 
active labour market policies -0.080*** -0.009 1.407 0.018 -0.007* 0.404 
foreign trade flows 0.004 0.013*** -0.816* -0.014** -0.009** -0.717 
trade restrictions 0.058*** -0.005 -0.315 0.019 0.020** -0.568 
country effects yes yes yes 
time effects yes yes yes 
N 511 511 333 
r2 0.66 0.68 0.82 
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
Estimation: OLS allowing for heteroscedastic; all estimations including time and country effects which control for common 
unobserved macroeconomic developments as well as unobserved country characteristics (not represented in the table). 
Column 3 represents interactions between all institutions and 4 specific observed macroeconomic shocks which are included 
in a single estimation equation. This model covers the period from 1980 to 2003. 
Source: Estimations based on data described in Annex I. 
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The main results can be summarized as follows. Columns 1 shows that the interaction 
effects of institutions with common macroeconomic developments have been significant. 
Thus, the common developments of unemployment have been increased through the inter-
action with intermediated corporatism, unemployment benefits, employment protection 
and weak trade restrictions whereas the interaction with product market regulation, the tax 
wedge and active labour market policies reduce unemployment in the observed sample. 
 
Column 2 shows that some significant changes accrue when the same interaction effects of 
the baseline variables are interacting with the output gap instead of common time-effects. 
The results point out that the coverage rate as well as the unemployment benefit level have 
negative interaction effects on unemployment when interacting with the output gap. On the 
other hand, employment protection, the tax wedge and actual foreign trade flows are 
positive related to unemployment when interacting with the output gap. With regard to the 
interaction of the variables with specific observed macroeconomic shocks, Column 3 
shows that the interaction of a productivity shock with the union density rate has a signifi-
cant negative effect on unemployment and the interaction of a productivity shock with the 
coverage rate a significant positive interaction effect. At the same time, the interaction of 
interest rate shock with the tax wedge and intermediated wage bargaining is negative 
correlated with unemployment. The interaction of an interest rate shock with the coverage 
rate and unemployment benefits are positive related. With regard to a terms of trade shock, 
the interaction with active labour market policies as well as foreign trade flows have 
negative marginal effects and positive effects if interacting with weak trade restrictions. 
The interaction of a labour demand shocks with institutions seems to be significant in the 
case of the coverage rate which shows positive marginal effects. High and intermediated 
corporatism as well as product market regulation show negative interaction effects. Beside 
the main results described above, there have been a lot more information in the result 
tables which have the potential to be discussed in another context. 
 
4.6 Summary and discussion of the results 
The empirical analysis reveals several potential problems concerning the data and the used 
econometric methods. Nevertheless, the research question stated in the beginning can be 
discussed in the light of the represented theoretical framework and empirical analysis. First 
of all it seems to be clear and unambiguous that, generally spoken, institutions affect actual 
unemployment.  
 
The results from Table 1 provide good evidence on the direct effects of institutions on 
actual unemployment even if controlled for country- and time effects as well as for specific 
macroeconomic developments. Therefore, the first set of hypotheses seems to be true for 
that couple of institutions. Thus, the union density rate, unemployment benefits, the tax 
wedge, foreign trade flows and weak trade restrictions have been significantly positive 
related with actual unemployment in the most specifications. On the other hand, the cover-
age rate, the coordination of collective wage bargaining, product market regulation and 
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active labour market policies have been significantly negative related to actual unem-
ployment in the most specifications. Other labour market institutions which were expected 
to be relevant were not significant in most specifications such as the level of bargaining or 
employment protection. The results of Table 1 suggest that the effects of those institutions 
have been captured by other institutions due to interaction effects and/or multicollinearity. 
With regard to the second part of analysis targeting on the explanation of unemployment 
trough institutional interactions, the picture is less clear. The results represented in Table 2 
show that the interaction of institutions with globalization changed over the three sub-
sample of different corporatism regimes. Thus, some interaction effects are significant in 
one subsample such as the negative interaction effect of the tax wedge and globalization in 
high corporatism economies whereas the same interaction effect is not significant in the 
other subsamples. Therefore, the results have to be handled with caution due to potential 
implicit interaction effects. With regard to the third part of analysis, the interaction bet-
ween time-invariant institutions and macroeconomic shocks, the results are less con-
vincing. Even if some of the proven interaction effects seem to be significant and relevant, 
the overall benefit from such an approach in order to explain unemployment is weak. By 
comparing the predictions of the three different approaches, the interaction between 
macroeconomic shocks and institutions provide no additional explanation of actual unem-
ployment in the OECD. This observation is in-line with former findings, hence, “inter-
actions between average values of these institutions and shocks make no significant 
additional contribution to our understanding of OECD unemployment changes” (Nickell et 
al. 2005: p. 1). 
 
But do the results correspond with other existing empirical findings? In order to assess an 
overview about existing empirical research, Bassanini and Duval (2006) delivered a useful 
comprehensive and detailed survey about the existing empirical studies and their results 
(cp. Table A1 in Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 61ff). On that basis, the results from the 
empirical analysis presented above can be compared and discussed in the following sec-
tion. Thereby, the discussion concerns the theoretical argumentation and the expected 
relation between single institutions and unemployment (instead of technical considerations 
concerning the methodology). The discussion of the results is subsumed under the fol-
lowing dimensions i) the wage-setting system and coordination of bargaining, ii) the social 
security system, flexibility and regulation of labour markets and iii) additional indicators 
referring to globalization and competitiveness. 
 
The relevance of the collective bargaining systems on the wage- and price setting process 
and on aggregated labour demand and supply, and therefore on unemployment, is obvious. 
According to the theoretical considerations and empirical studies, bargaining power - in 
terms of trade union membership and the coverage of collective agreements - affects the 
wage-setting through higher wage claims over the equilibrium level or warrant wage. Thus, 
bargaining power seems to be positive correlated with unemployment (cp. Bassanini & 
Duval 2006: p. 70f). Thus, the wage claims of the working union members – the insiders – 
do not have to take into account the negative effects on employment. The consequences 
strongly affect those groups where labour supply is more elastic such as youth, women and 
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old-age workers which alternatives are education, household production and retirement. 
Whatever the bargaining power comes from, the effect of the bargaining power on wages 
and unemployment depends on the specific structure of the collective bargaining as well 
(cp. Traxler & Kittel 2000: p. 1154ff). With regard to the results presented above, the 
current analysis supports the former findings that high union density is positively related to 
unemployment whereas the effect of the coverage rate is not that clear. Especially, the 
interaction between the coverage rate and high (or intermediated) corporatism seems to 
reduce unemployment. 
 
The dimension of the structure of the collective bargaining, namely the coordination and 
centralization within collective bargaining systems, is a central aspect of the analytic 
framework and relevant for the understanding of the Philips curve relation. Accordingly, 
the literature has been extensive and the data base steadily increases. The discussion 
follows the argumentation, that decentralized wage bargaining on firm level is most 
employment-friendly allowing wage-setting at the factor price frontier. But on the other 
hand, a (negative) effect of centralized and coordinated collective bargaining is less clear 
and still ambiguous. According to the hump-shape thesis, economies with liberal and 
decentralized wage-setting as well as economies with a high degree of corporatism are 
associated with good labour market performance and low unemployment. Whereas in 
economies with an intermediated wage-setting regime (where collective bargaining take 
place at the regional or sectoral level without coordination), is associated with bad per-
formance and high unemployment. A series of different studies have been related to the 
effects of corporatism on unemployment Where some studies postulate a positive effect of 
strong and coordinated unions and unemployment (e.g. Flanagan et al. 1983; Bruno & 
Sachs 1985; Soskice 1990; Calmfors 2001: p. 34), other studies support the hump-shaped 
relation (e.g. Calmfors et al. 1988; Scarpetta 1996; Elmeskov et al. 1998). Nevertheless, it 
can be noted that the positive effect of coordination on employment has been widely 
accepted and there has apparently existed a broad consensus about that relation (cp. Driffill 
2006: p. 8; Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 71). With regard to the empirical analysis above, 
the represented results can be seen as a support of the positive effects of coordination or 
high corporatism on unemployment whereas the hump-shape relation or the negative effect 
of intermediated corporatism is not that clear. The findings suggest, that particular high 
corporatism is significant and negative related with unemployment whereas intermediated 
corporatism is not that significant. An interesting aspect is that labour market institutions 
have very different effects in the different subsamples of corporatism (cp. Table 2). Thus, 
the significance as well as the strength of the effects depend to a large extend on the 
particular specification whereas the direction of the effect is clear and unambiguous in 
most cases. Moreover, the results point out that the interaction effects of several institu-
tions with high corporatism (such as product market regulation, the tax wedge or high 
globalization) have been positive on unemployment. 
 
The entire social security system as well as all institutions and political regulations which 
affect the flexibility of labour markets have been seen as relevant factors determining 
actual and particular equilibrium unemployment. In the context of the current analysis the 
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unemployment benefits, the employment protection legislation and the regulation of 
product markets are relevant due to the theoretical and empirical findings. The theoretical 
analytic framework as well as the existing empirical studies have suggested a significant 
positive impact of the benefit replacement rates and the benefit duration on unemployment 
(e.g. Scarpetta 1996; Nickell 1997; Elmeskov et al. 1998; Nickell et al. 2005). Thus, high 
benefit replacement rates and long benefit duration seem to increase unemployment 
through two mechanisms. On the one hand, it can be considered that unemployment bene-
fits reduce the job-search intensity and the acceptance of job-offers and therefore, reduce 
the efficiency of the matching-process between unemployment and vacancies. On the other 
hand it can be assumed that unemployment benefits increase the pressure on wage-claims 
due to lower economic cost of unemployment. This results in lower vacancies and finally 
in higher unemployment. Additionally, higher unemployment benefits demand for higher 
taxes which can result in higher unemployment as well. With regard to the results of the 
empirical analysis above, the positive relation between unemployment benefits and 
unemployment seems to be relative robust in most of the specifications. 
 
But the theoretical considerations are not that clear as such empirical findings suggest. 
With regard to the matching process, unemployment benefits allows job-seekers for better 
matches inducing lower successive job separations and enhancing productivity. Further-
more, the unemployment benefit system has to be reflected in the light of the entire social 
security system. Thus, unemployment benefits are often seen as a necessary social function 
ensuring social stability and cohesion. In conclusion, the effects of unemployment benefits 
can be described as a kind of trade-off between efficiency and equality. On the one hand, if 
the negative effects on job-search and wage claims prevail the positive effects on the 
quality of the matches, the argument demands for low and short unemployment benefits. 
On the other hand, unemployment benefits protect the whole society in the case of unex-
pected job-losses and allow the unemployed further job-searches. That function is strongly 
related to the effects of employment protection (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 60). The 
regulation of labour and product markets is theoretical and empirical ambiguous. There-
fore, employment protection affects unemployment via various mechanisms and the net-
effect depends on the elasticity of labour demand and supply and the initial unemployment 
level. Thereby, the data seems to be very fragile and invalid and the results are highly 
influenced by the developments of a couple of countries such as Spain and Portugal where 
institutions and unemployment changes to a large extend (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 
12). According to the flow models of the search- and matching theory, the effects of 
employment protection on actual or equilibrium unemployment are unclear and ambigu-
ous. Hence, two different mechanism of employment protection affect the unemployment 
rate. It can be assumed that i) high employment protection decreases the job destruction 
and the inflow in unemployment through strong protection of regular workers and high 
firing cost for the firms and ii) high employment protection decreases the flexibility of job 
allocation and job construction through higher risk and cost for the firms (cp. Boeri & Van 
Ours 2013: p. 2). Whereas the net-effect on unemployment is still unclear, the effects on 
the duration of unemployment are obvious, the higher employment protection the higher 
the average unemployment duration. The effects of unemployment benefits as well as of 
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employment protection seem to be influenced by their specific interactions with other 
institutions. Consequently, the argumentation captures only a part of the entire system and 
hides supplementary effects of the benefit system which demands for an analysis of institu-
tional interactions and complementarities. The debate of the so-called two-tier reforms of 
the European labour markets reflects such potential complementarities (Boeri & Garibaldi 
2007; Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 290f). 
 
A quite good example is the reform of the Danish benefit system – broad discussed under 
the term of flexicurity. Thus, the Danish system which obviously consist of a high level of 
unemployment benefits is characterized by a couple of reforms towards tight incentives 
and strict sanctions or active labour market policies on the one hand and flexible employ-
ment protection on the other hand. This comprehensive political reforms have been seen as 
a key factor for a decrease of Danish unemployment rate (cp. Layard et al. 2005: p. xxix; 
referring to Finansministeriet 1999: chap. 2).31 The new credo of active labour market 
policy and flexicurity has been supported by an increase of global competition (cp. Driffill 
2006: p. 12f). According to Blanchard (2013) the right motto for labour markets should 
follow “protect workers no jobs” (Blanchard et al. 2013: p. 5). There is an increasing 
attention on the effects of product market regulation which are usually seen as one of the 
main causes for (European) unemployment (cp. Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003: p. 879). Ac-
cording to Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) product market deregulation “comes with a 
strong intertemporal trade-off” (Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003: p. 880), hence deregulation 
seems to reduce unemployment in the long-run but the effects in short-run have been 
associated with lower real wages and higher unemployment. Thus, the political economy 
plays a major role in the understanding of product market regulation reforms where de-
regulation of product markets influenced labour market regulation through reducing 
workers opposition to deregulation (cp. Blanchard & Giavazzi 2003: p. 900f). 
 
The results of the represented empirical analysis do not provide a clear relation between 
employment protection, product market regulation, unemployment benefits and actual un-
employment which can be seen in-line with the former existing ambiguous findings 
described above. Nevertheless, the postulated negative effects of active labour market 
policies on unemployment have been highly supported by the results presented above. But 
even if the negative effects of active labour market policies on actual unemployment seem 
to be clear they have to be handled with caution. Thus, active labour market policies often 
affect actual unemployment directly through the status of unemployed persons. Often, 
persons in active labour market programs have been subtracted from the unemployment 
rate without being employed. 
 
In the course of the debate about globalization, labour taxation has been one of the most 
mentioned cause of unemployment in the context of increasing global competition (cp. 
Daveri & Tabellini 2000: p. 47ff). But even if there is a large consensus that the effects are 
similar for all kind of payroll taxes, individual income taxes as well as consumption taxes, 
                                                 
31
 It has been postulated that the decline of unemployment reflects a decline of equilibrium unemployment 
due to the absence of inflation pressure. 
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the empirical evidence of the overall effects is unclear (cp. Nickell et al. 2005: p. 8f; 
Blanchard 2006: pp. 31–34). Thus, the sum of those relevant taxes, the so-called tax-
wedge, describes the difference between the cost of labour for the employees and the net 
benefits for the employers and seems to be the relevant criteria in order to analyze the 
effects on unemployment. In the course of an increasing mobility of capital and a growing 
product market competition, the discussion about the tax-wedge has been moved into the 
focus of research. With regard to the mobility of capital in the long-run, labour demand 
depends on the real labour cost including the exogenous real capital cost and the level of 
technological progress, the so-called factor price frontier. Although in a world of a perfect-
ly competitive labour market, the total tax burden is hold solely by the workers and 
therefore does not affect the labour market equilibrium, such assumptions do not hold for 
several reasons (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 60ff). Hence, recent empirical findings are 
ambiguous, some studies have postulated positive effects of labour taxation on unemploy-
ment (e.g. Nickell 1997; Belot & Van Ours 2004) whereas other researchers are less clear 
(e.g. Scarpetta 1996; Nunziata 2002; Di Tella & MacCulloch 2005). An interesting aspect 
is the interaction with the collective bargaining system, whereas the positive effect of the 
tax wedge on unemployment increases with the bargaining power of trade unions in low or 
intermediated coordinated bargaining systems (e.g. Elmeskov et al. 1998; Daveri & 
Tabellini 2000). In the context of strong trade unions but less coordination in bargaining 
process, it can be assumed that higher taxes have been compensated by higher wage 
claims. The results of the represented empirical analysis support the direct positive effects 
of taxes on unemployment whereas the postulated interaction with different types of 
corporatism is less clear. But Table 2 shows that the positive direct effect of the tax-wedge 
is only significant in the context of high corporatism. 
 
According to the empirical findings of Gozgor (2013), globalization (measured by different 
indicators) seems to be significant and negative related with unemployment which have 
been in-line with theoretical considerations (cp. Gozgor 2013: p. 16). This relation is not 
supported by the current empirical results where the KOF indicators for economic globali-
zation are significant positive related with unemployment in most of the specifications (cp. 
Table 1-3). Thus, the recent Financial Crisis 2007 revealed another aspect of globalization 
which can be described as higher risk and fluctuations due to the strong dependencies and 
deep financial connections (cp. Giannone et al. 2011: p. 111ff; Gozgor 2013: p. 2; Boeri & 
Van Ours 2013: p. 3).  
 
5 Conclusion 
To which extend can OECD unemployment be explained by institutions, institutional 
interactions and interactions between institutions and macroeconomic shocks? 
The historical developments represented in Chapter 2 illustrate the major theoretical and 
empirical problems which have been mentioned in the beginning. Labour market 
institutions can explain cross-country differences but rarely the developments over time 
due to relative small changes over time. Certainly, a close look to the developments of the 
relevant institutions such as the collective bargaining system, unemployment benefits, 
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labour taxes or employment protection shows that a lot of changes accrue. But those 
changes cannot explain the developments of unemployment alone. The developments of 
labour market institutions as well as the developments of unemployment in the OECD do 
not follow any unique trend or direction. There is no clear trend or convergence towards 
employment- and market friendly labour markets such as Sachs and Warner (1995) have 
postulated. On the other hand, there is no clear direction towards the often cited varieties of 
capitalism which have been characterized by varied institutional settings and comparative 
institutional advantages (cp. Hall & Soskice 2001: p. 36ff). Consequently, the relation and 
interactions seem to be much more complex than former theories suggest and include the 
whole political economy. 
 
In order to answer the central research question, the theoretical framework and the empiri-
cal assessments, which are represented above, deliver some important answers. Thus, the 
first and most evident impression is surely that the extent of different theoretical 
perspectives and the huge amount of empirical data and potential results provide too much 
information for one clear answer. It is rather a question for a comprehensive effort which 
can deal with the whole spectrum of aspects determining (equilibrium) unemployment in 
the OECD. The extensive works from Layard et al. (2005) or Pissarides (2000) can be seen 
as good examples for the demand of a completed and closed theory. But even if they have 
established a useful and differentiated fundament of unemployment explanations, econo-
mic research is still far from that universal understanding of unemployment. Consequently, 
a main challenge is the management of the huge amount of data in order to connect theo-
retic assumptions with empirical approaches. The present work has to be seen in this 
context. Therefore, clear answers or political recommendations are surely limited.  
 
The main implications from the experience of the empirical analysis with up-to-date data 
are that: i) institutions can explain actual unemployment to a large extend due to direct 
effects as well as institutional interactions, ii) macroeconomic shocks contribute to the 
explanation of actual unemployment due to direct effects as well as interactions with time-
invariant institutions and iii) the empirical analysis of institutional interactions and 
interactions between institutions and macroeconomic shocks provides useful insights but 
contains several technical challenges and theoretical and empirical problems. Where the 
analysis of specific institutional complementarities can provide fruitful insights of the 
developments of unemployment in the OECD, the analysis of the interaction between 
macroeconomic shocks and institutions depends to a large extent on the specific statistical 
approach. Thus, in order to provide robust results, a special focus has to be on the particu-
lar econometric approach including sensitive and robustness checks or extensive estimation 
methods such as Bassanini and Duval (2006, 2009) or Nymoen and Sparrman (2013) 
presented. But even if the empirical analysis of OECD labour markets seems to be still at 
the beginning and a lot of additional efforts have been necessary, the results are actual and 
relevant. The specific effects of institutions and institutional complementarities are 
particular relevant in the context of an increasing globalization, the Financial Crisis 2007 
and the ongoing Euro crisis.  
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The explanations of the Financial Crisis 2007 have primarily focused on i) the deregulation 
of the financial markets, ii) the increasing global current account imbalances and iii) the 
rise of economic inequality in nearly each OECD economy (cp. Stiglitz et al. 2009; De 
Grauwe 2009; Horn et al. 2009; Reich 2010; Rajan 2011). In the case of the EMU, the 
single currency area suffers still from the persistent macroeconomic imbalances and in-
equalities due to the strongly diverging competitiveness (cp. European Commission 2013c: 
p. 26f; European Commission 2014). Thus, the large heterogeneity of national institutional 
conditions was seen as the source of the inner-European inequalities and imbalances. 
These explanations include particular aspects of the institutional framework of an economy 
and consider the entire political economy of the system (cp. inter alia Iversen & Soskice 
2010; Gabor & Ban 2012; Carlin 2013). Within such a framework of “deep-seated 
differences in institutions, culture and trust” (Boltho & Carlin 2013: p. 387), the conse-
quences of the Financial Crisis 2007, which affect the national economies of the EMU 
cause a different and asymmetric reaction as well. Thus, the effects of the Financial Crisis 
2007 have influenced the following debate on economic asymmetries in the EMU to this 
day (cp. European Commission 2014). A good example is the individual success of the 
German economy to recover from the crisis. The export-orientated growth model under the 
strict focus on competitiveness, German labour and product markets have become more 
and more competitive in terms of the relative unit labour costs particularly in relation to 
their European neighbours in the South (cp. inter alia Rinne & Zimmermann 2013; 
Spielmann 2006). At the same time, national economic adjustments are implemented 
through structural policies (rather than monetary policies). But fiscal policy programs 
supporting national economies are limited due to the restrictions and fiscal discipline 
enforced by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However, the success of political 
reforms, such as the EC growth and convergence strategy Europe 2020, will depend on the 
specific understanding of the national labour market institutions. Therefore, the EC re-
commended comprehensive adjustments of the national labour markets including 
collective bargaining systems (cp. European Commission 2013c: p. 18).  
 
The present work shows that unemployment is not only affected by national labour market 
institutions but as well by increasing global dependencies and the so-called financiali-
zation. Whereas globalization is used to be negative related with unemployment, the 
Financial Crisis 2007 has had the greatest impact on employment in those economies 
which are highly globalized and where firm financing depends to a large extend on 
financial markets such as in Ireland, United Kingdom, United States, New Zealand and 
(since deregulation of the financial markets) Spain (cp. Figure 6). In the light of the current 
adverse shock, the financial crisis, a useful explanation for the different impacts are the 
differences in the degree of the “financial deepening” (Boeri & Van Ours 2013: p. 3) 
which, in turn, produce the economic turbulences described above. Freeman (2010) 
summarized the threat of financialization with regard to the OECD Employment Outlook 
2009 as a “laissez-faire experiment failed on two counts. Deregulation of finance produced 
greater instability in capital markets, with no compensating boost for growth of output, 
profits, or earnings save in the finance sector itself. When finance collapsed, efforts to 
increase labour flexibility did little to insulate workers and the real economy from the costs 
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of financial mismanagement – costs that are, by any measure, massive.”(Freeman 2010: p. 
171) Therefore, recent research efforts targeted on the theoretical interactions and 
empirical measurements of the rising financialization of the OECD economies (cp. Epstein 
2005: p. 3; Palley 2007: p. 3f) and recent empirical analysis of the effects of financializa-
tion on unemployment suggested a significant positive correlation (cp. Assa 2012: p. 38). 
Labour markets are strongly influenced by changes of corporate governance, corporate 
finance and financial markets. The measurement of institutions which reflect such financial 
deepening or (de-)regulation of financial markets is still at the beginning. The work of 
Chinn and Ito (2008) on the so-called Chinn-Ito Index (cp. Chinn & Ito 2008 updated in 
2013 (up  to 2011)) can be seen as a potential source for new empirical studies on the 
relation and interaction between unemployment, labour market institutions and institutions 
of financialization. The current work suggests an increasing demand for a more compre-
hensive perspective on labour market institutions which takes into account the interaction 
between financial and labour markets. Therefore, the effect of financial deepening or 
financialization on unemployment can be seen as one of the future challenges of labour 
market research.  
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Annex 
Annex I: Data description 
The data used in the empirical analysis covers the following 20 OECD member states over 
the period from 1960 to 2012: 
Australia (AUS)  Austria (AUT)  Belgium (BEL)   Canada (CAN) 
Denmark (DNK)  Finland (FIN)  France (FRA)   Germany (DEU) 
Ireland (IRL)  Italy (ITA)  Japan (JPN)   Netherlands (NLD) 
Norway (NOR)  New Zealand (NZL) Portugal (PRT)   Spain (ESP) 
Sweden (SWE)  Switzerland (CHE) United Kingdom (GBR)  United States (USA) 
 
The range of the single time-series depends on the availability of the data and varies across 
the indicators. Cases where the coverage is limited or a variable shows deviations are 
described below in more detail. Most of the data originates from the OECD Statistical 
Database (http://stats.oecd.org/) as well as from additional source such as the database on 
Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social 
Pacts (ICTWSS) from the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) 
(http://www.uva-aias.net/208), the CEP-OECD Institutions Data Set (1960-2004) from the 
Centre of Economic Performance (CEP) in London (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/ 
data0759.zip) and from indicators which have been provided by previous researchers. 
Particular acknowledgments count for the work from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
Nickell and Nunziata (2001), Nickell et al (2005) and Bassanini and Duval (2006, 2009) 
which serve as a base for data collection. The following descriptions refer to the used 
dataset which is available on request.32 
 
Unemployment rate (%) 
u: Unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labour force (active working age (15-64) 
population). Data is taken from the OECD Labour Force Statistics. 
NAIRU (%) 
u_nairu: The unemployment rate with non-accelerating inflation rate (NAIRU) describes 
the structural unemployment rate consistence with constant price inflation (or wage 
inflation (NAWRU)). The data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Statistics. 
 
Long-term unemployment rate (%) 
u_longterm: The long-term unemployment rate reflects the share of unemployed persons 
for more than one year in relation to all unemployed persons. Data is taken from the OECD 
labour force statistics. 
 
  
                                                 
32
 Please contact knirsch.f@gmail.com. Note that some of the following variables are not directly used in the 
current paper but complement the database and the bold terms referring to the variable names within the 
dataset. 
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Youth unemployment rate (%) 
u_young: The youth unemployment rate reflects the share of unemployed persons in the 
age between 15 and 24 in relation to all unemployed persons. Data is taken from the 
OECD labour force statistics. 
 
Old-age unemployment rate (%) 
u_old: The old-age unemployment rate reflects the share of unemployed persons in the age 
between 55 and 64 in relation to all unemployed persons. Data is taken from the OECD 
labour force statistics. 
 
GDP growth rate (%) 
growth: Real annual GDP growth per capita. Data is taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook statistics. 
 
Output gap (%) 
og: The output gap describes the difference between actual and potential GDP as a percent 
of potential GDP. The data is taken from OECD Economic Outlook Statistics. 
 
Inflation (%) 
cpi: Change of the consumer price index as an annual percentage change on the same 
period of the previous year. Data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook statistics. 
 
Short-term interest rates (%) 
irs: Short-term interest reflects usually the three month interbank offer rate (%). Data is 
taken from the OECD Economic Outlook Statistics. 
 
Immediate interest rates (%) 
irm: The immediate interest rates, Call Money or interbank rate reflects usually the 
overnight (24 hours) or immediate rate (%). Data is taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook Statistics. 
 
Long-term interest rates (%) 
irl: Long-term interest reflects usually the 10 years government bond yields. Data is taken 
from the OECD Economic Outlook Statistics. 
 
Total factor productivity shock 
tfp_shock: The indicator describes the difference of the log of total factor productivity 
from its trend measured by means of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (using a common 
smoothing parameter for annual data (λ=100)). Data is taken from the OECD Economic 
Outlook Statistics.  
The calculation follows Bassanini and Duval (2006) where i) the growth in the Solow 
residual in the business sector is given by: ∆ log(tfp) = 3∆ log(Y) − α∆ log(N) + (1 − α)∆log	(K)4/α 
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where y reflects real business sector GDP, N total employment, K gross capital stock and α 
labour income as a share of business income, ii) an index of log(tfp) describes the 
cumulating annual values of ∆log(tfp) and iii) the final productivity shock is expressed as 
the differences between log(tfp) and its HP filtered trend (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 
83). 
 
Real interest rate shock 
rir_shock: The indicator of real interest rate shock is constructed as the difference between 
long-term interest rate on government bonds (%) and the annual change in GDP deflator 
(%). Data is taken from the OECD Economic Outlook statistics. 
 
Terms of trade shock 
tot_shock: The indicator of terms of trade shock is constructed as the logarithm of relative 
import prices weighted by the share of imports in GDP. Data is taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook Statistics. 
The calculation follows Bassanini and Duval (2006), 
totbcdef = MY ∗ log hpFpij 	 
where M and Y reflects nominal imports and GDP and klmlno 	the relation of import deflator 
to GDP deflator (cp. Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 83). 
 
Labour demand shock 
lds_shock: The indicator of labour demand shock is directly taken from Bassanini and 
Duval (2006) which refer to the approach and methodology of Blanchard (1998) and 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Therefore, a labour demand shock is defined as the  
“logarithm of the labour share in business sector GDP purged from the 
shortrun influence of factor prices. [...]. 
The simplest possible measure of labour demand shocks would be the negative 
of the sum of the logarithm of the ratio of labour input in efficiency units to 
real output in the business sector, on the one hand, and the logarithm of real 
wages in efficiency units, on the other hand. [...] However, this simple measure 
of labour demand shocks is accurate only to the extent that the production 
function is Cobb-Douglas and factor proportions adjust instantaneously to 
changes in factor prices. Insofar as the latter assumption is unlikely to be 
verified in the shortrun, changes in the labour share reflect both genuine 
labour demand shocks and the lagged adjustment of factor proportions to 
changes in factor prices. 
Therefore, it is necessary to purge the labour share from the short-run 
influence of factor prices. [...]  The negative sign implies that an increase in 
this variable should be interpreted as an adverse labour demand shock. 
Finally, this variable is set equal to zero in 1970 (or in the first year of data 
availability for those countries where long time series are unavailable).” 
(Bassanini & Duval 2006: p. 84) 
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Union density rate (%) 
cbs_ud: Union density rate indicates the net union membership as a proportion of wage 
and salary earners in employment {0,100}. Data is taken from the ICTWSS Database. 
 
Coverage rate of collective agreements (%) 
cbs_uc: Employees covered by collective wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of 
all wage and salary earners in employment {0,100}. Data is taken from the ICTWSS 
Database. 
 
Coordination of bargaining {1,5} 
cbs_coor: Index of the degree of coordination within the collective wage bargaining {1,5} 
where:  
 5 = economy-wide bargaining, based on: a) enforceable agreements between the 
central organizations of unions and employers affecting the entire economy or 
entire private sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or 
ceiling.  
 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) central organizations 
negotiate non-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and 
employers associations set pattern for the entire economy. 
 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of 
central organizations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining. 
 2 = mixed or alternating industry- and firm level bargaining, with weak 
enforceability of industry agreements. 
 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, mostly at company level. 
Data is taken from the ICTWSS Database. 
 
Level of bargaining {1,5} 
cbs_level: Index of the dominant level at which collective wage bargaining takes place 
{0,5} where the dominant level is:  
 5 = National or central level. 
 4 = National or central level, with additional sectoral/local or company bargaining. 
 3 = Sectoral or industry level. 
 2 = Sectoral or industry level, with additional local or company bargaining. 
 1 = Local or company bargaining. 
Data is taken from the ICTWSS Database. 
 
Government intervention {1,5} 
cbs_government: Index of the government interventions {0,5} where: 
 5 = Government imposes private sector wage settlements, places a ceiling on 
bargaining outcomes or suspends bargaining. 
 4 = Government participates directly in wage bargaining (tripartite bargaining, as in 
social pacts). 
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 3 = Government influences wage bargaining outcomes indirectly through price 
ceilings, indexation, tax measures, minimum wages, and/or pattern setting through 
public sector wages. 
 2 = Government influences wage bargaining by providing an institutional 
framework of consultation and information exchange, by conditional agreement to 
extend private sector agreements, and/or by providing a conflict resolution 
mechanism which links the settlement of disputes across the economy and/or 
allows the intervention of state arbitrators or Parliament. 
 1 = None of the above. 
Data is taken from the ICTWSS Database. 
 
High corporatism {0,1} 
cbs_high: The indicator describes the degree of corporatism in terms of coordination, 
centralization and government intervention. The indicator is a dummy variable which takes 
1 if either coordination, the level or government intervention is coordinated and/or 
centralized (national or central) and zero otherwise. 
 
Intermediated corporatism {0,1} 
cbs_inter: The indicator describes the degree of corporatism in terms of coordination, 
centralization and government intervention. The indicator is a dummy variable which takes 
1 if collective bargaining is intermediated that means either coordinated and/or centralized 
(national or central) nor uncoordinated and decentralized (none or firm) and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Low corporatism {0,1} 
cbs_low: The indicator describes the degree of corporatism in terms of coordination, 
centralization and government intervention. The indicator is a dummy variable which takes 
1 if either coordination, the level or government intervention is uncoordinated and 
decentralized (none or firm) and zero otherwise. 
 
Unemployment benefit level (%) 
ub_grr: The average gross replacement rate over two income situations (100% and 67% of 
APW earnings), three family types (single, married single earnings, married couple 
earnings) and three unemployment durations (1st ; 2nd and 3rd ; 4th and 5th). Data is taken 
from OECD Benefits and Wages Statistics and missing values were expanded by a linear 
interpolation. 
 
Employment protection {0,2} 
epl: Index of the strictness of employment protection legislation. The data is a combination 
of the index developed by Lazear (1990) (cp. Lazear 1990; Nickell et al. 2001) {0,2} 
which has been expanded with the 1st version of the index developed by the OECD {0,5} 
(for a detailed description and differences cp. Venn 2009). Therefore, the OECD index has 
to be normalized between 0 and 2, where higher values indicate a stricter protection. Data 
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is taken from CEP-OECD Institutions data set (cp. Nickell 2006) and the OECD 
Employment Database. 
 
Product market regulation {0,6} 
pmr: The OECD indicators of regulatory reforms indicate regulatory provisions in seven 
non-manufacturing sectors: telecoms, electricity, gas, post, rail, air passenger transport, and 
road freight and has been estimated over the period of 1975 to 2003. This measurement is 
expanded by an interpolation with the OECD economy-wide product market regulation 
indicator from 2013 (including values for 1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013). The range is {0,6} 
where high values indicate a high degree of regulation. Data is taken from CEP-OECD 
Institutions data set (cp. Nickell 2006) and from the OECD Product Market Statistics for 
1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013. 
 
Tax wedge (%) 
tw: The tax wedge describes the gap between the cost of labour to the employer and the 
employee’s take-home pay that means the average sum of all personal income tax, payroll 
taxes and total social security contributions (including employee and employer 
contribution) expressed as a percentage of total labour cost. Data is taken from CEP-OECD 
Institutions data set (cp. Nickell 2006) and from the OECD Taxing Wages Statistics. 
 
Active labour market policies (%) 
almp_u: The indicator describes the expenditures on active labour market programs as a 
percentage of GDP in relation to the actual unemployment rate. Data is taken from OECD 
Social Expenditures Statistics and OECD Labour Force Statistic. 
 
KOF economic globalization index {0,100} 
kof_economic: The KOF economic globalization index consists of data on actual 
economic flows (including trade (percent of GDP), Foreign Direct Investment stocks 
(percent of GDP), Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)) and trade 
restrictions (including Hidden Import Barriers, Mean Tariff Rates, Taxes on International 
Trade (percent of current revenue), Capital Account Restrictions). The index is constructed 
that higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization. For a detailed description 
please see as well the definition, method and calculations from the ETH Zürich 
(http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/). Data is taken from the KOF Index of Globalization 
Database from the ETH Zürich. 
 
KOF actual foreign trade flows {0,100} 
kof_flow: The sub-index of the KOF economic globalization index consists of data on 
actual foreign trade flows including data on trade (percent of GDP) from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-develop-
ment-indicators), data on foreign direct investment stocks (percent of GDP) from 
UNCTAD STAT (http://unctadstat.unctad.org), data on portfolio investment from the IMF 
Financial Statistics Indicators (http://elibrary-data.imf.org/) and data on income payments 
to foreign nationals (percent of GDP) from the World Bank’s World Development 
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Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators). The in-
dex is constructed so that higher values indicate a higher degree of globalization. For a 
detailed description please see the definition, method and calculations from the ETH 
Zürich (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/). Data is taken from the KOF Index of 
Globalization Database from the ETH Zürich. 
 
KOF trade restrictions {0,100} 
kof_restrictions: The sub-index of the KOF economic globalization index consists of data 
trade restrictions including data on hidden import barriers from the Economic Freedom of 
the World database (cp. Gwartney et al. 2012), data on mean tariff rates from the 
Economic Freedom of the World database (cp. Gwartney et al. 2012), data on taxes on 
international trade (percent of current revenue) from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators) and 
data on capital account restrictions from the Economic Freedom of the World database (cp. 
Gwartney et al. 2012). The index is constructed so that higher values indicate less restric-
tions and a higher degree of globalization. For a detailed description please see the 
definition, method and calculations from the ETH Zürich (http://globalization.kof. 
ethz.ch/). Data is taken from the KOF Index of Globalization Database from the ETH 
Zürich. 
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Annex II: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
mean sd min max obs. years 
unemployment rate 5.47 3.99 0.00 25.13 1060 1960-2012 
NAIRU 5.98 3.10 0.08 20.76 894 1965-2012 
long-term unemployment 0.31 0.18 0.02 0.76 601 1975-2012 
youth unemployment 13.86 8.31 0.46 53.16 755 1960-2012 
old-age unemployment 4.79 3.03 0 21.03 755 1960-2012 
GDP growth  2.68 2.42 -8.54 11.20 858 1960-2011 
output gap -0.38 2.69 -12.21 16.02 802 1970-2012 
inflation 4.85 4.45 -4.50 31.00 1036 1960-2012 
short-term interest rates 6.88 4.53 0.08 24.9 846 1960-2012 
productivity shock 0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.11 862 1960-2012 
interest rate shock 2.67 3.17 -17.08 11.15 1019 1960-2012 
terms of trade shock 6.15 6.89 -9.90 33.77 792 1970-2011 
labour demand shock 0.02 0.06 -0.14 0.24 597 1970-2003 
union density 39.05 19.86 0.09 83.90 1009 1960-2012 
coverage rate 67.51 24.26 13.10 100.00 1012 1960-2012 
bargaining coordination 3.28 1.35 1 5 1060 1960-2012 
bargaining level 2.68 1.18 1 5 1060 1960-2012 
government intervention 2.64 1.27 1 5 1060 1960-2012 
high corporatism 0.57 0.49 0 1 1060 1960-2012 
intermediated 
corporatism 0.28 0.45 0 1 1060 1960-2012 
low corporatism 0.15 0.36 0 1 1060 1960-2012 
unemployment benefits 25.11 13.64 0.00 65.00 1060 1960-2012 
employment protection 0.96 0.54 0 2 1045 1960-2012 
product market 
regulation 3.78 1.48 0.72 6 854 1970-2012 
tax wedge 30.91 10.25 4.5 53.3 824 1970-2012 
ALMP 14.16 12.11 1.57 103.56 580 1985-2012 
KOF foreign trade flows 58.47 22.39 13.13 99.08 820 1970-2010 
KOF trade restriction 79.95 11.80 31.75 98.51 820 1970-2010 
Notes: For a detailed description of data see Annex I. 
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Annex III: Correlation between institutional variables 
Table 5: Cross-country correlation of the institutional variables 
 
union 
density coverage 
high 
corporatism 
un-
employment 
benefits 
employment 
protection 
product 
market 
regulation 
tax wedge ALMP KOF foreign trade flows 
KOF trade 
restrictions 
union density 1 
         
coverage 0.3943* 1 
        
high corporatism 0.2051* 0.4714* 1 
       
unemployment benefits 0.2948* 0.4896* 0.3870* 1 
      
employment protection 0.0102 0.5591* 0.5566* 0.1474* 1 
     
product market regulation 0.0506 0.5416* 0.4270* 0.2659* 0.6683* 1 
    
tax wedge 0.3952* 0.7581* 0.4664* 0.4822* 0.5060* 0.4366* 1 
   
ALMP 0.6397* 0.4199* 0.3230* 0.4989* 0.2096* 0.1846* 0.5606* 1 
  
KOF foreign trade flows 0.4061* 0.2844* 0.2419* 0.5448* -0.1530* 0.2143* 0.1500* 0.4615* 1 
 
KOF trade restrictions 0.2602* 0.4287* 0.1583* 0.4872* 0.0684* 0.1196* 0.5547* 0.4888* 0.4961* 1 
Note: The values represent the cross-country correlation between (time-invariant) country means of the institutional indicators. The star * indicates 
significances at the 5% level or better. For a detailed description of data see Annex I. 
 
Knirsch: Institutions, Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD 
 
78 
 
Annex IV: Comparison with other sources 
Table 6: Variables compared with other sources 
 used data 
1970-2012 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) 
1970-2003 
Nickell and Nunziata (2001) 
1960-1995 
unemployment rate 1 0.9167* 0.9586* 
obs 860 669 515 
union density 1 0.9964* 0.9298* 
obs 819 654 515 
coverage 1 0.9071*  
obs 842 674  
coordination 1  0.6845* 
obs 860  515 
high corporatism 1 0.5652*  
obs 860 674  
unemployment benefits 1 0.9814* 0.7014* 
obs 860 674 515 
employment protection 1 0.8974* 1 
obs 855 669 515 
product market regulation 1 0.9942*  
obs 854 674  
tax wedge 1 0.8155* 0.6800* 
obs 824 505 474 
active labour market policies 1 0.8431*  
obs 580 394  
output gap 1 0.9318*  
obs 802 616  
productivity shock 1 0.6567* 0.7109* 
obs 837 622 508 
interest rate shock 1 0.8936* 0.9062* 
obs 860 674 515 
terms of trade shock 1 0.5879* 0.2059* 
obs 792 615 474 
labour demand shock 1 1 -0.0862 
obs 597 597 466 
Note: Table indicates correlation coefficients and number of observations of the used data, the 
data from Nickell and Nunziata (2001) and Bassanini and Duval (2006). The star * indicates a 
significant level of 5% or better. For a detailed description of the data see Annex I particular 
with regard to the adoption of values from other sources. 
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Annex V: Tables of data developments 
Table 7: Unemployment rate (%) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 2.3 -0.6 1.7 0.3 2.0 2.1 4.1 2.3 6.3 2.3 8.7 -0.5 8.1 1.1 9.2 -2.4 6.8 -1.7 5.1 0.0 5.1 5.4 2.8 
Austria 2.1 -0.1 1.9 -0.4 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.9 2.4 1.3 3.7 -0.3 3.4 0.6 4.0 -0.1 3.9 0.9 4.7 -0.4 4.3 3.0 2.2 
Belgium 2.6 -0.8 1.8 0.4 2.3 2.2 4.5 4.7 9.1 3.5 12.6 -2.8 9.8 2.9 12.7 -4.4 8.3 -0.1 8.2 -0.6 7.6 7.2 5.0 
Canada 6.7 -2.4 4.3 1.1 5.4 1.2 6.6 1.8 8.4 2.1 10.5 -1.5 9.0 1.0 10.0 -2.5 7.5 -0.7 6.8 0.6 7.4 7.5 0.8 
Denmark 1.9 -0.4 1.5 -0.4 1.0 3.6 4.6 3.9 8.6 -0.9 7.7 0.6 8.3 -0.4 7.8 -2.8 5.1 -0.2 4.9 1.6 6.5 5.3 4.6 
Finland 1.3 0.4 1.8 0.9 2.7 0.5 3.2 2.4 5.7 -0.4 5.3 0.6 5.9 9.3 15.2 -5.2 9.9 -1.8 8.2 -0.5 7.7 6.1 6.4 
France 1.2 0.2 1.5 0.9 2.3 1.1 3.5 2.6 6.0 3.1 9.1 -0.5 8.6 1.8 10.4 -1.7 8.7 -0.3 8.4 0.5 9.0 6.2 7.7 
Germany 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.8 2.2 3.0 1.2 4.3 2.8 7.1 -1.3 5.8 2.9 8.7 -0.3 8.4 1.6 10.0 -3.2 6.8 5.1 6.0 
Ireland 5.7 -0.6 5.1 0.8 5.9 1.8 7.7 1.2 8.9 7.2 16.1 -1.2 14.9 -1.9 13.0 -7.7 5.4 -0.7 4.7 7.6 12.3 9.1 6.7 
Italy 1.5 -0.2 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.5 1.7 0.5 2.2 0.5 2.7 -0.5 2.2 0.8 3.1 1.7 4.8 -0.3 4.5 0.1 4.6 2.7 3.1 
Japan 1.5 5.8 7.3 -2.6 4.6 -0.7 3.9 0.3 4.2 -0.5 3.7 -1.2 2.5 -0.1 2.4 2.6 5.0 -1.5 3.5 -0.1 3.4 3.8 2.0 
Netherlands 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.6 1.4 2.9 4.3 3.2 7.5 3.5 11.0 -3.2 7.8 -1.3 6.5 -3.4 3.1 0.9 4.0 0.1 4.1 4.6 3.5 
New Zealand 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 -0.1 0.2 2.4 2.6 2.2 4.8 3.6 8.4 -0.9 7.5 -1.2 6.3 -2.3 4.0 2.0 6.1 3.7 6.0 
Norway 1.1 -0.1 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.6 1.7 0.3 2.0 0.6 2.7 2.3 5.0 0.1 5.1 -1.6 3.5 0.4 3.9 -0.7 3.2 2.8 2.1 
Portugal 2.2 0.4 2.6 0.0 2.6 1.9 4.6 3.2 7.8 0.3 8.2 -3.4 4.8 1.9 6.7 -2.2 4.5 2.8 7.3 4.0 11.3 5.7 9.1 
Spain 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.5 2.0 2.1 4.1 7.4 11.5 8.7 20.1 -2.6 17.6 5.0 22.5 -8.5 14.1 -4.4 9.7 9.6 19.3 11.3 17.9 
Sweden 1.6 0.1 1.6 0.6 2.2 -0.2 1.9 0.7 2.6 0.5 3.1 -0.3 2.9 6.9 9.7 -3.4 6.4 0.3 6.7 1.1 7.8 4.2 6.2 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.3 1.2 2.4 3.6 -0.8 2.8 1.1 3.9 -0.1 3.8 1.5 3.8 
United Kingdom 1.4 0.1 1.5 0.9 2.5 1.1 3.5 3.5 7.0 4.2 11.2 -3.0 8.2 0.5 8.8 -3.3 5.5 -0.5 5.0 2.3 7.3 5.6 5.9 
United States 5.9 -1.3 4.6 0.1 4.7 2.0 6.7 0.5 7.3 0.2 7.5 -1.4 6.1 -0.3 5.8 -1.1 4.6 0.5 5.2 3.2 8.3 6.1 2.4 
Ø 2.1 0.0 2.1 0.2 2.3 1.3 3.6 2.1 5.7 2.1 7.8 -0.8 7.0 1.6 8.6 -2.4 6.2 -0.3 5.9 1.4 7.3 5.3 5.2 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 8: NAIRU (%) 
country Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 
  
3.2 1.1 4.3 1.7 6.0 1.5 7.5 0.2 7.7 0.3 8.1 -1.5 6.5 -1.1 5.4 -0.2 5.2 6.0 2.0 
Austria 1.8 0.1 1.8 0.1 2.0 0.5 2.5 0.8 3.3 0.4 3.7 0.2 3.8 0.2 4.1 0.2 4.3 0.0 4.3 3.2 2.6 
Belgium 1.8 0.9 2.7 1.7 4.4 2.0 6.4 1.4 7.8 0.2 8.0 0.3 8.3 -0.2 8.1 -0.1 8.0 -0.1 7.9 6.3 6.2 
Canada 
  
5.8 1.1 6.8 1.6 8.4 1.0 9.5 -0.2 9.3 -0.1 9.2 -1.3 8.0 -0.7 7.2 0.0 7.3 7.9 1.5 
Denmark 0.4 1.0 1.5 1.9 3.4 1.9 5.3 0.9 6.2 0.5 6.7 -0.3 6.4 -1.1 5.4 -0.3 5.0 0.4 5.4 4.6 5.0 
Finland 1.7 2.7 4.4 0.1 4.5 0.1 4.5 0.7 5.3 2.5 7.7 4.7 12.4 -2.0 10.5 -2.1 8.4 -0.9 7.5 6.7 5.8 
France 2.0 0.9 2.9 0.9 3.7 2.0 5.8 2.2 8.0 0.7 8.7 1.1 9.8 -0.7 9.1 -0.4 8.6 0.2 8.8 6.7 6.8 
Germany 
      
3.5 0.9 4.4 1.2 5.6 1.6 7.2 0.5 7.7 0.3 7.9 -0.9 7.1 6.2 3.5 
Ireland 5.0 1.4 6.4 1.1 7.5 2.3 9.8 4.3 14.1 0.2 14.3 -2.7 11.6 -3.0 8.6 -1.1 7.5 1.8 9.4 9.4 4.4 
Italy 4.5 1.0 5.4 0.2 5.7 0.5 6.1 1.5 7.6 1.3 8.9 0.5 9.4 -0.3 9.1 -1.3 7.8 0.0 7.8 7.2 3.3 
Japan 
  
1.4 0.1 1.5 0.3 1.8 0.5 2.3 0.3 2.5 0.5 3.1 0.7 3.8 0.3 4.1 0.2 4.3 2.7 2.9 
Netherlands 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 2.8 2.1 4.9 2.2 7.2 -0.6 6.5 -1.0 5.6 -1.5 4.1 -0.2 3.8 -0.1 3.7 4.0 3.7 
New Zealand 
      
3.6 1.4 5.0 2.3 7.3 0.1 7.4 -1.4 6.0 -1.6 4.4 1.3 5.7 5.6 2.1 
Norway 
  
1.7 0.1 1.8 0.4 2.2 0.7 2.9 1.4 4.3 0.3 4.6 -0.8 3.8 -0.1 3.7 -0.4 3.3 3.1 1.6 
Portugal 2.1 0.8 2.9 1.9 4.8 2.0 6.8 -0.1 6.7 -0.7 6.0 -0.1 6.0 0.0 5.9 1.4 7.4 2.2 9.5 5.8 7.5 
Spain 2.1 1.0 3.1 2.4 5.5 2.4 7.9 5.5 13.4 1.1 14.5 1.2 15.6 -1.9 13.8 -0.9 12.8 5.2 18.0 10.7 15.9 
Sweden 1.1 1.2 2.2 0.6 2.9 0.4 3.2 0.7 3.9 1.3 5.2 2.5 7.7 -0.1 7.6 -0.3 7.3 -0.1 7.2 4.8 6.1 
Switzerland 
    
0.5 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.1 2.9 0.3 3.2 0.5 3.7 0.2 3.9 2.2 3.4 
United Kingdom 1.5 2.0 3.5 1.6 5.1 2.5 7.6 2.2 9.8 -0.8 9.0 -0.9 8.1 -1.9 6.2 -0.5 5.7 1.0 6.6 6.3 5.2 
United States 
  
5.6 0.5 6.2 0.2 6.4 0.0 6.4 -0.4 6.0 -0.4 5.6 -0.2 5.4 0.2 5.6 0.4 6.0 5.9 0.4 
Ø 2.0 1.2 3.3 1.0 4.1 1.3 5.2 1.4 6.6 0.6 7.2 0.4 7.6 -0.8 6.8 -0.4 6.4 0.5 7.0 5.8 4.5 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 9: Long-term unemployment rate (%) 
country Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 0.29 -0.02 0.26 0.07 0.33 -0.05 0.28 -0.09 0.19 -0.01 0.17 0.13 -0.11 
Austria 
    
0.25 0.01 0.26 0.01 0.26 -0.02 0.24 0.14 -0.01 
Belgium 0.69 0.00 0.68 -0.09 0.59 -0.03 0.56 -0.06 0.50 -0.03 0.47 0.30 -0.22 
Canada 0.12 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.17 -0.06 0.11 -0.02 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.06 -0.01 
Denmark 0.33 -0.06 0.27 0.01 0.28 -0.06 0.22 -0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.19 0.12 -0.14 
Finland 0.20 -0.14 0.05 0.28 0.33 -0.06 0.27 -0.03 0.24 -0.04 0.21 0.12 0.01 
France 0.44 -0.02 0.41 -0.04 0.38 0.00 0.38 0.03 0.41 -0.02 0.39 0.21 -0.05 
Germany 0.46 -0.05 0.41 0.05 0.46 0.05 0.51 0.03 0.54 -0.06 0.48 0.26 0.02 
Ireland 0.55 0.08 0.63 -0.03 0.60 -0.21 0.40 -0.07 0.32 0.13 0.45 0.26 -0.10 
Italy 0.64 0.03 0.67 -0.04 0.63 -0.02 0.61 -0.10 0.51 -0.02 0.49 0.31 -0.16 
Japan 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.33 0.02 0.35 0.15 0.20 
Netherlands 0.52 -0.04 0.47 0.02 0.50 -0.10 0.39 -0.02 0.37 -0.06 0.31 0.21 -0.21 
New Zealand 0.09 0.13 0.22 0.05 0.27 -0.08 0.18 -0.09 0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.09 -0.01 
Norway 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.21 -0.15 0.07 0.03 0.10 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.00 
Portugal 0.54 -0.12 0.42 0.08 0.49 -0.09 0.40 0.05 0.45 0.03 0.48 0.25 -0.06 
Spain 0.60 -0.08 0.52 0.00 0.52 -0.10 0.42 -0.15 0.26 0.06 0.33 0.22 -0.27 
Sweden 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.27 0.00 0.27 -0.10 0.17 -0.01 0.16 0.10 0.04 
Switzerland 
  
0.18 0.09 0.27 0.04 0.31 0.05 0.36 -0.01 0.34 0.18 0.07 
United Kingdom 0.48 -0.12 0.36 0.06 0.42 -0.14 0.28 -0.06 0.22 0.08 0.30 0.17 -0.18 
United States 0.10 -0.03 0.07 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.23 0.07 0.13 
Ø 0.36 -0.03 0.33 0.03 0.36 -0.05 0.31 -0.03 0.29 0.01 0.29 0.17 -0.05 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
  
Knirsch: Institutions, Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD 
82 
 
Table 10: Youth unemployment (%) 
country Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø total 
Australia 12.72 3.32 16.04 -1.14 14.91 1.67 16.57 -3.31 13.26 -2.59 10.68 0.31 10.99 10.84 -1.73 
Austria 
      
5.70 -0.14 5.55 3.41 8.96 -0.18 8.78 7.25 3.08 
Belgium 
  
23.02 -7.97 15.05 5.65 20.71 -2.45 18.25 2.51 20.76 -0.61 20.16 19.66 -2.86 
Canada 14.11 2.03 16.14 -2.56 13.57 2.34 15.92 -2.23 13.69 -1.21 12.48 1.53 14.01 14.13 -0.10 
Denmark 
  
12.28 -1.20 11.08 -0.41 10.67 -2.77 7.90 0.35 8.25 4.19 12.44 10.44 0.16 
Finland 11.14 -0.93 10.21 2.76 12.97 14.48 27.45 -7.28 20.17 -1.75 18.42 0.44 18.86 13.38 7.72 
France 
  
23.49 -2.90 20.59 7.01 27.61 -5.55 22.06 -2.21 19.85 2.25 22.10 22.62 -1.40 
Germany 5.78 3.55 9.33 -3.66 5.67 3.05 8.71 0.12 8.83 3.89 12.72 -3.18 9.54 7.26 3.77 
Ireland 11.93 11.34 23.26 -1.77 21.49 -0.89 20.60 -11.05 9.55 0.22 9.78 16.04 25.81 14.88 13.88 
Italy 25.89 7.57 33.46 -0.84 32.61 -1.53 31.08 -1.83 29.25 -6.12 23.13 4.66 27.79 25.48 1.90 
Japan 3.73 1.19 4.92 -0.43 4.49 1.52 6.00 3.19 9.19 -0.39 8.80 -0.50 8.30 5.60 4.57 
Netherlands 11.42 10.16 21.58 -10.52 11.06 -0.30 10.76 -4.43 6.33 1.73 8.06 -0.06 7.99 9.42 -3.43 
New Zealand 
  
7.97 7.39 15.37 -1.08 14.28 -0.95 13.34 -3.36 9.98 6.00 15.98 12.82 8.01 
Norway 6.08 0.57 6.65 4.92 11.58 0.71 12.28 -2.12 10.16 0.10 10.27 -1.62 8.65 8.52 2.57 
Portugal 16.70 1.86 18.56 -7.87 10.68 4.25 14.93 -5.19 9.75 5.99 15.73 9.58 25.31 15.23 8.61 
Spain 25.12 16.10 41.22 -9.00 32.22 8.07 40.29 -14.19 26.09 -5.98 20.11 20.63 40.74 26.41 15.62 
Sweden 7.20 0.25 7.45 -0.56 6.89 14.57 21.45 -8.06 13.39 5.07 18.46 4.80 23.26 10.99 16.06 
Switzerland 
    
3.95 1.82 5.77 -0.30 5.46 2.48 7.95 -0.06 7.89 6.20 3.94 
United Kingdom 
  
17.78 -5.39 12.39 2.97 15.35 -3.84 11.52 1.02 12.54 6.13 18.67 14.71 0.89 
United States 14.11 -0.08 14.03 -1.87 12.15 0.09 12.24 -1.79 10.45 0.88 11.33 5.15 16.48 12.24 2.37 
Ø 12.76 4.31 17.08 -2.93 14.14 2.78 16.92 -3.71 13.21 0.20 13.41 3.78 17.19 13.40 4.42 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 11: Old-age unemployment (%) 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 1.07 0.81 1.88 1.34 3.22 2.57 5.79 1.06 6.85 1.60 8.45 -3.51 4.93 -1.61 3.33 -0.13 3.20 3.98 2.13 
Austria 
          
3.99 1.03 5.02 -1.17 3.85 -1.27 2.58 3.86 -1.41 
Belgium 
      
5.53 -1.61 3.92 0.40 4.32 -0.09 4.23 -0.23 4.00 0.53 4.52 4.42 -1.01 
Canada 
  
4.70 0.64 5.34 2.59 7.93 -0.67 7.26 1.31 8.58 -2.51 6.07 -0.50 5.56 0.82 6.38 6.48 1.68 
Denmark 
      
5.61 1.66 7.27 -0.38 6.90 -2.59 4.30 0.28 4.58 0.10 4.68 5.56 -0.93 
Finland 2.42 0.08 2.50 2.77 5.27 0.92 6.19 -0.90 5.29 12.90 18.19 -8.08 10.11 -3.11 7.00 -0.76 6.25 6.48 3.82 
France 
      
6.98 0.07 7.05 0.27 7.32 -0.33 6.99 -1.65 5.34 0.87 6.21 6.65 -0.77 
Germany 1.64 2.01 3.64 2.19 5.83 1.36 7.20 1.13 8.33 4.34 12.67 -0.07 12.59 -1.06 11.53 -4.21 7.32 7.86 5.68 
Ireland 8.37 -0.53 7.84 -0.85 6.99 3.10 10.09 -1.02 9.07 -1.60 7.47 -4.28 3.19 -0.70 2.49 4.86 7.35 6.93 -1.02 
Italy 0.64 0.36 1.00 2.13 3.13 -1.01 2.12 0.24 2.37 1.34 3.70 0.73 4.44 -1.11 3.33 0.51 3.84 2.73 3.20 
Japan 1.33 0.91 2.24 0.84 3.08 0.88 3.96 -1.10 2.85 0.79 3.64 1.86 5.50 -1.23 4.27 0.10 4.37 3.47 3.04 
Netherlands 1.87 1.13 3.00 0.83 3.83 4.44 8.27 -4.86 3.41 -0.38 3.03 -0.69 2.35 1.60 3.95 -0.06 3.89 3.73 2.01 
New Zealand 
      
1.69 2.98 4.67 -0.35 4.33 -0.03 4.30 -1.99 2.31 0.87 3.17 3.41 1.48 
Norway 1.43 -1.02 0.41 0.31 0.72 0.26 0.98 1.35 2.33 0.06 2.39 -0.87 1.52 -0.25 1.27 -0.06 1.21 1.36 -0.22 
Portugal 
  
0.74 0.18 0.92 1.24 2.15 -0.22 1.93 2.29 4.22 -0.94 3.28 2.50 5.78 3.60 9.37 3.55 8.64 
Spain 1.47 0.81 2.28 2.81 5.09 4.66 9.75 -1.11 8.64 3.18 11.81 -3.25 8.56 -2.23 6.33 6.94 13.27 7.47 11.81 
Sweden 2.00 -0.31 1.69 0.43 2.12 1.51 3.63 -1.67 1.97 5.46 7.43 -1.63 5.79 -1.28 4.51 0.53 5.04 3.55 3.04 
Switzerland 
        
1.74 1.58 3.33 -0.84 2.48 0.64 3.12 -0.09 3.03 2.74 1.28 
United Kingdom 
      
8.98 -1.10 7.87 0.13 8.00 -3.69 4.31 -1.26 3.05 1.34 4.39 6.10 -4.59 
United States 2.65 1.02 3.67 -0.03 3.65 0.81 4.46 -0.68 3.78 -0.05 3.73 -0.80 2.93 0.53 3.46 2.55 6.01 3.83 3.36 
Ø 2.26 0.47 2.74 1.04 3.78 1.85 5.63 -0.54 5.08 1.59 6.67 -1.53 5.14 -0.69 4.45 0.85 5.30 4.71 3.04 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 12: GDP growth rate (%) 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 5.0 -2.5 2.5 -0.2 2.3 2.2 4.5 -2.2 2.3 1.8 4.1 -0.5 3.6 0.0 3.6 -1.7 1.9 3.5 -3.1 
Austria 5.7 -2.0 3.6 -1.9 1.7 0.1 1.8 1.6 3.4 -1.3 2.1 0.6 2.7 -0.1 2.6 -2.0 0.6 2.7 -5.1 
Belgium 4.5 -1.4 3.1 -1.1 2.0 -0.3 1.7 1.2 2.9 -1.0 2.0 0.3 2.3 0.0 2.3 -1.7 0.6 2.4 -3.9 
Canada 4.8 -0.6 4.2 -2.1 2.1 1.9 4.0 -2.7 1.3 1.8 3.2 0.8 3.9 -1.3 2.6 -1.7 0.9 3.0 -3.9 
Denmark 4.2 -2.2 2.0 -0.2 1.7 1.5 3.2 -2.2 1.1 1.8 2.9 -1.0 1.9 0.1 2.0 -3.2 -1.1 2.3 -5.3 
Finland 5.0 -2.5 2.5 1.4 4.0 -0.8 3.1 -2.8 0.3 3.1 3.3 0.4 3.7 0.1 3.8 -4.3 -0.5 2.8 -5.6 
France 5.5 -1.9 3.6 -1.2 2.5 -0.7 1.8 1.0 2.8 -1.4 1.4 1.2 2.6 -0.6 2.0 -2.0 0.0 3.1 -5.5 
Germany 3.7 -1.1 2.6 -0.9 1.7 0.3 2.1 1.9 4.0 -2.8 1.1 0.5 1.7 0.0 1.7 -0.9 0.8 2.2 -2.9 
Ireland 5.0 -0.1 4.8 -1.1 3.8 -1.5 2.3 2.7 5.0 2.4 7.3 0.2 7.5 -2.6 4.9 -7.3 -2.4 4.2 -7.4 
Italy 2.8 1.3 4.0 -1.3 2.8 -0.1 2.6 -0.3 2.4 -1.0 1.4 0.3 1.8 -0.5 1.3 -2.4 -1.1 2.0 -3.9 
Japan 6.6 -2.9 3.7 0.6 4.2 -0.1 4.2 0.3 4.4 -3.0 1.4 -1.3 0.1 1.7 1.8 -2.6 -0.7 2.9 -7.3 
Netherlands 4.3 -1.0 3.4 -2.3 1.1 1.4 2.5 0.8 3.2 -0.2 3.0 -0.1 2.9 -0.5 2.4 -2.2 0.2 2.6 -4.2 
New Zealand 4.5 -2.6 1.8 -0.3 1.6 0.6 2.2 -1.8 0.4 3.9 4.3 -0.8 3.4 -0.3 3.2 -2.9 0.3 2.4 -4.1 
Norway 5.4 -0.8 4.7 -1.8 2.9 1.3 4.2 -2.3 1.9 2.6 4.5 -2.2 2.3 0.2 2.5 -2.4 0.1 3.2 -5.3 
Portugal 7.3 -3.2 4.1 -0.7 3.4 -1.1 2.3 2.4 4.7 -2.4 2.3 0.9 3.2 -2.1 1.0 -1.8 -0.8 3.0 -8.1 
Spain 6.4 -2.4 4.0 -3.1 1.0 2.0 2.9 0.5 3.4 -1.4 2.1 2.0 4.1 -0.6 3.5 -4.2 -0.7 3.0 -7.1 
Sweden 3.7 -1.8 1.8 -0.2 1.7 1.3 2.9 -2.1 0.8 1.2 2.0 1.4 3.4 0.1 3.5 -2.4 1.1 2.7 -2.6 
Switzerland 3.6 -4.0 -0.3 1.9 1.6 0.6 2.2 -0.1 2.1 -1.2 0.8 1.0 1.8 0.7 2.5 -1.2 1.3 1.7 -2.3 
United Kingdom 2.8 -0.8 2.0 -1.1 1.0 2.8 3.7 -2.3 1.4 2.4 3.7 -0.5 3.2 -0.1 3.1 -3.7 -0.6 2.3 -3.4 
United States 4.5 -1.4 3.1 -1.2 1.8 2.7 4.5 -2.0 2.5 1.0 3.6 -0.3 3.3 -0.5 2.7 -2.5 0.2 2.9 -4.3 
Ø 4.8 -1.7 3.1 -0.8 2.2 0.7 2.9 -0.4 2.5 0.3 2.8 0.1 3.0 -0.3 2.7 -2.7 0.0 2.7 -4.8 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 13: Inflation rate (%) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 1.9 0.8 2.7 1.5 4.3 8.8 13.1 -3.4 9.6 -2.0 7.7 -2.4 5.2 -3.0 2.2 0.6 2.9 -0.1 2.7 0.1 2.8 5.0 0.9 
Austria 3.3 0.3 3.5 0.8 4.3 3.4 7.6 -2.5 5.2 -2.1 3.1 0.0 3.0 -0.6 2.4 -0.7 1.7 0.2 1.9 0.4 2.3 3.5 -1.0 
Belgium 0.9 2.6 3.5 0.6 4.0 5.7 9.7 -3.4 6.4 -2.0 4.4 -1.7 2.7 -0.6 2.1 -0.4 1.7 0.3 2.0 0.6 2.6 3.6 1.7 
Canada 1.2 1.5 2.6 1.3 3.9 5.0 8.9 1.4 10.3 -5.7 4.6 -0.4 4.2 -2.7 1.5 0.6 2.0 0.2 2.2 -0.4 1.8 3.9 0.6 
Denmark 
  
7.7 -1.6 6.1 4.7 10.8 0.0 10.8 -5.7 5.1 -1.8 3.3 -1.3 1.9 0.5 2.4 -0.7 1.7 0.7 2.4 5.2 -5.3 
Finland 3.2 2.7 5.9 -0.4 5.5 8.9 14.3 -4.8 9.6 -4.0 5.5 -0.5 5.0 -3.8 1.2 0.8 2.0 -0.8 1.2 1.1 2.3 5.0 -0.9 
France 3.9 -0.7 3.3 2.2 5.5 4.9 10.4 1.4 11.8 -6.0 5.8 -2.8 3.0 -1.2 1.8 -0.5 1.3 0.6 1.8 -0.1 1.7 4.6 -2.2 
Germany 2.2 0.6 2.8 0.8 3.5 2.0 5.6 -0.8 4.7 -3.1 1.6 1.6 3.2 -0.7 2.4 -1.2 1.3 0.4 1.6 0.0 1.6 2.8 -0.6 
Ireland 
      
15.7 -0.4 15.3 -9.0 6.3 -3.2 3.2 -1.3 1.9 1.9 3.8 -0.4 3.4 -2.8 0.6 6.3 -15.1 
Italy 3.1 1.7 4.8 -0.9 3.9 12.2 16.1 0.4 16.5 -7.5 9.0 -3.1 5.9 -1.9 4.0 -1.7 2.3 -0.1 2.2 0.1 2.3 6.4 -0.8 
Japan 5.3 0.0 5.2 0.5 5.7 7.1 12.8 -8.2 4.7 -3.3 1.4 0.8 2.2 -1.4 0.8 -1.2 -0.4 0.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 3.4 -5.4 
Netherlands 1.5 2.9 4.4 1.6 6.0 2.6 8.6 -3.1 5.5 -3.9 1.5 0.6 2.1 0.2 2.3 0.5 2.8 -1.2 1.6 0.4 2.0 3.5 0.5 
New Zealand 1.7 1.8 3.6 3.0 6.6 6.5 13.1 1.8 14.9 -3.3 11.6 -7.2 4.4 -2.3 2.1 -0.2 1.8 0.8 2.6 0.1 2.7 5.9 1.0 
Norway 2.6 1.5 4.1 2.0 6.1 3.3 9.4 0.4 9.8 -2.5 7.3 -3.1 4.2 -2.2 2.0 0.4 2.4 -0.9 1.5 0.6 2.1 4.7 -0.6 
Portugal 2.4 1.5 3.9 4.9 8.8 12.3 21.1 -1.2 19.9 -1.1 18.8 -7.2 11.6 -7.2 4.4 -1.2 3.2 -0.5 2.7 -0.8 1.9 9.0 -0.5 
Spain 2.6 5.7 8.3 -2.4 5.9 11.4 17.2 -1.2 16.0 -6.7 9.3 -3.2 6.0 -2.1 3.9 -1.1 2.8 0.3 3.1 -0.9 2.2 7.0 -0.3 
Sweden 3.7 0.7 4.4 0.6 5.0 4.6 9.6 0.7 10.3 -3.8 6.5 0.3 6.9 -4.8 2.1 -1.0 1.1 0.1 1.3 0.3 1.6 4.8 -2.1 
Switzerland 2.5 1.2 3.7 0.6 4.4 1.3 5.7 -1.5 4.2 -1.9 2.3 1.8 4.1 -2.6 1.5 -0.7 0.8 0.1 0.9 -0.5 0.4 2.8 -2.1 
United Kingdom 2.9 0.4 3.3 3.3 6.6 9.8 16.4 -4.3 12.0 -7.4 4.6 1.0 5.6 -3.3 2.3 -1.0 1.2 0.6 1.9 1.4 3.3 5.5 0.4 
United States 1.3 0.7 2.0 2.7 4.6 3.1 7.7 2.0 9.8 -6.4 3.3 1.0 4.3 -1.6 2.7 -0.4 2.3 0.6 2.9 -0.8 2.1 3.9 0.8 
Ø 2.6 1.6 4.2 1.1 5.3 6.4 11.7 -1.3 10.4 -4.4 6.0 -1.5 4.5 -2.2 2.3 -0.3 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.9 4.8 -1.5 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 14: Short-term interest rates (%) 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 6.0 3.6 9.6 3.1 12.7 1.4 14.1 -1.8 12.3 -6.1 6.2 -1.1 5.2 0.6 5.7 -1.0 4.7 8.5 -1.3 
Austria 5.1 1.3 6.4 2.1 8.5 -3.0 5.5 2.5 8.0 -3.3 4.7 -1.0 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.1 1.7 5.2 -3.3 
Belgium 5.5 2.5 8.1 4.2 12.3 -3.0 9.3 -0.5 8.8 -3.7 5.1 -1.3 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.1 1.7 6.0 -3.8 
Canada 6.4 2.2 8.5 4.8 13.3 -3.7 9.6 0.5 10.1 -5.0 5.1 -0.7 4.5 -1.1 3.4 -1.9 1.5 6.5 -4.9 
Denmark 
    
15.5 -4.9 10.6 -0.4 10.2 -4.0 6.2 -2.0 4.2 -1.3 2.9 -0.7 2.2 7.4 -13.3 
Finland 8.8 2.3 11.1 -0.6 10.6 2.9 13.5 -0.9 12.6 -7.4 5.2 -1.4 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.1 1.7 7.8 -7.1 
France 6.9 2.7 9.6 2.4 12.0 -1.9 10.0 -0.5 9.5 -3.8 5.7 -2.0 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.1 1.7 6.9 -5.2 
Germany 6.3 0.8 7.1 1.1 8.2 -3.0 5.2 2.6 7.7 -3.0 4.8 -1.1 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.1 1.7 5.1 -4.6 
Ireland 
      
12.1 -1.3 10.8 -4.3 6.5 -2.5 4.1 -1.3 2.8 -1.1 1.7 6.3 -10.4 
Italy 5.5 6.9 12.4 3.5 15.9 -0.8 15.1 -2.7 12.4 -3.4 9.0 -5.0 4.0 -1.2 2.8 -1.1 1.7 8.7 -3.7 
Japan 6.7 2.6 9.2 -1.9 7.3 -1.5 5.8 0.1 5.9 -4.4 1.5 -1.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 4.2 -6.2 
Netherlands 5.4 1.4 6.8 2.5 9.3 -3.5 5.8 2.1 7.9 -3.4 4.6 -0.9 3.7 -0.9 2.8 -1.1 1.7 5.3 -3.7 
New Zealand 
  
10.2 4.3 14.5 3.9 18.3 -6.4 11.9 -4.1 7.8 -1.8 6.0 0.9 6.9 -3.0 3.9 9.9 -6.3 
Norway 8.8 2.3 11.1 0.9 12.0 1.6 13.6 -1.8 11.8 -6.3 5.5 1.2 6.6 -3.3 3.3 0.0 3.3 8.4 -5.6 
Portugal 4.5 2.8 7.3 9.7 17.0 2.9 19.9 -4.1 15.8 -6.4 9.4 -5.6 3.9 -1.1 2.8 -1.1 1.7 9.1 -2.8 
Spain 
  
15.5 0.9 16.4 -1.5 14.9 -1.2 13.7 -5.3 8.4 -4.6 3.8 -1.0 2.8 -1.1 1.7 9.7 -13.8 
Sweden 
    
13.3 -2.0 11.3 0.6 12.0 -5.1 6.9 -3.0 3.9 -1.3 2.5 -1.0 1.6 7.4 -11.7 
Switzerland 
  
4.6 -0.1 4.5 -0.2 4.3 2.8 7.1 -4.0 3.1 -1.1 2.0 -0.9 1.2 -0.5 0.7 3.4 -3.9 
United Kingdom 7.3 3.8 11.1 2.0 13.1 -2.6 10.6 1.5 12.0 -5.8 6.2 -0.6 5.6 -0.8 4.8 -2.9 1.8 8.1 -5.5 
United States 6.2 1.0 7.2 5.0 12.1 -4.0 8.2 -1.3 6.9 -1.9 4.9 -0.4 4.5 -1.2 3.4 -2.5 0.9 5.9 -5.3 
Ø 6.4 2.8 9.2 2.9 12.0 -1.1 10.9 -0.5 10.4 -4.5 5.8 -1.8 4.0 -0.9 3.1 -1.2 1.9 7.0 -6.1 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 15: Output gap (%) 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 1.1 -1.3 -0.2 0.4 0.1 -2.1 -2.0 -0.9 -2.9 1.0 -1.9 2.7 0.9 0.4 1.3 -1.8 -0.5 -0.5 -1.6 
Austria 0.2 0.8 1.0 -0.8 0.2 -2.4 -2.2 2.9 0.7 -1.2 -0.5 1.8 1.3 -0.3 1.0 -1.7 -0.7 0.1 -0.9 
Belgium 0.3 1.1 1.4 -1.2 0.2 -3.4 -3.2 3.5 0.3 -2.3 -2.0 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 -0.8 0.0 -0.2 -0.3 
Canada -0.2 1.9 1.7 -2.0 -0.3 -1.9 -2.2 2.2 -0.1 -2.3 -2.4 2.3 -0.2 1.6 1.4 -2.2 -0.7 -0.3 -0.6 
Denmark 0.8 0.0 0.8 -1.6 -0.8 1.6 0.8 -1.4 -0.7 -0.8 -1.4 2.1 0.7 1.5 2.2 -4.1 -1.9 0.1 -2.6 
Finland 
  
-2.0 1.8 -0.3 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.9 -8.9 -8.0 7.8 -0.2 1.9 1.7 -2.2 -0.6 -1.0 1.5 
France 0.7 -0.3 0.5 -0.1 0.3 -3.3 -2.9 3.9 1.0 -2.9 -2.0 1.9 0.0 1.3 1.3 -2.6 -1.3 -0.3 -2.0 
Germany 0.7 -1.3 -0.6 0.7 0.1 -2.5 -2.4 5.1 2.6 -4.2 -1.6 1.8 0.2 -1.0 -0.8 -0.1 -0.9 -0.3 -1.7 
Ireland 
    
1.5 -4.8 -3.3 3.2 -0.1 -3.6 -3.7 6.2 2.5 4.0 6.5 -11.5 -5.0 -0.2 -6.5 
Italy 1.0 -0.9 0.1 0.6 0.6 -3.4 -2.8 2.6 -0.2 -1.8 -2.0 2.5 0.5 1.0 1.4 -3.9 -2.5 -0.4 -3.5 
Japan 0.9 -2.6 -1.7 2.3 0.5 -2.4 -1.9 4.5 2.6 -2.0 0.6 -2.7 -2.1 2.3 0.2 -1.7 -1.5 -0.3 -2.4 
Netherlands -1.1 0.6 -0.6 -2.4 -3.0 0.1 -2.9 4.1 1.2 -1.2 0.0 2.7 2.7 -2.7 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 1.0 
New Zealand 
    
0.1 1.4 1.5 -4.6 -3.1 3.5 0.4 0.0 0.4 1.8 2.3 -3.2 -0.9 0.1 -1.0 
Norway 
    
1.7 -1.2 0.5 -4.7 -4.2 2.8 -1.4 3.2 1.8 -0.9 0.9 -1.2 -0.3 -0.1 -2.0 
Portugal 8.2 -2.9 5.3 -5.2 0.1 -8.2 -8.0 10.5 2.4 -3.9 -1.4 3.2 1.8 -2.5 -0.8 -2.4 -3.1 0.5 -11.3 
Spain 
    
-4.1 1.4 -2.7 4.9 2.2 -5.3 -3.2 3.2 0.1 2.1 2.1 -4.1 -2.0 -1.1 2.1 
Sweden 1.8 0.0 1.7 -3.9 -2.2 1.6 -0.6 0.5 -0.2 -4.4 -4.6 5.0 0.4 1.5 1.9 -3.2 -1.3 -0.3 -3.1 
Switzerland 
    
-0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.3 1.2 -3.9 -2.6 2.9 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.1 
United Kingdom -1.7 1.1 -0.6 -2.7 -3.4 1.0 -2.3 3.0 0.7 -2.3 -1.6 1.8 0.2 1.9 2.1 -3.7 -1.5 -0.9 0.2 
United States -1.1 0.3 -0.8 -0.1 -0.9 -0.5 -1.4 1.1 -0.3 -1.1 -1.4 1.1 -0.3 2.2 1.8 -4.5 -2.7 -0.8 -1.6 
Ø 0.8 -0.4 0.4 -0.9 -0.5 -1.4 -1.9 2.1 0.2 -2.2 -2.0 2.6 0.6 0.8 1.4 -2.7 -1.4 -0.3 -1.8 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 16: Total factor productivity shock 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 0.012 -0.021 -0.008 0.006 -0.003 0.017 0.015 -0.032 -0.017 0.017 0.000 0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.007 -0.015 -0.008 0.000 -0.021 
Austria -0.021 0.037 0.016 -0.011 0.006 -0.019 -0.014 0.028 0.014 -0.036 -0.022 0.030 0.008 0.006 0.014 -0.024 -0.010 -0.001 0.011 
Belgium -0.012 0.021 0.008 -0.005 0.004 -0.009 -0.006 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.005 -0.002 0.009 0.007 -0.014 -0.007 -0.001 0.005 
Canada -0.005 0.012 0.007 -0.016 -0.008 0.014 0.006 -0.010 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 0.015 0.010 -0.005 0.005 -0.013 -0.007 0.000 -0.002 
Denmark 0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 -0.003 0.013 0.010 -0.033 -0.022 0.029 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.009 -0.022 -0.013 -0.002 -0.021 
Finland -0.011 0.017 0.006 -0.004 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 0.002 -0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 0.018 0.017 -0.028 -0.012 0.000 -0.001 
France 0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 0.011 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.006 -0.013 -0.007 0.000 -0.009 
Germany -0.009 0.010 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.015 0.012 -0.005 0.006 -0.031 -0.025 0.033 0.009 0.004 0.013 -0.021 -0.008 0.000 0.000 
Ireland -0.008 0.015 0.006 -0.001 0.005 -0.018 -0.013 0.023 0.010 -0.022 -0.012 0.023 0.011 0.001 0.012 -0.026 -0.014 0.000 -0.006 
Italy -0.015 0.023 0.008 0.002 0.009 -0.023 -0.013 0.007 -0.006 0.018 0.012 -0.006 0.006 -0.005 0.000 -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 0.008 
Japan -0.008 0.014 0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.012 -0.013 0.036 0.023 -0.025 -0.002 -0.013 -0.015 0.028 0.013 -0.021 -0.008 -0.001 0.000 
Netherlands -0.020 0.040 0.020 -0.023 -0.003 0.011 0.008 -0.022 -0.014 0.015 0.001 0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.016 
New Zealand -0.021 0.042 0.022 -0.041 -0.020 0.036 0.016 -0.032 -0.016 0.016 0.000 0.010 0.010 -0.002 0.008 -0.015 -0.007 -0.001 0.013 
Norway -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.020 -0.014 0.024 0.010 -0.017 -0.007 0.027 0.021 -0.036 -0.015 0.000 -0.012 
Portugal -0.016 0.020 0.004 0.023 0.027 -0.061 -0.034 0.043 0.009 -0.001 0.008 -0.003 0.004 -0.011 -0.007 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.014 
Spain -0.016 0.029 0.013 -0.016 -0.004 0.008 0.004 -0.019 -0.014 0.032 0.018 -0.012 0.006 -0.025 -0.019 0.026 0.006 -0.001 0.023 
Sweden 0.023 -0.007 0.016 -0.039 -0.022 0.025 0.003 0.004 0.007 -0.008 -0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.025 -0.020 
  
0.001 -0.043 
Switzerland 
  
-0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.004 0.004 -0.017 -0.013 0.013 0.000 0.005 0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 
United Kingdom -0.005 0.010 0.005 -0.015 -0.010 0.026 0.016 -0.034 -0.018 0.023 0.004 -0.003 0.001 0.015 0.016 -0.027 -0.011 0.000 -0.007 
United States -0.001 0.005 0.004 -0.011 -0.007 0.011 0.004 -0.003 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.007 -0.012 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 
Ø -0.006 0.014 0.007 -0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.013 -0.008 0.000 -0.001 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 17: Real interest rate shock 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 
    
1.2 -5.0 -3.9 6.2 2.3 3.6 5.9 0.5 6.5 -0.6 5.9 -2.9 3.0 -0.1 2.9 -0.8 2.1 2.9 2.1 
Austria 
  
3.0 0.5 3.5 -2.1 1.4 2.7 4.0 0.5 4.6 0.2 4.8 -0.7 4.2 -0.8 3.3 -1.3 2.1 -0.9 1.2 3.2 1.2 
Belgium 4.6 -1.8 2.9 0.3 3.2 -4.4 -1.2 6.3 5.1 0.9 6.0 0.2 6.3 -1.5 4.8 -1.5 3.3 -1.3 1.9 -0.8 1.2 3.5 -3.5 
Canada 4.0 -1.2 2.8 0.6 3.3 -3.6 -0.3 2.2 1.9 4.2 6.2 -0.8 5.4 0.6 6.0 -2.5 3.5 -1.3 2.2 -1.0 1.2 3.3 -2.8 
Denmark 2.3 0.1 2.4 1.7 4.1 0.1 4.2 4.5 8.7 -1.3 7.3 -0.9 6.4 -1.0 5.4 -2.7 2.8 -0.5 2.3 -1.7 0.5 4.2 -1.8 
Finland 2.0 0.6 2.6 -0.8 1.8 -6.6 -4.8 5.6 0.8 3.6 4.3 2.6 6.9 -0.1 6.8 -3.7 3.0 -0.3 2.8 -1.9 0.9 2.5 -1.1 
France 1.6 1.2 2.8 -0.2 2.6 -2.6 0.0 1.7 1.7 4.1 5.9 0.2 6.1 -1.2 4.9 -1.3 3.6 -1.5 2.1 -0.5 1.7 3.0 0.1 
Germany 3.9 0.3 4.1 -0.2 4.0 -1.0 3.0 0.5 3.5 2.0 5.5 -1.0 4.5 -0.5 4.0 -0.5 3.5 -1.3 2.3 -1.1 1.2 3.6 -2.7 
Ireland 3.3 -1.9 1.4 -1.4 0.0 -0.4 -0.4 0.6 0.2 6.2 6.4 -0.1 6.4 -0.8 5.6 -4.4 1.2 -0.6 0.5 5.1 5.7 2.8 2.3 
Italy 2.0 -1.4 0.6 1.8 2.4 -7.7 -5.4 5.0 -0.3 5.2 4.9 1.9 6.9 -0.8 6.1 -3.3 2.8 -0.8 2.0 0.5 2.5 2.2 0.5 
Japan 
  
2.0 -0.4 1.6 -6.4 -4.9 8.2 3.4 1.6 5.0 -1.5 3.5 -0.7 2.8 -0.8 1.9 -0.4 1.5 -0.1 1.4 1.8 1.4 
Netherlands 2.1 -1.0 1.1 0.2 1.4 -1.3 0.1 4.1 4.2 1.7 5.9 -0.1 5.7 -1.7 4.1 -2.0 2.1 0.3 2.4 -1.2 1.2 2.8 -0.9 
New Zealand 4.0 -1.6 2.4 -2.9 -0.5 -5.5 -5.9 3.2 -2.7 6.1 3.4 3.7 7.0 -1.6 5.4 -0.8 4.7 -1.3 3.4 -0.9 2.5 2.2 -1.5 
Norway 0.0 1.2 1.2 -1.8 -0.6 -1.7 -2.3 3.1 0.8 4.8 5.6 1.0 6.6 -1.7 4.9 -1.4 3.5 -0.6 2.9 -1.5 1.4 2.2 1.4 
Portugal 
    
-2.8 -8.0 -10.9 11.5 0.6 6.0 6.6 1.6 8.3 -2.4 5.9 -3.9 1.9 -0.6 1.3 3.7 5.0 1.8 5.0 
Spain 
  
0.0 2.2 2.2 -8.9 -6.7 5.3 -1.4 6.3 4.9 1.9 6.8 -1.4 5.4 -3.2 2.2 -1.4 0.8 1.7 2.5 1.7 2.5 
Sweden 1.7 -0.5 1.2 0.9 2.1 -2.8 -0.7 2.4 1.7 3.9 5.6 -1.2 4.4 2.1 6.5 -2.5 4.0 -1.2 2.8 -1.5 1.2 2.8 -0.4 
Switzerland 0.6 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.2 0.2 1.9 2.1 -0.5 1.6 1.2 2.8 -0.3 2.5 -0.8 1.7 -0.4 1.3 1.2 0.8 
United Kingdom 3.1 -0.2 2.9 -1.3 1.6 -5.3 -3.6 5.0 1.3 4.6 6.0 -1.4 4.6 0.9 5.5 -1.5 3.9 -1.1 2.8 -2.7 0.1 2.6 -3.0 
United States 2.7 -0.2 2.5 -0.8 1.8 -2.0 -0.2 1.7 1.5 5.2 6.7 -2.9 3.9 -0.1 3.7 -0.8 3.0 -1.5 1.5 -0.6 0.9 2.5 -1.8 
Ø 2.5 -0.5 2.0 -0.3 1.7 -3.8 -2.1 4.0 1.9 3.6 5.4 0.2 5.6 -0.6 5.0 -2.0 3.0 -0.9 2.1 -0.3 1.8 2.6 -0.7 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 18: Terms of trade shock 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ 1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 7.8 1.7 9.5 3.0 12.6 0.1 12.7 -3.0 9.7 -0.1 9.6 -0.6 9.0 -4.6 4.4 -2.1 2.3 8.6 -5.5 
Austria 10.0 -0.1 9.9 0.4 10.2 -2.8 7.4 -2.6 4.8 -2.8 2.0 0.0 2.0 -1.7 0.3 0.3 0.6 5.2 -9.3 
Belgium 11.3 3.2 14.5 4.2 18.7 4.9 23.6 -10.7 12.9 -10.1 2.8 -0.8 2.0 -1.6 0.4 0.1 0.5 9.6 -10.8 
Canada 9.9 2.8 12.6 1.1 13.7 -4.5 9.3 -4.6 4.7 2.8 7.5 1.1 8.6 -6.5 2.1 -1.4 0.7 7.7 -9.2 
Denmark 16.7 2.5 19.3 -2.8 16.5 -3.0 13.5 -7.3 6.2 -2.8 3.4 -1.5 1.8 -1.8 0.1 -1.8 -1.7 8.4 -18.5 
Finland 4.0 2.0 6.0 2.7 8.7 -2.8 5.9 -4.7 1.2 0.9 2.1 -3.3 -1.1 -0.5 -1.6 -1.0 -2.6 2.5 -6.6 
France 6.0 3.1 9.1 2.0 11.1 -0.5 10.6 -4.8 5.8 -3.2 2.6 -0.7 1.9 -1.9 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 5.2 -6.3 
Germany 
        
5.2 -3.1 2.0 -0.1 2.0 -1.8 0.1 -0.7 -0.6 1.7 -5.8 
Ireland 
        
3.0 -0.2 2.8 -0.7 2.1 -10.2 -8.1 2.6 -5.5 -1.2 -8.5 
Italy 2.6 6.8 9.4 2.5 11.9 -4.7 7.3 -6.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 -0.5 0.7 -0.7 0.0 0.4 0.5 3.9 -2.2 
Japan 3.3 3.2 6.5 0.8 7.3 -3.0 4.3 -3.9 0.3 -1.5 -1.2 -0.3 -1.4 1.8 0.4 1.5 1.8 2.4 -1.4 
Netherlands 21.1 2.4 23.4 3.9 27.3 -0.5 26.8 -8.4 18.4 -7.4 11.0 -5.2 5.8 -5.8 0.0 1.9 1.9 15.1 -19.1 
New Zealand 7.7 6.3 14.0 1.3 15.3 -1.7 13.6 -10.9 2.7 -2.4 0.4 0.9 1.3 -5.3 -4.0 0.5 -3.5 5.3 -11.2 
Norway 8.3 4.3 12.6 0.5 13.0 -2.9 10.1 -3.8 6.3 -3.2 3.0 -1.9 1.1 -1.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 6.1 -7.8 
Portugal 10.9 4.4 15.3 6.4 21.6 0.1 21.8 -8.0 13.8 -8.8 5.0 -1.9 3.0 -3.4 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 10.0 -11.7 
Spain 8.6 2.8 11.3 -0.3 11.0 2.4 13.3 -8.0 5.3 -2.2 3.1 -0.2 2.9 -2.9 0.0 -0.6 -0.6 6.1 -9.1 
Sweden 2.5 5.0 7.5 2.7 10.2 0.1 10.2 -7.0 3.2 -1.1 2.1 -0.5 1.6 0.2 1.8 0.4 2.2 4.6 -0.3 
Switzerland 19.8 -3.6 16.3 -1.2 15.0 -4.5 10.6 -3.3 7.3 -5.7 1.5 -0.4 1.1 -0.9 0.2 -0.3 -0.1 8.0 -19.9 
United Kingdom 5.5 8.2 13.7 -4.4 9.3 -0.6 8.7 -4.2 4.4 -0.5 3.9 -4.7 -0.8 -1.7 -2.5 2.6 0.1 4.7 -5.4 
United States 0.0 2.8 2.9 2.1 5.0 -1.8 3.1 -0.5 2.6 -1.1 1.5 -1.7 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.9 1.8 0.8 
Ø 8.7 3.2 11.9 1.4 13.2 -1.4 11.8 -5.9 6.0 -2.6 3.3 -1.2 2.2 -2.5 -0.3 0.1 -0.2 5.8 -8.4 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 19: Labour demand shock 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 0.001 -0.035 -0.034 -0.004 -0.038 0.023 -0.016 0.026 0.011 -0.021 -0.010 0.001 -0.010 0.026 0.016 -0.010 0.015 
Austria -0.003 -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 -0.026 0.015 -0.012 0.009 -0.002 0.030 0.028 0.046 0.074 0.043 0.117 0.020 0.120 
Belgium -0.009 -0.037 -0.046 -0.041 -0.087 0.003 -0.084 0.011 -0.073 0.004 -0.069 0.003 -0.066 
  
-0.062 0.009 
Canada -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.017 0.015 0.002 0.017 -0.023 -0.006 -0.034 -0.040 -0.013 -0.053 0.025 -0.028 -0.013 -0.023 
Denmark 0.006 0.033 0.038 0.003 0.042 0.007 0.049 0.011 0.060 0.025 0.085 0.016 0.101 
  
0.054 -0.006 
Finland 
  
0.011 0.016 0.027 0.017 0.044 0.002 0.047 0.048 0.094 0.017 0.112 0.032 0.144 0.069 0.144 
France 0.013 0.026 0.038 -0.025 0.014 -0.009 0.004 0.045 0.050 0.067 0.117 0.013 0.130 0.023 0.153 0.065 0.140 
Germany 0.009 0.006 0.015 -0.009 0.006 0.011 0.017 0.006 0.023 0.018 0.040 0.005 0.046 0.010 0.055 0.026 0.046 
Ireland -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 0.017 0.010 0.038 0.048 0.039 0.087 0.041 0.128 0.039 0.167 
  
0.062 0.001 
Italy 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.033 0.037 0.036 0.073 0.032 0.105 0.047 0.152 0.030 0.182 0.070 0.177 
Japan 0.007 -0.032 -0.026 -0.062 -0.087 0.004 -0.084 0.050 -0.034 0.060 0.026 0.023 0.049 
  
-0.021 -0.007 
Netherlands -0.006 -0.030 -0.036 -0.005 -0.041 0.031 -0.010 0.014 0.005 0.014 0.019 0.009 0.028 0.019 0.046 0.001 0.052 
New Zealand 
      
0.000 0.032 0.032 -0.030 0.001 -0.001 
   
0.011 0.000 
Norway 
    
0.009 0.003 0.012 0.032 0.044 0.012 0.055 0.029 0.084 0.017 0.101 0.051 0.101 
Portugal 
  
0.000 0.057 0.057 0.100 0.157 0.062 0.218 
      
0.108 0.000 
Spain -0.003 0.016 0.013 0.018 0.031 -0.029 0.002 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.026 -0.009 0.017 0.013 0.030 0.016 0.033 
Sweden 0.011 0.028 0.038 -0.007 0.031 0.020 0.051 0.015 0.066 0.051 0.117 -0.019 0.099 -0.022 0.077 0.061 0.067 
Switzerland 
  
0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.024 -0.026 -0.034 -0.060 -0.030 -0.090 -0.037 -0.127 
  
-0.051 0.000 
United Kingdom 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.013 0.019 -0.011 0.008 -0.003 0.005 0.016 0.021 0.023 0.044 0.002 0.046 0.019 0.042 
United States 0.001 0.020 0.021 0.023 0.044 0.005 0.048 0.009 0.057 0.012 0.069 0.007 0.076 0.004 0.080 0.049 0.079 
Ø 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.013 0.017 0.031 0.007 0.038 0.013 0.051 0.027 0.078 0.026 0.077 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 20: Union density rate (%) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 49.7 -2.5 47.2 -2.2 45.0 4.2 49.2 -0.6 48.5 -3.2 45.4 -5.8 39.6 -7.0 32.6 -7.8 24.8 -3.9 20.9 -2.6 18.3 38.3 -31.4 
Austria 67.3 -1.1 66.2 -4.0 62.2 -3.0 59.1 -2.9 56.2 -4.7 51.5 -4.8 46.7 -5.8 40.9 -4.3 36.7 -4.1 32.6 -4.0 28.6 49.8 -38.7 
Belgium 40.3 -0.2 40.1 3.3 43.4 8.0 51.3 1.9 53.3 -1.4 51.9 1.4 53.3 2.0 55.3 -4.2 51.1 1.9 53.0 -1.0 51.9 49.5 11.7 
Canada 28.2 -0.8 27.4 3.4 30.8 3.7 34.5 1.8 36.3 0.4 36.7 -0.4 36.2 -0.8 35.4 -5.2 30.3 -0.4 29.8 -0.6 29.2 32.3 1.0 
Denmark 57.6 0.5 58.1 2.1 60.3 8.4 68.7 10.0 78.7 -0.6 78.1 -2.9 75.3 1.7 77.0 -1.8 75.1 -4.3 70.9 -2.7 68.2 69.8 10.6 
Finland 32.9 5.7 38.6 12.8 51.4 13.4 64.8 3.4 68.2 1.3 69.5 4.8 74.3 5.9 80.2 -4.8 75.5 -3.3 72.1 -3.2 68.9 63.3 36.0 
France 19.6 -0.2 19.5 2.0 21.5 0.2 21.7 -3.2 18.5 -4.7 13.8 -3.5 10.3 -1.5 8.8 -0.8 8.1 -0.3 7.7 -0.1 7.6 14.3 -12.0 
Germany 34.2 -1.3 32.9 -0.9 32.1 2.1 34.2 1.0 35.2 -0.8 34.4 -1.0 33.3 -4.1 29.2 -4.6 24.6 -3.1 21.5 -2.7 18.8 30.0 -15.4 
Ireland 44.5 1.4 45.9 3.7 49.6 2.8 52.4 1.8 54.2 -2.8 51.3 -2.7 48.6 -3.3 45.3 -7.1 38.2 -3.7 34.4 -0.3 34.1 45.3 -10.4 
Italy 24.9 0.9 25.8 10.8 36.6 11.0 47.6 1.3 48.9 -6.1 42.7 -3.6 39.1 -1.2 37.9 -3.1 34.8 -1.2 33.6 0.8 34.4 36.9 9.5 
Japan 33.5 1.4 35.0 -0.2 34.7 -0.9 33.8 -2.4 31.4 -2.7 28.7 -3.2 25.5 -1.8 23.8 -2.3 21.5 -2.6 18.9 -0.4 18.5 27.8 -15.0 
Netherlands 39.4 -1.4 38.0 -1.4 36.7 0.6 37.2 -2.5 34.7 -6.9 27.9 -3.4 24.5 0.8 25.3 -2.4 22.9 -2.6 20.2 -1.6 18.7 29.6 -20.8 
New Zealand 0.4 0.0 0.4 33.6 34.0 26.6 60.6 6.3 66.9 -10.6 56.3 -9.7 46.6 -18.9 27.7 -5.6 22.1 -1.1 21.1 -0.2 20.9 32.4 20.5 
Norway 60.2 -1.4 58.8 -3.3 55.6 -2.1 53.5 3.3 56.8 0.6 57.3 0.4 57.8 -0.8 57.0 -2.3 54.7 0.0 54.7 -0.5 54.3 56.4 -6.0 
Portugal 
      
0.6 55.3 55.9 -12.2 43.8 -13.9 29.9 -4.2 25.6 -3.5 22.1 -1.0 21.1 -1.1 20.0 27.4 20.0 
Spain 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 3.6 3.7 6.4 10.1 3.1 13.2 3.5 16.7 -0.5 16.2 -0.9 15.3 0.2 15.5 8.3 15.4 
Sweden 72.5 -6.0 66.5 2.6 69.1 5.0 74.1 3.9 77.9 3.3 81.2 -0.9 80.3 2.9 83.1 -4.0 79.1 -4.0 75.1 -6.9 68.2 75.2 -4.3 
Switzerland 35.2 -2.6 32.7 -3.1 29.5 1.8 31.4 -2.2 29.2 -4.1 25.1 -2.2 22.8 -0.3 22.6 -1.8 20.7 -1.5 19.2 -1.2 18.0 26.0 -17.2 
United Kingdom 38.7 -0.1 38.6 3.4 42.0 2.3 44.3 5.0 49.3 -3.9 45.4 -6.2 39.2 -5.7 33.5 -3.6 29.9 -1.3 28.7 -2.0 26.7 37.8 -12.1 
United States 29.9 -1.7 28.2 -1.0 27.2 -2.2 25.0 -3.0 22.0 -4.3 17.7 -2.1 15.6 -1.3 14.4 -1.3 13.1 -1.2 11.9 -0.3 11.6 19.7 -18.3 
Ø 37.3 -0.5 36.8 3.2 40.1 2.1 42.2 4.1 46.3 -2.8 43.4 -2.8 40.6 -2.0 38.6 -3.6 35.1 -1.9 33.1 -1.5 31.6 38.5 -5.7 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 21: Collective bargaining coverage (%) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 85.0 0.0 85.0 0.0 85.0 -0.1 84.9 -0.6 84.2 0.2 84.5 -2.8 81.7 -1.0 80.7 -11.2 69.5 -21.5 48.0 -8.0 40.0 75.3 -45.0 
Austria 95.0 0.0 95.0 0.0 95.0 0.0 95.0 1.8 96.8 1.4 98.3 0.3 98.6 0.2 98.8 -0.4 98.4 0.6 99.0 0.0 99.0 97.2 4.0 
Belgium 80.0 0.0 80.0 0.6 80.6 4.6 85.2 5.4 90.5 -0.2 90.4 0.7 91.1 -0.4 90.7 3.2 93.9 2.1 96.0 0.0 96.0 88.6 16.0 
Canada 34.6 -1.0 33.6 2.4 36.0 2.6 38.6 0.0 38.6 0.2 38.8 -1.0 37.8 -2.5 35.3 -2.8 32.5 -0.6 31.9 -0.3 31.6 35.4 -3.0 
Denmark 67.2 0.7 67.9 0.4 68.2 1.8 70.1 2.3 72.4 1.1 73.5 -2.4 71.1 0.8 71.9 9.7 81.6 0.8 82.4 -2.4 80.0 73.3 12.8 
Finland 95.0 0.0 95.0 0.0 95.0 -0.1 94.9 -0.6 94.2 0.5 94.8 -0.5 94.3 0.3 94.6 -2.6 92.0 -2.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 93.6 -5.0 
France 70.0 0.0 70.0 0.0 70.0 3.6 73.6 8.2 81.8 9.3 91.1 1.0 92.1 1.6 93.7 -1.7 92.0 -2.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 83.1 20.0 
Germany 90.0 0.0 90.0 0.0 90.0 -0.4 89.6 -1.9 87.7 1.5 89.2 -1.5 87.8 -0.8 86.9 -17.0 69.9 -6.0 64.0 -1.9 62.1 82.5 -27.9 
Ireland 50.4 1.9 52.3 4.6 56.9 3.6 60.6 2.1 62.7 -1.2 61.5 -1.4 60.1 -0.1 60.0 -3.0 57.0 -4.6 52.5 -8.5 44.0 56.2 -6.4 
Italy 90.8 -0.9 89.9 -2.0 87.9 -2.6 85.2 -1.0 84.2 0.4 84.6 -1.5 83.1 -0.8 82.3 -0.6 81.7 -1.7 80.0 0.0 80.0 84.5 -10.8 
Japan 30.8 1.0 31.8 -0.1 31.7 -0.9 30.8 -2.7 28.1 -2.6 25.5 -2.5 23.0 -2.5 20.5 -2.1 18.4 -1.7 16.6 -0.6 16.0 24.8 -14.8 
Netherlands 98.7 -5.1 93.6 -6.4 87.3 -6.4 80.9 -4.9 75.9 2.6 78.5 -2.9 75.6 8.4 84.0 0.4 84.4 1.0 85.4 -3.1 82.3 84.2 -16.4 
New Zealand 
    
70.0 0.0 70.0 -4.1 65.9 -1.9 64.0 -4.2 59.8 -27.7 32.1 -7.2 24.9 -7.1 17.8 -0.8 17.0 46.8 17.0 
Norway 65.0 0.0 65.0 0.0 65.0 0.8 65.8 4.8 70.5 -0.2 70.4 0.7 71.1 -0.4 70.7 1.6 72.3 0.3 72.6 1.4 74.0 69.3 9.0 
Portugal 
        
72.0 1.8 73.8 1.2 75.0 -1.3 73.7 4.7 78.4 -19.9 58.5 -9.5 49.0 68.6 49.0 
Spain 
      
33.0 28.4 61.4 8.6 70.0 4.5 74.5 4.3 78.8 6.9 85.7 2.9 88.6 -4.1 84.5 72.1 84.5 
Sweden 83.0 0.0 83.0 0.6 83.6 0.4 84.0 -0.5 83.5 0.3 83.8 1.3 85.1 4.5 89.6 3.4 93.0 0.4 93.4 -2.4 91.0 86.6 8.0 
Switzerland 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 1.8 51.8 1.2 53.0 0.0 53.0 -2.0 51.0 -5.2 45.8 2.2 48.0 0.0 48.0 50.1 -2.0 
United Kingdom 67.0 0.1 67.1 1.2 68.4 3.1 71.5 -1.0 70.4 -8.9 61.5 -12.7 48.9 -9.8 39.0 -4.4 34.6 0.0 34.6 -1.7 32.9 54.2 -34.1 
United States 28.6 -1.4 27.2 -0.6 26.6 -2.3 24.3 -1.0 23.3 -2.3 20.9 -2.7 18.2 -1.8 16.5 -1.9 14.5 -0.9 13.6 -0.3 13.3 20.7 -15.3 
Ø 69.5 -0.3 69.2 0.1 69.3 -1.5 67.8 2.0 69.8 0.6 70.4 -1.3 69.1 -1.6 67.5 -1.5 66.0 -2.9 63.1 -2.1 61.0 67.4 -8.4 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 22: Coordination of collective bargaining (1-5) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 -1 2 2 4 -1 4 -2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 -1 
Austria 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 -1 
Belgium 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 1 5 -1 4 1 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 
Canada 1 0 1 0 1 2 3 -1 2 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Denmark 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 -1 4 -1 3 0 3 1 4 0 3 0 3 4 -2 
Finland 5 0 5 0 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 4 0 4 -1 3 4 -2 
France 3 -1 2 0 2 1 3 -1 2 1 3 -1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 -1 
Germany 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 0 
Ireland 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 0 3 -1 2 2 4 1 5 0 5 0 5 -2 3 3 2 
Italy 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 -1 2 2 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 3 2 
Japan 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 4 -1 
Netherlands 5 -1 4 -1 3 1 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 4 -1 
New Zealand 4 0 4 0 4 1 5 0 5 -1 4 -2 2 -1 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 3 -2 
Norway 5 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 -1 3 1 4 1 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 4 -1 
Portugal 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 -2 3 -1 3 1 3 0 3 -1 3 0 3 0 3 4 -2 
Spain 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 -1 4 -1 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 1 4 0 4 4 -1 
Sweden 5 0 5 -1 4 -1 3 1 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 4 -2 
Switzerland 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 4 -1 
United Kingdom 1 2 3 1 3 0 4 -1 3 -2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 
United States 1 0 1 1 2 0 2 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Ø 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 -1 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 23: Level of collective bargaining (1-5) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 2 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 1 4 0 4 -2 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 0 
Austria 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 -1 2 0 3 0 2 3 -2 
Belgium 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 4 0 3 0 4 0 3 1 4 4 0 
Canada 1 0 1 0 1 1 2 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Denmark 3 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 2 3 -1 
Finland 3 0 3 2 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 4 0 
France 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 
Germany 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 
Ireland 1 0 1 1 2 1 3 -1 2 0 2 3 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 -2 2 3 1 
Italy 4 -1 3 -1 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 -1 2 3 -2 
Japan 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Netherlands 5 -1 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 4 -1 2 4 -3 
New Zealand 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -3 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 -3 
Norway 5 0 4 0 5 0 4 0 4 -1 3 1 4 1 5 -2 3 0 3 1 4 4 -1 
Portugal 3 0 3 0 3 -1 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 -1 2 3 -1 
Spain 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 1 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 
Sweden 5 0 5 -1 4 -1 3 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 4 -2 
Switzerland 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 -1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 -1 
United Kingdom 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 -1 2 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 -1 
United States 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Ø 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 -1 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 24: Government interventions (1-5) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 2 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 
Austria 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 
Belgium 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 -1 3 1 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 3 2 
Canada 1 0 1 0 1 2 3 -1 2 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Denmark 3 0 3 0 3 1 4 0 4 0 4 -2 2 0 2 1 3 -1 2 0 2 3 -1 
Finland 4 0 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 3 1 4 0 4 -1 3 4 -1 
France 3 0 3 0 3 1 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 
Germany 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 1 3 -1 2 0 2 2 0 
Ireland 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 3 0 3 1 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 -1 3 3 2 
Italy 1 1 2 0 2 1 3 1 3 0 4 0 4 -1 2 0 3 0 2 0 2 3 1 
Japan 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Netherlands 5 -1 4 -1 4 1 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 -1 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 3 -2 
New Zealand 3 0 3 1 4 1 5 0 5 -1 4 -1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 -1 
Norway 3 0 3 0 3 1 4 0 4 -1 3 1 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 3 0 
Portugal 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 -1 4 -1 3 0 4 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 4 -2 
Spain 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 -1 4 0 4 -1 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 4 -2 
Sweden 2 0 2 0 2 0 3 0 3 -1 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 2 0 
Switzerland 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
United Kingdom 2 1 3 1 4 0 4 -2 3 -2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 2 0 
United States 2 0 2 1 3 0 3 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 -1 
Ø 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 3 0 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
  
Knirsch: Institutions, Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD 
97 
 
Table 25: Dummy high corporatism (0;1) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Austria 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Belgium 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
Finland 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 1 -1 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Germany 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 1 0 
Italy 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Japan 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
Netherlands 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
New Zealand 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
Norway 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Portugal 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
Spain 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Sweden 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
Switzerland 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ø 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 26: Dummy intermediated corporatism (0;1) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
France 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Italy 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
United Kingdom 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 
United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ø 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 27: Unemployment benefit gross replacement rates (%) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 17.5 0.5 18.0 -3.6 14.4 6.7 21.1 2.4 23.5 0.2 23.7 1.9 25.6 1.4 27.0 -1.9 25.1 -1.8 23.3 -1.7 21.6 21.9 4.1 
Austria 19.7 -4.0 15.7 5.7 21.4 1.1 22.5 5.8 28.3 -0.8 27.5 2.0 29.5 1.4 30.9 -0.1 30.8 -2.8 28.0 0.0 28.0 25.7 8.3 
Belgium 41.3 -8.1 33.2 7.2 40.4 6.3 46.7 -1.2 45.5 -2.2 43.3 -1.4 41.9 -2.3 39.6 -2.2 37.4 -0.1 37.3 0.1 37.4 40.4 -3.9 
Canada 13.8 -1.5 12.3 1.9 14.2 6.4 20.6 -2.3 18.3 0.7 19.0 0.0 19.0 -1.2 17.8 -2.8 15.0 -2.1 12.9 1.8 14.7 16.1 0.9 
Denmark 20.2 0.0 20.2 9.9 30.1 9.5 39.6 12.0 51.6 1.1 52.7 -1.1 51.6 8.6 60.2 -2.1 58.1 -4.0 54.1 -11.6 42.5 43.7 22.3 
Finland 5.0 -0.7 4.3 4.5 8.8 17.9 26.7 -0.9 25.8 6.1 31.9 4.7 36.6 -0.6 36.0 -0.9 35.1 0.6 35.7 -1.2 34.5 25.5 29.5 
France 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.2 25.2 -0.7 24.5 3.0 27.5 6.8 34.3 3.3 37.6 -0.3 37.3 0.8 38.1 -2.8 35.3 0.1 35.4 31.4 10.4 
Germany 30.0 0.0 30.0 -0.6 29.4 -0.7 28.7 0.7 29.4 -1.1 28.3 0.1 28.4 -1.8 26.6 3.2 29.8 -4.4 25.4 -3.9 21.5 28.0 -8.5 
Ireland 17.0 0.3 17.3 -0.7 16.6 4.7 21.3 7.0 28.3 1.5 29.8 -1.3 28.5 -0.1 28.4 0.8 29.2 5.4 34.6 5.1 39.7 26.4 22.7 
Italy 3.8 -1.2 2.6 -0.6 2.0 -0.6 1.4 -0.4 1.0 -0.7 0.3 3.8 4.1 14.0 18.1 0.8 18.9 -10.5 8.4 2.4 10.8 6.5 7.0 
Japan 12.0 0.0 12.0 0.5 12.5 -0.7 11.8 -2.8 9.0 0.7 9.7 0.3 10.0 0.3 10.3 1.7 12.0 0.3 12.3 -0.3 12.0 11.2 0.0 
Netherlands 13.0 23.9 36.9 10.9 47.8 0.2 48.0 -0.5 47.5 5.7 53.2 1.0 54.2 -1.9 52.3 -1.1 51.2 -11.7 39.5 -6.5 33.0 43.3 20.0 
New Zealand 41.3 -6.8 34.5 -5.2 29.3 -1.6 27.7 0.5 28.2 3.4 31.6 -0.5 31.1 -1.7 29.4 1.8 31.2 -0.5 30.7 -4.0 26.7 31.1 -14.6 
Norway 4.0 -0.4 3.6 1.2 4.8 7.1 11.9 12.7 24.6 11.4 36.0 3.0 39.0 0.0 39.0 9.2 48.2 6.8 55.0 -21.6 33.4 27.2 29.4 
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 3.5 4.1 7.6 12.6 20.2 12.8 33.0 2.0 35.0 4.9 39.9 -2.4 37.5 2.9 40.4 19.7 40.4 
Spain 9.0 7.0 16.0 -0.4 15.6 3.0 18.6 5.9 24.5 7.7 32.2 1.6 33.8 0.7 34.5 -0.5 34.0 -1.0 33.0 -1.4 31.6 25.7 22.6 
Sweden 4.0 0.7 4.7 1.7 6.4 11.7 18.1 7.1 25.2 3.4 28.6 0.4 29.0 -1.7 27.3 4.1 31.4 6.0 37.4 -0.2 37.2 22.7 33.2 
Switzerland 1.8 -0.8 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.9 3.9 8.6 12.5 6.8 19.3 3.5 22.8 8.4 31.2 4.1 35.3 -5.7 29.6 -0.6 29.0 17.0 27.2 
United Kingdom 24.2 2.1 26.3 -0.3 26.0 -2.5 23.5 0.4 23.9 -3.2 20.7 -2.5 18.2 0.1 18.3 -3.7 14.6 -3.3 11.3 -0.3 11.0 19.8 -13.2 
United States 7.5 2.1 9.6 0.5 10.1 2.5 12.6 1.1 13.7 -0.2 13.5 -2.4 11.1 1.5 12.6 -1.5 11.1 -2.4 8.7 11.6 20.3 11.9 12.8 
Ø 15.5 0.7 16.2 1.6 17.8 3.8 21.6 3.2 24.8 3.0 27.8 1.5 29.3 1.3 30.6 0.7 31.3 -1.8 29.5 -1.5 28.0 24.8 12.5 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 28: Employment Protection (0-2) 
country Ø1960 ∆ Ø1965 ∆ Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.1 
Austria 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.2 1.3 0.0 1.3 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 1.1 -0.2 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.3 
Belgium 0.7 0.3 0.9 0.4 1.4 0.2 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.6 -0.1 1.4 -0.4 1.0 -0.3 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.8 1.1 0.1 
Canada 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.1 
Denmark 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.1 1.0 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 -0.1 1.0 -0.2 0.8 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.0 
Finland 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 -0.1 1.0 -0.1 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.1 -0.3 
France 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.2 0.1 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.1 1.4 -0.1 1.3 -0.3 0.9 0.1 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 
Germany 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.7 1.3 0.4 1.7 0.0 1.7 0.0 1.7 -0.1 1.6 -0.3 1.3 -0.2 1.1 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.2 0.7 
Ireland 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Italy 1.9 0.1 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 -0.1 1.9 -0.4 1.5 -0.4 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.1 1.7 -0.8 
Japan 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 -0.3 1.1 -0.4 0.7 0.0 0.7 -0.1 0.5 1.2 -0.9 
Netherlands 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.3 -0.1 1.2 -0.1 1.2 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.1 1.3 -0.2 
New Zealand 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 -0.1 0.7 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.7 -0.2 
Norway 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.6 0.0 1.6 -0.1 1.5 -0.3 1.2 -0.3 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.3 -0.6 
Portugal 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
1.6 1.6 0.2 1.9 0.1 2.0 0.0 1.9 -0.1 1.9 0.0 1.8 -0.1 1.8 -0.1 1.7 1.8 1.7 
Spain 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 2.0 -0.1 1.9 0.0 1.9 -0.1 1.8 -0.4 1.4 -0.4 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.6 -1.1 
Sweden 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.3 0.5 1.8 0.0 1.8 -0.2 1.6 -0.4 1.3 -0.2 1.1 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Switzerland 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.1 
United Kingdom 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 
United States 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Ø 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 1.1 0.1 1.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.1 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.0 0.0 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 29: Product market regulation (0-6) 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.0 -0.2 3.8 -1.0 2.8 -1.1 1.7 -0.2 1.5 0.1 1.6 3.0 -2.5 
Austria 5.2 0.0 5.2 -0.1 5.1 -0.2 4.9 -0.4 4.5 -0.5 4.0 -1.0 3.0 -0.6 2.4 -0.3 2.1 4.1 -3.1 
Belgium 5.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 5.4 -0.3 5.1 -1.1 4.1 -1.3 2.8 -0.7 2.1 -0.1 2.1 4.2 -3.4 
Canada 4.3 0.0 4.3 0.0 4.3 -0.2 4.1 -1.4 2.7 -0.4 2.3 -0.4 2.0 -0.1 1.9 0.0 1.8 3.1 -2.5 
Denmark 5.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 5.5 -0.7 4.8 -1.2 3.7 -1.3 2.3 -0.7 1.6 -0.7 0.9 3.9 -4.6 
Finland 5.5 0.0 5.5 -0.1 5.4 -0.3 5.2 -0.4 4.7 -1.5 3.3 -0.7 2.5 -0.2 2.4 -0.1 2.3 4.1 -3.2 
France 6.0 0.0 6.0 0.0 6.0 -0.1 5.9 -0.6 5.3 -0.5 4.8 -0.9 3.8 -0.8 3.0 -0.3 2.7 4.8 -3.3 
Germany 5.2 0.0 5.2 0.0 5.2 -0.1 5.1 -0.2 4.9 -1.2 3.7 -1.4 2.2 -0.5 1.7 -0.4 1.3 3.9 -3.9 
Ireland 5.7 0.0 5.7 0.0 5.7 -0.1 5.6 -0.6 5.0 -0.4 4.6 -0.8 3.8 -0.6 3.2 -0.4 2.7 4.7 -3.0 
Italy 5.8 0.0 5.8 0.0 5.8 0.0 5.8 -0.1 5.8 -0.8 5.0 -1.4 3.6 -1.1 2.6 -0.7 1.9 4.7 -3.9 
Japan 5.1 0.0 5.1 0.0 5.1 -0.2 4.9 -1.2 3.7 -0.5 3.2 -0.6 2.6 -0.4 2.2 0.0 2.2 3.8 -2.8 
Netherlands 5.6 0.0 5.6 0.0 5.6 0.0 5.6 -0.2 5.3 -1.7 3.6 -1.5 2.1 -0.5 1.6 -0.9 0.7 4.0 -4.8 
New Zealand 4.9 0.0 4.9 0.2 5.1 -0.6 4.5 -0.9 3.6 -1.0 2.6 -0.8 1.9 0.2 2.1 0.1 2.1 3.5 -2.8 
Norway 5.5 0.0 5.5 0.0 5.5 -0.4 5.1 -0.7 4.3 -0.9 3.4 -0.6 2.8 -0.5 2.3 -0.1 2.3 4.1 -3.2 
Portugal 5.9 0.0 5.9 0.0 5.9 -0.1 5.8 -0.5 5.3 -0.5 4.8 -1.3 3.5 -0.9 2.6 -0.8 1.8 4.6 -4.1 
Spain 5.1 0.0 5.1 0.0 5.0 -0.1 5.0 -0.2 4.7 -0.6 4.1 -1.4 2.8 -0.7 2.0 -0.2 1.8 4.0 -3.3 
Sweden 4.5 0.0 4.5 0.0 4.5 0.0 4.5 -0.2 4.4 -1.5 2.9 -0.7 2.2 -0.3 1.9 0.1 2.0 3.5 -2.6 
Switzerland 4.1 0.0 4.1 0.0 4.1 0.0 4.2 0.0 4.2 -0.2 4.0 -0.9 3.1 -0.4 2.8 -0.3 2.5 3.7 -1.6 
United Kingdom 4.8 0.0 4.8 -0.1 4.7 -0.5 4.2 -1.0 3.2 -1.4 1.8 -0.6 1.2 -0.2 1.0 0.1 1.1 3.0 -3.6 
United States 3.7 0.0 3.7 -0.5 3.2 -0.7 2.5 -0.2 2.3 -0.4 1.9 -0.4 1.5 -0.1 1.4 -0.1 1.4 2.4 -2.4 
Ø 5.1 0.0 5.1 0.0 5.1 -0.2 4.9 -0.5 4.4 -0.9 3.5 -1.0 2.6 -0.5 2.1 -0.3 1.9 3.8 -3.2 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 30: Tax wedge (%) 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 7.9 -0.2 7.8 3.5 11.2 2.9 14.2 1.8 16.0 2.8 18.8 3.3 22.1 -0.9 21.2 -1.8 19.4 15.4 11.4 
Austria 32.4 -0.5 31.9 4.2 36.0 3.5 39.6 -0.9 38.6 3.6 42.2 -1.2 41.0 0.1 41.1 0.2 41.4 38.2 9.0 
Belgium 32.8 3.3 36.1 5.0 41.1 5.8 46.8 -3.1 43.7 0.4 44.1 3.3 47.4 0.3 47.6 0.4 48.0 43.1 15.2 
Canada 18.9 -4.0 14.9 0.5 15.4 6.4 21.8 3.2 25.0 3.2 28.2 -1.3 26.9 -2.6 24.3 -2.0 22.3 22.0 3.4 
Denmark 28.2 3.1 31.3 5.3 36.5 7.0 43.5 -0.6 42.9 3.2 46.2 -7.7 38.4 -3.3 35.2 -1.6 33.5 37.3 5.4 
Finland 26.7 4.5 31.3 2.7 33.9 0.7 34.6 2.6 37.2 10.1 47.3 -4.1 43.2 -3.8 39.4 -1.5 37.9 36.8 11.2 
France 26.7 1.5 28.3 5.4 33.7 6.1 39.8 1.6 41.4 1.9 43.3 0.1 43.4 1.3 44.7 0.7 45.4 38.5 18.7 
Germany 30.4 3.5 33.9 1.4 35.3 2.4 37.7 -1.1 36.7 2.7 39.3 3.7 43.0 1.6 44.6 -2.0 42.6 38.2 12.2 
Ireland 
  
16.7 2.3 19.0 7.3 26.3 1.7 28.0 -0.9 27.1 -7.7 19.4 -7.0 12.4 0.1 12.5 20.2 12.5 
Italy 27.9 1.4 29.3 2.4 31.8 4.4 36.1 1.2 37.4 5.1 42.5 -0.6 41.9 -1.2 40.7 1.1 41.8 36.6 13.9 
Japan 8.4 3.7 12.1 8.1 20.2 4.3 24.6 2.2 26.8 1.4 28.2 -1.7 26.5 -0.3 26.2 1.0 27.2 22.2 18.9 
Netherlands 33.5 3.4 37.0 3.3 40.3 6.0 46.3 0.3 46.6 -0.6 46.0 -8.4 37.5 -4.1 33.4 -1.9 31.5 39.1 -2.0 
New Zealand 13.0 5.0 18.0 1.9 19.9 4.8 24.7 -1.4 23.3 0.3 23.6 -5.9 17.7 -2.9 14.9 -5.3 9.6 18.3 -3.4 
Norway 
  
26.2 0.9 27.1 1.7 28.8 9.1 37.9 2.1 40.0 -3.8 36.2 -3.0 33.2 0.2 33.4 32.8 33.4 
Portugal 10.2 3.3 13.5 8.6 22.0 4.0 26.1 1.0 27.0 1.1 28.2 4.3 32.5 -0.1 32.4 -0.7 31.6 24.8 21.4 
Spain 14.4 2.9 17.3 7.8 25.1 5.9 31.0 0.7 31.7 1.5 33.2 1.2 34.3 1.5 35.8 0.2 36.1 28.8 21.7 
Sweden 26.4 5.1 31.5 7.2 38.8 3.9 42.7 3.3 46.0 3.0 49.0 -0.4 48.5 -3.8 44.8 -4.2 40.6 40.9 14.2 
Switzerland 21.4 7.6 29.0 2.2 31.2 1.2 32.4 -1.1 31.2 5.0 36.2 -19.0 17.2 -0.6 16.6 -0.8 15.9 25.7 -5.6 
United Kingdom 
  
31.2 -4.9 26.2 0.6 26.9 -2.8 24.1 1.0 25.1 1.4 26.5 2.2 28.7 -1.6 27.2 27.0 27.2 
United States 16.0 0.8 16.8 3.0 19.8 0.7 20.5 2.6 23.1 1.8 24.9 0.7 25.6 -1.7 23.9 0.4 24.3 21.6 8.3 
Ø 22.1 2.6 24.7 3.5 28.2 4.0 32.2 1.0 33.2 2.4 35.7 -2.2 33.5 -1.4 32.1 -0.9 31.1 30.4 9.0 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 31: Active labour market policies (%) 
country Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 4.7 0.1 4.8 1.8 6.6 -0.5 6.1 1.4 7.5 -1.6 5.9 5.9 1.2 
Austria 8.0 0.5 8.5 0.7 9.3 3.8 13.1 -0.2 13.0 2.7 15.7 11.3 7.7 
Belgium 10.3 5.9 16.2 -1.8 14.5 2.6 17.0 -2.8 14.3 2.5 16.8 14.8 6.5 
Canada 6.3 0.1 6.3 -0.4 5.9 0.0 5.9 -1.3 4.6 -0.8 3.8 5.5 -2.5 
Denmark 17.4 -1.4 16.0 7.6 23.6 13.4 36.9 -4.9 32.0 -4.7 27.3 25.5 9.9 
Finland 17.4 6.9 24.3 -13.9 10.4 0.7 11.1 -0.7 10.4 0.4 10.8 14.5 -6.6 
France 6.6 2.7 9.3 1.5 10.7 1.3 12.0 -1.3 10.7 0.2 10.9 10.0 4.4 
Germany 13.1 11.2 24.3 -3.2 21.1 -5.5 15.6 -5.9 9.7 2.2 11.9 15.9 -1.2 
Ireland 8.8 1.0 9.8 2.3 12.1 17.4 29.5 -11.3 18.3 -9.9 8.4 14.5 -0.4 
Italy 
  
9.5 1.9 11.4 0.0 11.4 1.8 13.2 -4.2 9.0 10.9 9.0 
Japan 6.1 0.2 6.3 -3.3 3.0 1.1 4.1 2.5 6.5 4.2 10.7 6.1 4.6 
Netherlands 9.5 9.4 18.9 7.2 26.1 29.7 55.8 -23.7 32.1 1.6 33.6 26.3 24.1 
New Zealand 23.4 -11.9 11.4 -1.3 10.1 -0.7 9.4 1.3 10.8 -4.8 6.0 14.0 -17.4 
Norway 30.8 -11.9 18.8 2.4 21.3 2.6 23.9 -7.3 16.6 -1.0 15.6 21.2 -15.2 
Portugal 4.6 8.0 12.5 -0.3 12.2 4.4 16.6 -6.9 9.7 -1.1 8.6 10.7 4.0 
Spain 2.0 2.2 4.2 -1.6 2.6 3.0 5.6 2.3 7.9 -2.2 5.7 4.3 3.7 
Sweden 72.2 8.9 81.1 -54.1 27.0 2.4 29.3 -10.4 19.0 -5.0 13.9 40.4 -58.3 
Switzerland 25.8 4.6 30.4 -16.0 14.4 8.3 22.7 -5.5 17.3 -0.4 16.8 21.3 -9.0 
United Kingdom 7.5 0.6 8.0 -2.6 5.5 2.8 8.3 1.3 9.6 -4.8 4.8 7.5 -2.6 
United States 3.6 0.1 3.7 -0.4 3.4 0.4 3.8 -1.6 2.2 -0.1 2.1 3.2 -1.5 
Ø 14.6 1.6 16.2 -3.7 12.6 4.4 16.9 -3.6 13.3 -1.3 11.9 14.2 -2.0 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
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Table 32: KOF actual trade flows 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 42.7 0.3 42.9 0.7 43.6 4.5 48.1 12.8 60.9 2.7 63.7 2.6 66.3 4.6 70.9 1.4 72.3 56.8 29.6 
Austria 36.4 3.7 40.1 8.6 48.7 5.6 54.4 7.2 61.6 1.5 63.1 14.6 77.7 8.4 86.1 2.5 88.6 61.8 52.2 
Belgium 72.0 1.5 73.4 2.3 75.8 8.8 84.6 4.1 88.7 1.8 90.6 3.3 93.8 1.5 95.3 1.0 96.3 85.6 24.4 
Canada 57.7 2.9 60.5 6.6 67.1 0.5 67.6 -0.3 67.3 7.0 74.3 4.2 78.6 -3.7 74.8 -2.1 72.7 69.0 15.1 
Denmark 46.8 1.6 48.4 9.3 57.7 5.2 62.8 7.4 70.2 7.2 77.4 5.1 82.5 3.2 85.7 1.2 86.9 68.7 40.1 
Finland 30.0 1.3 31.3 7.4 38.8 6.4 45.2 10.5 55.7 11.7 67.4 10.3 77.7 4.9 82.6 -0.6 82.0 56.7 52.1 
France 24.5 1.2 25.7 7.5 33.2 5.7 38.9 4.1 43.0 1.3 44.3 6.6 51.0 7.5 58.5 1.3 59.7 42.1 35.3 
Germany 23.7 1.0 24.7 3.5 28.2 4.1 32.3 4.8 37.1 3.2 40.3 14.1 54.4 7.4 61.8 1.0 62.8 40.6 39.1 
Ireland 78.0 4.1 82.1 7.9 90.0 2.3 92.3 0.6 92.8 1.7 94.6 3.0 97.5 -0.2 97.3 1.1 98.4 91.5 20.4 
Italy 26.2 1.3 27.5 1.7 29.2 3.9 33.1 9.6 42.7 14.4 57.0 7.3 64.3 2.1 66.4 1.3 67.7 46.0 41.6 
Japan 13.3 0.5 13.8 2.5 16.3 1.6 17.9 8.9 26.8 -2.7 24.1 -3.1 21.0 3.9 24.9 3.5 28.3 20.7 15.0 
Netherlands 66.3 1.8 68.1 7.5 75.6 6.2 81.8 3.2 85.0 1.5 86.4 5.8 92.2 2.1 94.3 0.4 94.8 82.7 28.5 
New Zealand 28.1 3.7 31.8 2.7 34.5 10.0 44.4 13.2 57.6 15.3 72.9 4.3 77.2 0.0 77.2 -2.0 75.3 55.4 47.2 
Norway 50.3 2.3 52.7 7.4 60.1 0.4 60.5 4.0 64.4 2.3 66.7 5.8 72.6 6.8 79.4 1.7 81.1 65.3 30.8 
Portugal 36.8 0.5 37.3 9.9 47.2 7.2 54.4 -7.0 47.4 10.0 57.4 15.4 72.8 5.8 78.6 3.7 82.3 57.1 45.5 
Spain 18.2 0.6 18.8 4.2 23.0 8.2 31.2 10.9 42.1 13.4 55.5 12.3 67.9 5.8 73.7 2.3 76.0 45.1 57.8 
Sweden 25.2 3.3 28.5 8.5 36.9 13.1 50.1 10.4 60.5 15.1 75.5 7.8 83.3 3.2 86.5 2.4 88.9 59.5 63.7 
Switzerland 52.8 0.0 52.8 0.6 53.4 20.0 73.5 3.9 77.4 1.4 78.8 8.5 87.3 3.2 90.5 1.3 91.8 73.1 39.0 
United Kingdom 38.7 11.1 49.8 4.8 54.6 3.2 57.8 0.4 58.2 1.9 60.1 3.0 63.0 1.7 64.7 1.2 65.9 57.0 27.2 
United States 20.2 1.6 21.9 3.3 25.2 3.5 28.7 5.1 33.8 3.1 36.9 4.0 40.9 3.8 44.8 -0.2 44.5 33.0 24.3 
Ø 39.4 2.2 41.6 5.4 47.0 6.0 53.0 5.7 58.7 5.7 64.4 6.7 71.1 3.6 74.7 1.1 75.8 58.4 36.4 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex I. 
  
Knirsch: Institutions, Shocks and Unemployment in the OECD 
105 
 
Table 33: KOF trade restrictions 
country Ø1970 ∆ Ø1975 ∆ Ø1980 ∆ Ø1985 ∆ Ø1990 ∆ Ø1995 ∆ Ø2000 ∆ Ø2005 ∆ Ø2010 Ø ∆ total 
Australia 50.7 0.5 51.2 3.1 54.3 7.6 61.9 5.1 67.0 7.2 74.1 4.5 78.6 0.5 79.1 -1.6 77.5 66.1 26.7 
Austria 61.3 0.3 61.6 3.1 64.7 3.8 68.5 8.9 77.4 9.7 87.1 6.6 93.7 -5.2 88.5 -6.2 82.3 76.1 20.9 
Belgium 86.7 0.2 86.9 0.7 87.6 1.3 89.0 0.6 89.6 1.6 91.2 3.8 95.0 -4.9 90.1 -3.0 87.1 89.2 0.4 
Canada 68.2 0.3 68.6 2.1 70.6 1.0 71.6 1.6 73.2 1.8 74.9 7.8 82.7 -2.3 80.4 -0.4 80.0 74.5 11.8 
Denmark 82.1 0.1 82.1 0.4 82.5 1.3 83.8 1.7 85.5 6.7 92.1 4.4 96.6 -4.5 92.1 -5.8 86.3 87.0 4.2 
Finland 65.3 0.4 65.8 3.5 69.2 3.8 73.0 2.4 75.4 13.3 88.7 7.8 96.4 -6.1 90.3 -3.5 86.9 79.0 21.5 
France 65.7 0.3 66.0 2.5 68.5 3.1 71.7 7.3 79.0 5.2 84.2 5.9 90.2 -1.3 88.9 -4.5 84.4 77.6 18.7 
Germany 84.9 0.2 85.0 1.2 86.2 2.7 88.9 0.7 89.6 1.9 91.5 4.1 95.6 -5.5 90.0 -8.0 82.0 88.2 -2.9 
Ireland 78.4 0.2 78.6 0.7 79.3 1.3 80.7 1.6 82.2 6.9 89.1 4.6 93.7 -3.3 90.5 -2.8 87.7 84.5 9.2 
Italy 73.6 0.3 73.9 2.5 76.4 1.5 78.0 1.5 79.5 6.2 85.7 5.9 91.6 -5.0 86.6 -4.3 82.4 80.9 8.7 
Japan 31.8 0.3 32.0 4.9 37.0 13.4 50.4 7.0 57.4 3.0 60.4 11.2 71.7 3.8 75.5 -8.6 66.9 53.7 35.2 
Netherlands 75.8 5.9 81.7 5.3 87.0 1.8 88.8 1.1 89.9 3.0 92.9 3.9 96.8 -4.4 92.3 -3.2 89.1 88.2 13.3 
New Zealand 63.1 0.6 63.7 2.9 66.6 0.3 66.9 6.5 73.4 7.1 80.5 6.9 87.4 0.3 87.7 0.0 87.7 75.2 24.5 
Norway 68.1 3.1 71.1 4.7 75.8 7.5 83.3 4.9 88.3 1.6 89.9 -2.2 87.7 -13.9 73.8 -4.8 69.0 78.6 0.9 
Portugal 71.2 0.0 71.2 0.0 71.2 1.6 72.8 7.1 79.9 6.7 86.6 4.0 90.6 -3.0 87.7 -3.5 84.2 79.5 13.0 
Spain 67.6 1.8 69.3 6.7 76.0 2.9 78.9 4.8 83.7 3.2 86.9 5.0 91.9 -6.0 85.9 -5.2 80.7 80.1 13.2 
Sweden 72.3 2.9 75.1 3.0 78.1 11.7 89.8 5.7 95.5 -1.9 93.5 0.7 94.2 -3.1 91.1 -2.8 88.4 86.4 16.1 
Switzerland 65.4 3.2 68.6 13.5 82.1 1.5 83.6 0.2 83.8 2.2 86.0 3.5 89.5 -15.4 74.1 -10.5 63.6 77.4 -1.8 
United Kingdom 70.9 3.1 74.0 12.2 86.2 2.3 88.5 0.6 89.1 2.0 91.1 5.1 96.1 -4.0 92.1 -3.2 88.9 86.3 18.0 
United States 77.9 0.5 78.4 3.4 81.8 1.6 83.4 0.7 84.1 1.4 85.5 1.9 87.4 -3.7 83.7 -5.5 78.2 82.2 0.4 
Ø 69.0 1.2 70.3 3.8 74.1 3.6 77.7 3.5 81.2 4.4 85.6 4.8 90.4 -4.3 86.0 -4.4 81.7 79.5 12.6 
Notes: Values are expressed in 5-year averages. For a detailed description see Annex 
